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ABSTRACT 
Gentrification is a shift in an urban community toward wealthier residents or 
businesses and increasing property values, at the expense of displacement of the poorer 
residents of the community. This is one of the most widely used concepts in urban 
planning and development, and has been practically evident in many cities around the 
world for the past several decades. However, poorer residents who are unable to pay 
increased rents in a gentrified community may be driven out. A more serious problem 
than displacement is the removal of affordable housing from the community’s building 
stock. 
In this sense, the Community Land Trust (CLT) can be a good way to address 
negative effects of gentrification. CLTs arose from the concept that land is not a private 
good but a public asset. The fundamental principle of CLTs is that a community owns 
and leases lands through a long-term ground lease to individual residents who own their 
homes located on the land. CLTs are used in the U.S. mainly to provide long-term 
owner-occupied housing for low income households, and are rapidly disseminated in the 
U.S. This research aims to assess the impacts of CLTs on gentrification to practically 
answer the question; “Do CLTs really counteract the negative effects on community 
caused by gentrification?” 
A mixed method research, which uses both quantitative and qualitative methods, 
is a fundamental structure to get a more holistic view about the research question. The 
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relationship between CLTs and gentrification is examined through a cross-sectional 
comparison and a logistic regression in the quantitative approach; how the findings of 
the quantitative approach are fit for the practical situation is reviewed by the qualitative 
approach. Findings show that CLTs have a negative relationship with gentrification and 
suggest that CLTs can address the problems caused by gentrification. 
The results of this study offer policy guidelines to the city governments having a 
plan to introduce CLTs in their jurisdiction, and help community leaders and/or residents 
know how to improve and stabilize their neighborhoods. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
Gentrification is one of the most widely discussed issues in urban planning and 
development, and has been a practically evident global phenomenon for several decades. 
Although there has been significant debate about the definition and characteristics of 
gentrification, most scholars agree that gentrification is the reinvestment of capital 
toward an urban center, one seemingly positive result of which is the rehabilitation of 
neighborhoods from deterioration (Smith, 1979; Smith & LeFaivre, 1984; Smith & 
Williams, 1986; Glass, 1964). Some scholars, for example, regard gentrification as a 
positive process such as a renovation, ‘upgrading’ of dwellings (Rose, 1984), and a 
reversal in major trends toward decline and disinvestments in inner-city neighborhoods 
(Freeman, 2005). However, more scholars argue that gentrification has more dark sides 
than bright sides. They define gentrification as the displacement of the working-class by 
the upper-middle class (Glass, 1964; Nelson, 1988a; Hartman, 1979; Sumka, 1979; 
Smith, 1979; Smith & LeFaivre, 1984; Smith & Williams, 1986; Rose, 1984; Freeman, 
2005; Atkinson, 2000). Because of an increase in housing costs and a displacement of 
existing populations, some residents of gentrifying neighborhoods resist gentrification. A 
more serious problem than displacement for them is the removal of affordable housing 
from the city’s building stock. The great decrease of affordable units can cause a 
diminishing of housing opportunities for low-income households in gentrified 
neighborhoods. 
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Solutions aimed at reducing the less desirable effects of gentrification have 
focused primarily on the combined efforts of interested parties such as governments, 
communities, and residents. Local governments, for example, can use housing policy 
such as rent regulation and measures to stop speculation in urban centers (Wily & 
Hammel, 2010). Local governments with nonprofit organizations can provide additional 
affordable housing units into gentrifying areas, and create new job opportunities with 
business sector like the Chamber of Commerce for incumbent residents. For instance, 
individual development accounts (IDAs) and programs are used as a way of asset 
building to increase homeownership of existing population, and Section 8 housing units 
can retain affordability in urban central area. Community Development Corporations 
(CDCs) and city government together can provide more affordable housing units (Levy, 
Comey & Padilla, 2006). However, providing one-time affordable housing units and just 
dividing land from speculative market are not enough (Davis, 2010). Thus, shared equity 
homeownership model such as limited equity housing cooperatives (LEHCs), 
community land trusts (CLTs), and mutual housing associations (MHAs), which mainly 
use deed restriction and/or ground lease, is necessary (Lees, 2008). 
The CLT, a relatively new housing model in the U.S., is one of the methods to 
address negative effects of gentrification. The CLT model is used in the U.S. mainly to 
provide long-term owner-occupied housing for low-income households. Since the first 
CLT, New Communities, Inc. was founded in 1969, CLTs have consistently spread out 
across the U.S. Today, there are over 240 CLTs in 45 states and the District of Columbia, 
and other countries have begun to adopt not only the model, but also the concept (Davis, 
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2010). While most CLTs are non-profit organizations, increasingly, state and city 
governments have started CLTs as part of their broader housing programs. 
CLTs arose from the concept that land is not a private good but a public asset. 
Based on this concept, the fundamental principle of CLTs is that a community owns and 
leases land to individual residents who buy an improved structure on the land from CLTs. 
Typically CLTs acquire land through donation or purchase and lease it through a long-
term ground lease to the residents who own their homes located on that land. Moreover, 
CLTs impose restrictions on resale prices of their units to preserve affordability, and 
serve as the long-term steward of the land and any improvement on their land (Davis, 
2007; Curtin & Bocarsly, 2008; Davis & Jacobus, 2008; Gray, 2008; Davis, 2010). 
1.2 Significance of this Study 
Although gentrification is a popular concept and a widespread process, empirical 
research about the relationship between gentrification and housing programs is rare or, if 
anything, has focused on a certain aspect of gentrification. Many scholars focus on 
whether gentrification and displacement exist, or on discussion of theoretical issues. The 
rest of studies are limited to a few practical examples of gentrification in typical 
American metropolitan cities such as New York and Boston. However, there is no study 
focused on the relationship between CLTs and gentrification, and there are also few 
quantitative studies about CLTs or its impacts so far. Therefore, this research seeks to 
address this lacking evaluation of CLTs’ effects on gentrification. 
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Although there are a variety of documents that show the benefits of CLTs, few 
researchers have examined the practical impacts of CLTs on their communities. In 
addition, even fewer studies focus on the relationship between a specific situation and 
CLTs. However, in a contemporary post-industrial society, both CLTs and gentrification 
are co-existing, and those two would be overlapped in many cases. The housing units 
provided by CLTs in gentrified neighborhoods might affect neighborhoods in some way 
or other. To investigate the relationship between recently rising CLTs and extensively 
preexisting gentrified neighborhoods is also beneficial to evaluate the effectiveness of 
CLTs. This study is one of the first empirical studies about the relationship between 
CLTs and gentrification. In addition, the results of this study might be a significant 
cornerstone for evaluating the CLT model. 
1.3 Research Question and Objectives 
Generally speaking, the CLT model is an effective tool for providing affordable 
housing, stabilizing neighborhoods, and building community assets (Davis, 2010). These 
three benefits of CLTs and the negative effects of gentrification are apparently related to 
each other, thus CLTs could be an effective model to address the problems of 
gentrification. In other words, CLTs could counteract gentrification in three ways: 1) 
counteract the displacement, 2) facilitate the increase of affordability, and 3) stabilize the 
speculative increase of property values in gentrified neighborhoods. 
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Then, do CLTs really counteract the negative effects of on neighborhoods caused 
by gentrification? Starting from this question, this study aims to assess the impacts of 
CLTs on gentrification in practice. 
1.4 Mixed Approach 
Although a few researchers and practitioners have studied on CLTs with working 
hypotheses based on literature and experience, those hypotheses were not directly related 
to the CLTs’ impacts on neighborhoods. Moreover, there are few quantitative studies 
about CLTs so far, thus this study seeks to address lacking quantitative evaluation of 
CLTs’ effects on their neighborhoods. 
For the quantitative approach, a comparative cross-sectional study based on the 
comparison of two group means is employed with the support of the binomial logistic 
regression analysis. However, although several scholars try to define the CLT model 
neatly using some features, the diversity of CLTs’ structure and operating system makes 
it difficult to evaluate each CLT under a specific set of criteria. At this point, the 
findings from the quantitative approach should be complemented by a qualitative 
approach, which allows us to get more practical and holistic information. 
Since the histories of CLTs are relatively short and the number of units provided 
by CLTs is still small, it is premature to make a judgment about the effectiveness of CLT 
itself. The most important role of CLTs, to provide long-term affordable housing to 
residents, cannot be assessed within such a short period, so the problem of CLTs’ short 
history establishes the need to consider a mixed approach. In addition, comparative 
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study would be one of the effective ways to examine the impacts of CLTs on 
neighborhoods. The evidences from this research using the mixed method could reveal 
the actual impacts of CLTs on gentrification from the holistic viewpoint. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, theory and practice about both gentrification and CLTs will be 
described, and the evidence for selecting indices for investigation will be provided 
through those descriptions. 
 
2.1 Gentrification   
2.1.1 Origin of gentrification 
The term ‘gentrification’, first identified by British sociologist Ruth Glass in the 
“East End of London” (1964), originated in the 1960s in Britain. She introduced the term 
to describe the invasion of new middle class, urban rehabilitation of built environment, 
and the subsequent displacement of the working class in London Islington. However, the 
glaring phenomenon of gentrification began in postwar modern capitalist cities such as 
Boston, London, Washington D.C., and New York City in the 1950s (Lees et al., 2008). 
At that time, urban decline or decay were irreversible and inevitable trends despite 
federal and local programs to revitalize existing urban areas (Nelson, 1988a). 
Deterioration and distress in urban neighborhoods created “slums” and “blighted areas” 
in urban cores, thus many of the middle- and upper-income households moved out to 
suburban communities. This urban process is called suburbanization (Jackson, 1985). 
Urban decline and neighborhood deterioration in the American cities after the Second 
World War caused suburbanization, and spreading suburbanization facilitated the advent 
of gentrification. The initial sign of revitalization appeared in the 1950s, intensified in 
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the 1960s, and gentrification became a widespread phenomenon in the 1970s in many 
older cities of America (Smith, 1979). 
 
2.1.2 Classical gentrification 
The early stage models of gentrification were predominantly developed in the 
1970s and 1980s, and gentrification was widely understood as a housing filtering process 
(Clay, 1979; Smith, 1979; Lees et al., 2008: 30-34; Naegler, 2012: 30). After the 
previous residents of convenient inner-city locations moved out toward suburban areas 
in which have high quality houses and amenities because their buildings decayed, lower 
income people came into the inner-city neighborhoods instead. When focusing on 
geographic change, this process was named suburbanization, but was also considered 
filtering down in the housing market. This classical explanation of gentrification 
described the causes and process of suburbanization and gentrification as shown below: 
In the early 20
th
 century, the American suburbs were vacant or slums in most 
places, but revolutions in modern transportation gave people open access to suburbs. The 
development of train and car raised the amount of available land for development away 
from the city center (Jackson, 1985). A principle from the heart of the economic theory 
states that, as the distance from the city center increases, the marginal cost of 
transportation slowly rises and the land price quickly falls. As a result, the middle- and 
upper-class households moved out to suburbs because of more affordable housing costs 
and less expensive marginal commute costs. Because land was less expensive in suburbs 
than in cities, they preferred suburbs with lower population densities and lower 
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transportation costs. In particular, inexpensive and suitable land for building and high 
wages of the upper middle class stimulated rapid suburbanization. Therefore, many 
quality single family homes were constructed in suburbs, and only the middle and upper 
class could attain suburban houses. The construction of new houses in the suburbs and 
the development of urban transportation encouraged lots of American families to move 
away from the cities to new residences on the periphery with new services of schools, 
sewers, utilities, police, and fire departments. 
The construction of new houses in the suburbs was a major cause of the decline 
of the inner-city areas. The upper and middle income families looked for good schools, 
private space, and personal safety for their family, and the improvement of 
transportation was so favorable as to make the suburbs accessible to them. Therefore, the 
housing market of the inner-city was deprived of purchasing power and new investment. 
Abandonment resulted from drastically insufficient demand and precipitous decline in 
property values. Those inner-city areas, vacated by upper- and middle-income 
households, were populated to a lesser degree by Blacks and often physically 
deteriorated with older housing stock. Most old houses became excluded from services 
such as electricity, water and/or sewage, and this deterioration led to a vicious cycle of 
dilapidation.  
Federal public housing policy was another major cause of the deterioration of the 
inner-city in some ways. First, lots of suburbs in the U.S. did not have public housing 
agencies and did not apply for federal funding for public housing. As a result, low-
income housing units did not increase in suburban areas, which have cheaper and more 
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open land, but increased in the city centers. Second, housing authorities were generally 
composed of wealthier people, and they did not want a reduction in real estate values. 
Thus, their policy tended to concentrate public housing in the inner-city rather than in 
the suburban areas. Third, only neighborhoods with a number of deteriorated units could 
get assistance for public housing, so suburbs did not have many opportunities to receive 
such help. Therefore, after the Second World War, the polarization of large American 
metropolitan areas became so obvious that downtown areas were identified with poverty 
and danger rather than with attraction and preference (Jackson, 1985).  
The inner-city areas to be gentrified were deteriorated and occupied by lower 
income, often elderly, households. These residential areas were located close to the 
central business district, and often had dilapidated outer appearance. Numerous houses 
were abandoned, and shabbily built environment was a common feature of those areas 
(Beauregard, 1986: 37-38). Moreover, there were dark sides of urbanization such as the 
slums, the crime, and the anomie in the inner-city areas as well. The ghettoes, which are 
featured as residential segregation, underemployment, substandard housing, disrupted 
family life, inferior education, and disease, came out in some inner-city areas. The crime 
such as violence from poor school and decline in marriage also spread out with other 
negative social effects, and those who were able to leave moved to a better neighborhood 
on suburbs. McDonald (2007: 222-223) argues that a downhill of a central city involves 
in the negative social and economic features, and they reinforce each other. The 
downhill of a part of a central city is caused mainly by a variety of external factors like 
deindustrialization since 1950s and/or constructing a highway. This situation led again to 
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suburbanization of both jobs and people with decent income, rising incomes for the 
middle class that hastened a move to the suburbs. 
As a whole, since 1950, many suburban areas absorbed the migrants from the 
inner-city areas, and their population increased rapidly. The loss in inner-city population 
caused a decrease in jobs, consumer demand, and a viable tax base to the city 
governments. Moreover, decline in inner-city area were closely related to a fall in the 
price of structures and caused to a loss of white middle-class who can be a source of 
consumer demand, commercial growth, neighborhood stability, and the tax base (Clay, 
1979). In this condition, numerous poor black people remained there, and cheaper 
housing price attracted more poor people in inner-city area. More construction of 
expressway facilitated the process. The loss of middle class, mostly white households in 
inner-city area caused to decline again, and this vicious circle repeated in many major 
cities, which experienced a net loss in white population and net growth in poorer black 
population. 
When the suburbanization and urban center decline were widespread, most 
suburbanites were anti-urban or, at least, had a fear of cities (Lang, Hughes, & Danielsen, 
1997). However, the first group of new comers moved to inner-city because of a demand 
for cheaper living space and cultural diversity. As more young couples had two full-time 
wage jobs, they didn’t need to live near the job of household’s head anymore. They were 
free to choose locations for different reasons, including being near activity centers, 
seeking more recreational opportunities, or looking for a cheaper housing costs. 
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Therefore, they moved into previously distressed urban centers and renovated properties 
for their own use (Palen & London, 1984).  
These early gentrifiers who previously had left inner-city neighborhoods also 
moved back because of their desire for cultural diversity. According to Clay (1979: 13-
15, 19-20), many of them were design professionals or artists who had the skill, time, 
and ability to undertake extensive rehabilitation. In addition, younger people and/or 
whites dominated the gentrified neighborhoods. Most gentrifiers were wealthier than the 
working class who lived in inner-city neighborhoods, and wanted high quality living 
spaces. Since those financially better-off gentrifiers were willing and able to pay more, 
rent and land price inflation in their neighborhoods followed. Then, infrastructures and 
buildings once again fit for the needs of them, and this improved neighborhoods’ outer 
appearance and image attracted more wealthy people into urban centers. In addition, the 
development of urban entertainment and retail centers draw suburbanites back to the city 
as well. New groups with even more economic resources than the early gentrifiers came 
in, and the previous process was repeated. This cycle shows that gentrification is self-
enhancing because the different consumer demands of two plainly conceptualized 
groups make it and decide when the action will occur (Naegler 2012: 30-31). However, 
in the midst of this process, the displacement of the working class residents who had 
lived there began to occur. 
With regard to classical gentrification theory, gentrification came to be 
considered as a middle class invasion to the inner-city neighborhood where was in many 
cases formerly characterized by their leaving. Most gentrifiers were of a higher 
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educational and economic status, and they embraced cultural diversity. Gentrifiers’ 
invasion caused the displacement of the working class from the inner-city 
neighborhoods. However, the infrastructure and buildings in inner-city area were 
renovated, and thus the neighborhoods become attractive to other gentrifiers.  
In sum, the main characteristics of this classical gentrification include the 
inflation of rents and land prices, and the changes in streetscape, building appearance, 
the population composition, cultural and retail infrastructure, the transformation of 
rented apartments into owner-occupied dwellings, a changing public perception, as well 
as the increased privatization of public space (Naegler, 2012:31; Lees et al, 2008: 30-
34). 
 
2.1.3 Consumption-side theory 
In several decades of research on gentrification, two theories, consumption-side 
theory and production-side theory, have emerged as primary approaches to 
gentrification. Each theory has its own explanation about the cause and process of 
gentrification.  
From the perspective of consumption-side theory, gentrification is fundamentally 
a process of class transformation in urban space. Therefore, researchers on the side of 
consumption theory focus on the invasion and succession of a neighborhood already 
occupied by one social class, which is displaced by a higher class. At least, there has 
been wide agreement that class should be a basis for gentrification research (Hamnett, 
1991; Wyly & Hammel, 1991; Leeset al, 2008). Butler (2007) and Hamnett (2002) 
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related gentrification with the appearance of the new middle class who are formed by 
national and international economic change. Ley (1996) emphasized the role of the 
creative class who are mainly artists and regards them as “special members of the middle 
class”. Moreover, some scholars regarded gentrification as an invasion (moving in) of 
‘yuppies’ (Short, 1989: 174), in spite of some criticisms about a link between yuppies 
and gentrification (Smith, 1996: 104; Beauregard, 1990: 856-857), or ‘middle class 
gentrifiers’ (Naegler, 2012).  
Several scholars regarded gentrification as the social and spatial reflection of 
changing middle class consumer demands in terms of cultural values and residential 
preferences in the transition from an industrial to a postindustrial society (Hamnett, 
2003a: 2402; Lees et al., 2008: 89-90; Naegler, 2012: 31-32; Krase, 2012). In particular, 
Ley (1996) regarded post-industrialization as a driving force behind the gentrification 
process, and Hamnett (1991) focused on professionalization. They pointed out industrial 
and occupational structure change in contemporary post-industrial cities (Lees et al., 
2008; Naegler, 2012), which means the decrease of employment in manufacturing 
industry and the increase in the service based industry. This change was related to the 
mass transition from manual working class to white-collar professionals, managers and 
technical workers in the financial, business, cultural, and service industries. Other 
contributing factors included changes in life style, demographic and occupational class, 
and housing market structure in inner city areas (Hamnett, 2003a: 2402). Thus, this 
change of urban economy is associated with the character and location of work, 
occupational class structure, life styles and the structure of the housing market. 
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Therefore, in consumption side theory, gentrification is defined as a middle-class 
movement into the urban core causing poor residents to leave. As a result, the 
transformation of class composition in gentrified area causes changes in cultural 
orientation and preferences. This definition focuses more on the displacement of the 
working class by middle- and upper-income professional households (Beauregard, 1986; 
Ley, 1996; Redfern, 2003; Lee et al., 2008; Brown-Saracino, 2009). In other words, 
consumption-side theory focuses more on a gentrifying ‘agent’ than on gentrified 
houses. People, including “gentry” or “gentrifiers”, are allocated across the housing 
stock (Redfern, 2003). 
However, while much of the literature supported the production of new middle-
class gentrifiers and the cause of gentrification, some criticisms were raised (Lees et al., 
2008). The excessive emphasis on middle-class gentrifiers who are the beneficiary group 
in gentrified neighborhoods shifted attention away from the negative effects of 
gentrification. In the same way, excessive emphasis on the change to a post-industrial 
industry forced researchers to ignore current industrial land use and the remaining 
working class in gentrified neighborhoods (Curran, 2004). In addition, the consumption-
side theory cannot correctly account for the resistance to gentrification, which actually 
occurred in many major cities, because standardization of diverse gentrifiers in a few 
groups to a few groups oversimplified the complexity of gentrification. Therefore, this 
theory cannot identify who is the target of the resistance.  
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2.1.4 Production-side theory 
From the perspective of production-side theory, although one of the most widely 
used concepts, gentrification cannot be the only reason for the process of upper-status 
groups replacing lower-status groups in inner-city neighborhoods that had previously 
experienced decline. In contrast to consumption-side theory, which is more focused on 
cultural orientation and preferences, the process of gentrification is caused by the 
changing industrial structure from an industrial to a post-industrial economy in 
production-side theory.  
In this sense, gentrification is originated by economic factors rather than by 
social and cultural factors, which are generated by consumer choices and house filtering. 
In other words, although gentrification is caused by diverse and complex factors, the 
capital based on capitalist property markets plays the most crucial role in gentrification 
process (Smith, 1996:51-53; Lees et al., 2008: 73; Naegler, 2012: 34). Thus, Smith 
(1979) defines gentrification as a back-to-the city movement of capital rather than 
people, and introduced the economic perspective to gentrification research fields. The 
move-in of young, wealthy, professional, upper- and middle-class groups into the urban 
core increased new investments in distressed urban areas, and thus old neighborhoods 
were replaced by new houses and roads. That is, gentrification is a visible urban process 
because the built environment and structures obviously change into new urban properties 
in the process. 
One of the most influential explanations in production-side theory is Neil Smith’s 
rent gap theory (Lees et al., 2008). Smith (1979: 545) pointed out ‘rent gap’, the 
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disparity between an actual rent – or a capitalized ground rent - and a potential ground 
rent level, as a major cause of gentrification. The potential ground rent is the maximum 
rent from the assumption of optimal, highest and best land use, and thus, almost always 
increases steadily over time in normal conditions of real estate markets. In addition, the 
potential rent reflects the most profitable condition of using land and its surrounding 
structures (Lees et al., 2008: 53; Naegler, 2012: 35). On the other hand, the capitalized 
ground rent is the actual rent for present land use, becoming smaller as time goes on due 
to increasing costs of repair and maintenance. That is, the value of structures is 
decreased with aging and deterioration (Lees et al., 2008: 53). Therefore, the rent gap is 
highly important in terms of the profitability of reinvestment in inner-city structures 
(Smith, 1996: 62-65; Naegler, 2012: 35). 
Private agents want to gain the maximum profit from their investment in modern 
capitalist market. Similarly, in the real estate market, profit-oriented landowners, 
developers and investors try to capitalize the potential ground rent as far as possible in 
order to maximize their profit. Although technology development or changes of 
consumer preference could slow down the devaluation of structures on the land, it is 
almost impossible to fully capitalize the potential ground rent because a physical decay 
of buildings is always ongoing. As a result, the gap between the potential ground rent 
and the capitalized ground rent will become larger, and thus, the disinvestment in the 
building is the most likely outcome (Smith, 1979). The results of that disinvestment 
could be under-maintenance, decay and abandonment of structures in many inner-city 
neighborhoods. In this condition, as a form of collective social action, capital flows to 
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where the profit is greatest, and thus, moves to suburbs because of continual depreciation 
of inner-city properties which leads to an extension of the rent gap.  
In American history, the depreciation of capital in inner-city neighborhoods 
along with suburbanization and withdrawal of capital produced the rent gap, and then, 
when the rent gap grew enough, capital flowed back into the inner-city neighborhoods. 
This cycle is the nature of gentrification and can be captured with the present land use. 
The key issue of rent gap theory is the structure of the land and property market and its 
financing (Hamnett, 2003a). 
When capital investment moves into the place that has an enough rent gap to get 
more profits, redevelopment in inner-city areas might be initiated in order to challenge 
the profit available elsewhere. This reinvestment leads to the rehabilitation of structures 
or improvements on the land, so the sale price will be increased and more profit can be 
available (Smith, 1996: 67-70). Where the rent gap is greatest and the largest profits to 
developers or investors are available, gentrification can be initiated in a given 
neighborhood by several different actors in the land and housing market (Smith, 1979). 
As gentrification proceeds in a given neighborhood, the rent gap will become smaller 
due to capitalization of the potential ground rent, and another cycle of depreciation and 
reinvestment will be initiated (Smith, 1996: 67-70). In addition, the ‘rent gap’ is not 
generated by individual consumers’ decisions, but by collective social action at the 
neighborhood level.  
However, the rent gap theory is also criticized due to the existence of many 
exceptional examples in the world. Furthermore, the theory focuses only on production 
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side, and ignores the role of reproduction and consumption in gentrification. The 
idealistic character of the theory is another criticism (Beauregard, 1986:39).  
As illustrated in the previous two sub-sections, two principal approaches for 
explaining gentrification found in a variety of literature were consumption-side and 
production-side approach. Compared to consumption-side theory, production-side theory 
is more economic rather than cultural. In sum, gentrification has a variety of aspects and 
it is hard to define it according to one perspective. 
 
2.1.5 Evolving perspectives for gentrification 
Based on two major approaches, which were described in the previous sub-
sections, a variety of explanations to define gentrification have been developed as time 
goes on. During the economic crisis of the early 1990s, some scholars insisted that a new 
‘post-gentrification era’ was emerging, which means the end of gentrification process 
around the world (Badcock, 1995; Lees & Bondi, 1995; Bourne, 1993).  However, after 
the global recession in the late 1990s ended, growing interests in the reappraisal of 
gentrification caused diverse derivatives (Lees, 2000). 
The resistance to gentrification is one of the derivatives. In this sense, 
gentrification does not only relate to the space change caused by economic reasons 
and/or demographic change, but also to a danger to identity, lifestyle, and status, 
inducing a resistance from incumbent residents (Redfern, 2003: 2361; Naegler, 2012: 
42). The resistances in many cities around the world eventually emerged out of 
gentrification’s inherent threat to identity of incumbent residents and exclusion. The 
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identity is the feeling of belonging to a place, and subjectively experienced belonging to 
a certain group, and gentrification always constitutes a struggle over identity, which is 
enacted both on physical and non-physical level (Redfern, 2003; Ley, 2003: 2533; 
Naegler, 2012: 41). According to Redfern (2003), the battle for identity seems to be 
eventually won by gentrifiers who have either higher economic or cultural resources. 
‘Rural gentrification’ is shown in several studies from the U.K. and the U.S. 
(Darling, 2005; Ghose, 2004). While gentrification is widely viewed as an urban 
phenomenon, similar dynamics also can be found in nonurban nature. According to 
Darling (2005), rural gentrification includes changes in class structure, housing stock 
composition, and capital accumulation in agriculture and rural industry. These 
characteristics are closely related to urban phenomenon except occurring in suburban or 
exurban areas. Smith & Philips (2001) paid attention to the demand of rural gentrifiers 
for green space, and termed the process ‘greentrification’. In addition, Smith & Graves 
(2005) studied gentrification in the mid-sized city, and asserted that gentrification is 
different by scale and context, and not only occurs in metropolitan cities but also occurs 
across national borders. However, such gentrifiers also had many similar characteristics 
and reasons to move into rural gentrified areas with urban gentrifiers. Therefore, rural 
gentrification provides strong grounds for this research that gentrification can occur 
anywhere regardless of urbanization of the area. 
‘New-build gentrification’ is suggested by some cases from Vancouver, Canada, 
and Newcastle and London in the U.K. (Lees et al., 2008). Although most scholars agree 
with new-build gentrification, how to see the new-build development on empty land is a 
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debatable issue in terms of identifying ‘new-build gentrification’. Many researchers 
consider new build development as gentrification because a new build development 
causes displacement, albeit indirect and/or sociocultural, in-movers are the urban new 
middle classes, and capital is reinvested in disinvested areas. However, a few oppose 
them because no incumbent resident means no displacement happening, no restoration of 
old houses by individuals exists, and ultimately, new build development is a different 
version of urban living (Davidson & Lees, 2005).  
‘Super-gentrification’ is another form of evolving concept explaining 
gentrification. This is a gentrification that occurs in neighborhoods that have already 
been gentrified, and ‘super’ means a higher level as well. A gentry in this gentrification 
is mainly composed of financial engineers who are globally connected, and a higher 
financial and economical investment come into neighborhoods (Lees et al., 2008). Thus, 
‘financification’ is another title of this gentrification, and such gentrification can be 
found in a few global metropolitan cities like London and New York (Lees, 2003). 
Contemporary gentrification is largely affected by neoliberalism and 
globalization. Because of the dominant influence of neoliberalism, which favors 
unimpeded trade and is characterized as deregulation, commercialization, privatization, 
public-private partnership, and the downsizing of governments’ role in social welfare 
and/or markets (Smith, 2002), the role of government has been transformed to attract 
new investments in their jurisdictions in the midst of harsh economic competition among 
cities or states. Many city governments see gentrification as a positive one and more 
focus on supporting capital market flow rather than addressing problems from 
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gentrification. In addition, globalization reveals the importance of ‘a geography of 
gentrification’, which means the process is different in different places, and this concept 
works on a number of different levels (Lees et al., 2008). The context, time, and space 
become critical factors to see gentrification correctly, and gentrifiers are seen to be the 
carriers of global capital flow. Contemporary gentrification is a global phenomenon, and 
a number of different geographical contexts in which gentrification has been occurring 
should be considered for a more exact understanding of it.  
The recent evolving perspectives for gentrification shows the trend of broad and 
more open definition of gentrification and the transformation toward a variety of views 
on how to see the processes and causes of gentrification. Moreover, today gentrification 
is not an exclusive possession of North America, Europe, or Oceania, but rather is much 
broader phenomenon around the world. Therefore, both more broad perspective and 
more specific investigation depending on location are needed to understand current 
gentrification better.  
 
2.1.6 Definition of gentrification 
The previous explanations of gentrification, which include classical, production-
side, and consumption-side approach, still have meaningful contributions to understand 
gentrification better (Lees et al., 2008: 192). The causes of gentrification led to a fierce 
debate between proponents of supply-side such as Neil Smith and those of demand-side 
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such as David Ley (Bailey & Robertson, 1997: 563)
1
. The proponents of supply-side 
explored gentrification as a result of capitalism, and focused on a process of flow of 
capital, which is mainly about developers, landlords, and investment from the 
perspective of class (Smith, 1979; Smith & LeFaivre, 1984). However, according to the 
proponents of demand-side, from 1970s to the early 1980s, numerous empirical 
assessments and case studies of gentrification focusing on changes in the built 
environment over time had failed to explain how gentrification occurs (Beauregard, 
1986: 37). They criticized supply-side theorists, and explained gentrification focusing on 
the forces that created the gentry and led to gentrification (Ley, 1996; Redfern, 2003). 
Clay (1979: 6) argued that gentrification is the resettlement of professional and upper 
middle class home owners in city neighborhoods, so revitalized population change is 
more important than physical change in gentrification.  
However, dominant debate for gentrification since the early 1990s was associated 
with the inquiry into a synthesis between consumption and production-side explanation 
(Lees, 2000; Hamnett, 1991; Ley, 1996). These two sides of explanations have to be 
seen as complementary rather than conflicting because they tried to explain the same 
phenomenon in different ways. Whereas the production-side theory assists to understand 
how physical changes in gentrified areas occurred using the logic of ‘rent gap’, the 
consumption-side theory focuses on the gentrifiers and their cultural attributes. For 
instance, Wyly & Hammel (1999) observed the resurgence of gentrification after 
                                                 
1 Supply versus demand, economics versus culture and/or production versus consumption refer 
to the same meaning (Lees, 2000). 
 24 
 
economic recession, and considered both class turnover and capital reinvestment as main 
traits of gentrification. 
The perspectives for gentrifiers can be debatable as well. First gentrifiers did not 
need schools, and desired to live in the city close to their jobs and live an urban life 
style, supported local retail shops and services, therefore they contributed to local tax 
base. They were considered urban pioneers who take on the risk of deteriorated inner-
city space for themselves and regenerate it by their own assets and ability (Beuregard, 
1986: 36). They are typically nontraditional households that are couples with later 
marriages, fewer children per family, gay couples, childless marriages, non-married 
couples, and singles (Lang et al., 1997). They are urban and professional managerial 
group, but several scholars did not like them with saying that gentrification cater to new 
middle class (Lees, 2000; Smith, 1996; Carpenter & Lees, 1995). Although diverse 
arguments for gentrifiers have been existed, one prominent identifier of gentrification is 
a rise of gentrifiers who have more educational attainment and income (Redfern 2003). 
Gentrification is basically identified as ‘fit for purpose’ in defining, describing, 
and understanding the changing associations between people and places in a series of 
situations across the world (Butler, 2007). Whereas neighborhood revitalization is a 
similar concept, it has to be identified by comparing gentrification to make the concept 
of gentrification clear. Neighborhood revitalization involves social mobility without 
spatial mobility (Palen & London, 1984) and the two distinct processes of “incumbent 
upgrading” and “gentrification” (Clay, 1979). Furthermore, many scholars have defined 
gentrification with variation as they needed. Smith (1979) argued that gentrification is a 
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back to the city movement, and one of capital rather than people from the perspective of 
production-side theory. Davidson (2011) framed gentrification as a class-based process 
which includes macro social change for individuals and social groups, identity and 
community (re)construction, and class conflict and displacement. Nevarez (2012) said 
that gentrification is an improvement of derelict and abandoned areas including housing 
stocks and public spaces, and mainly happens in the inner city.  
There have been many disagreements about the concept of gentrification. 
Beauregard (1986) considered the gentrification as a chaotic and complex phenomenon, 
and said that there was no single theory of a variant gentrification process. Rose (1984) 
and Davidson (2011) also thought that gentrification is ‘fuzzy’ and ‘chaotic’, and it can 
have a complex use. Moreover, Davidson (2011) insisted that there is an ontological 
disagreement over what gentrification is. Freeman (2005) considered gentrification as a 
positive one. He insisted that gentrification induces poverty deconcentration, lower 
turnover rates, and greater residential satisfaction and hence less motivation to move; in 
addition, there is no evidence of causal relationship between gentrification and 
displacement. 
Although there are a variety of debates and definitions, there are common themes 
as well. Several scholars thought of the characteristics of gentrification as a converting 
of a working class area into middle-class neighborhoods (Smith, 1979; Smith & 
Williams, 1986) and the replacement of lower income residents of a neighborhood with 
inhabitants of a higher income and socioeconomic standing (Rose, 1984). Others pointed 
out that it could be considered a rehabilitation of the housing stock of working-class 
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inner-city neighborhoods (Smith, 1979; Smith & LeFaivre, 1984; Smith & Williams, 
1986; Glass, 1964), and a renovation and ‘upgrading’ of dwellings (Rose, 1984). The 
common features in these different definitions are a reversal in major trends toward 
decline and disinvestments in inner-city neighborhoods (Freeman, 2005), a downward 
filtering of neighborhoods and housing stock (Nelson, 1988a), and displacement 
(Hartman, 1979; Sumka, 1979; Smith & LeFaivre, 1984; Atkinson, 2000). Furthermore, 
according to many scholars, it is not just a physical phenomenon or a spatial 
restructuring, but also a social, cultural, political, economic, and institutional one (Lees 
et al., 2008; Smith & LeFaivre, 1984; Smith & Williams, 1986; Bourne, 1993; Zukin, 
1987). In addition, it is an international phenomenon occurring simultaneously in many 
cities during a specific period of capitalism (Smith & LeFaivre, 1984), and this 
phenomenon was replicated among different global cities due to general economic and 
cultural patterns of globalization (Nevarez, 2012). 
All in all, the above debate on definition of gentrification shows the need for a 
broader and more open definition. Clark (2005) argued for a broader definition of 
gentrification than narrow, which render the concept genuinely chaotic, and suggested 
‘elastic yet targeted’ definition for gentrification. Because of its highly diverse dynamics 
around the world, it is better to more focusing on actual phases and impacts of 
gentrification with less definitional deliberation (Lees et al., 2008). 
The operational definition of gentrification in this study comes from common 
and fundamental characteristics that have been discussed actively up to date. The 
definition of gentrification in this research is as follows: Although one of the major 
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features of gentrification is a capital reinvestment toward an urban core, gentrification is 
a changing class of residents from working-class to upper-middle class in that area that 
could cause the displacement of the existing working-class. Obviously, gentrification has 
its own positive effects like improved landscape, but displacement of incumbent 
residents is a prominent drawback. Although it is very hard to define who are gentrifiers 
and where gentrification occurs because of different time, space and context of 
contemporary gentrification, even rough definitions for them are needed to frame 
gentrification for the study. Gentrifiers who move into the area are composed of diverse 
groups including those have professional jobs, artists, and mainly wealthier people than 
previous residents, and gentrification can be occurred at any place regardless of whether 
in urban area or not with a variety of distinct forms.  
 
2.1.7 Neighborhood effects of gentrification 
Lang (1982) suggested that many of the costs and benefits associated with 
gentrification can only be interpreted in relation to the viewpoints of the particular 
stakeholder involved. For example, rises in property values may be good for owners but 
bad for renters who are usually poorer households trying to purchase houses in the area. 
In addition, higher property value can cause too large burden of property tax to poorer 
home-owners in the area as well. Likewise, gentrification of one neighborhood can also 
have price-shadowing
2
 effects and/or other policy effects on surrounding neighborhoods. 
                                                 
2 increasing rents and prices in adjacent areas 
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Shaw (2000) found that gentrification in one area accelerated the decline of each 
adjacent poor area’s reputation. 
Atkinson (2004) attempted to identify the range of costs and benefits associated 
with the process through a systematic review of literature published in English on 
gentrification. Table 2-1 shows the findings of the identified research outputs 
summarized according to an analysis of the costs and benefits of gentrification. 
 
 
 
Table 2-1. Summary on neighborhood impacts of gentrification 
Positive Negative 
 Displacement through rent/price increases 
Stabilization of declining areas Community resentment and conflict 
 Secondary psychological costs of displacement 
Increased property values Loss of affordable housing 
 Unsustainable speculative property price increases 
 Increased cost and changes to local services 
Reduced vacancy rates Homelessness 
Increased local fiscal revenues 
Greater draw on local spending through lobbying by 
middle-class groups 
Encouragement and increased 
viability of further development 
Commercial/industrial displacement 
Reduction of suburban sprawl 
Displacement and housing demand pressures on 
surrounding poor areas 
Rehabilitation of property both 
with & without state sponsorship 
Under-occupancy and population loss to gentrified areas 
Increased social mix 
Loss of social diversity (from socially disparate to rich 
ghettos) 
 Source: Restructured from Atkinson (2004) 
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One of the common phenomena of gentrification is the moving-in of gentry 
accompanied by a public investment of funds and the moving-out of the working class 
from a traditional central city area (Brown-Saracino, 2009; Hamnett, 2003b). Gentry are 
typically young, professional and wealthy people, and they bring money into city center 
when they move in. Beside their own money, local governments try to improve 
infrastructure for development of the declined city center or from demand of newly 
moved gentry. Therefore, gentrification is supported by public investment preceding or 
following the moving-in of the gentry. Furthermore, from the viewpoint of the 
consumption-side theory, Freeman & Braconi (2004) simply defined gentrification as a 
dramatic shift in demographic composition toward better educated and more affluent 
residents. Most notably, gentrification breeds rising housing costs and infrastructure 
transformations inside cities geared toward gentry (Brown-Saracino, 2009; Powell & 
Spencer, 2002). 
The first major negative effect is the displacement of incumbent residents, which 
rendered a fierce debate among researchers. For some researchers like Freeman (2005), 
displacement does not exist or is not the problem from gentrification. Moreover, some 
researchers pointed out the difficulty in measuring displacement (Atkinson, 2000; 
Newman & Wyly, 2006). On the other hand, more researchers asserted that 
gentrification causes direct displacement, and moreover, gentrification is characterized 
as displacement and injustice (Smith, 1996). Even though there is not necessarily 
agreement on the severity and extent of displacement (Sumka, 1979), displacement is 
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undoubtedly existing in gentrified neighborhoods (Clay, 1979: 31-32; Slater, 2006; 
Angotti, 2012).  
Gentrification forces many longtime residents and businesses to be displaced 
because of skyrocketing land prices and rents. The newcomers are much wealthier and 
more powerful people, and monetary investments to improve physical environment are 
followed them. Thus, displacement causes several subsequent effects such as the 
destruction of the community and the loss of place or the precious spirit of the 
neighborhood (Betancur, 2002; Abu-Lughod, 1994). It also imposes dislocations and 
conflicts on communities, and the real tragedy of gentrification is not just displacement 
per se, but community disintegration caused by wiping out the collective memory of 
places (Smith, 1996; Rose, 1996; Betancur, 2011; Angotti, 2012). Other criticisms 
mention the disappearance of small businesses and changes in established neighborhood 
identities (Brown-Saracino, 2004). Critics think that those drawbacks make 
gentrification efforts a poor strategy for urban revitalization. Thus, Angotti (2012) said, 
“Gentrification is not place-making but place-taking.” 
The second major negative effect of gentrification is loss of affordable housing. 
Some researchers considered this negative effect as an important issue. Zukin (1987) 
argued that the general problem of gentrification is housing rather than displacement. 
Moreover, Betancur (2002; 2011) insisted that the most traumatic aspect is perhaps the 
disappearance of affordable housing units that is crucial for low-income, immigrant, and 
minority communities without any compensation. 
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Unsustainable speculative property price increase is the third primary negative 
effect of gentrification. Quite simply, in gentrified neighborhoods, rich people move in, 
and poor people move out, then rents go up (Lees et al., 2008). Rich people are more 
capable of institutional resistance in neighborhoods with speculative boom. Thus, 
actually in the process of gentrification, all neighborhoods are subject to potential threats 
from the rent increase process (Logan & Molotch, 1987). Even researchers who have 
positive attitudes toward gentrification point out the inflation of housing prices in 
gentrifying neighborhoods as a chief drawback of gentrification, while not admitting 
displacement and loss of affordable housing as problems (Freeman, 2005). 
 
2.1.8 Strategies for negative effects of gentrification 
In response to the negative effects of gentrification, some researchers suggested 
strategies to reduce such an effects. Even though three main drawbacks of gentrification 
are explored, strategies to reduce them are essentially intertwined together. In other 
words, in order to prevent displacement of incumbent residents, both providing 
affordable housing and building community assets are needed together. Thus, most 
following strategies are all about three main problems of gentrification. 
The first option to be able to use is finding solutions to deal with housing 
affordability. In this strategy, more affordable housing need to be produced and provided 
into gentrified neighborhoods. Whereas the roles of governments, nonprofit 
organizations, and community-based organizations are all necessary, the role of 
government is the most important from the perspective of policy makers. Governments 
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should motivate entities to build affordable housing using inclusionary zoning 
regulations. Retaining affordable housing is also an important strategy to mitigate 
displacement of residents. It includes assisting residents with home improvement and 
targeting policy on rental units (Levy et al., 2012). Other methods are to extend rent 
control, anti-speculation taxes, eviction controls, and an adequate financing of public 
housing to support low income housing (Bernt, 2012). The role of planners and policy 
makers are also emphasized, and increased public intervention to address displacement 
is needed (Freeman, 2005; Henig, 1980). However, different from generally expected, 
social mix is not only impossible way to use but also not a solution for gentrification 
(Bridge et al., 2012). 
The second option is building community assets. Community assets refer to not 
only physical assets like monetary resources and public infrastructure but also 
nonphysical assets like sense of belonging and quality of network among community 
residents (Green & Haines, 2002; Kretzmann & McKnight, 1993). It is important to 
increase individual’s assets in order to increase ability to address housing and other 
needs, thus individual development accounts (IDAs) and programs to increase 
homeownership are needed. Also local government involvement and leadership is 
critical to do the programs, and community involvement, for example, residents’ 
participation and democratic process of decision making, is important to build 
community assets as well (Levy et al., 2012). Providing more market-rate housing is 
another strategy for more housing options in neighborhoods, and maximizing public 
 33 
 
assets and education for residents are also needed to make community stronger 
(Kennedy & Loenard, 2001).  
Although local governments or communities have to develop a holistic approach 
including solutions for employment and earnings of their residents to addressing 
gentrification, Defilippis (2004) suggested several alternative strategies in housing 
market. Those are Limited-Equity Housing Co-operatives, Mutual Housing 
Associations, and CLTs. These are non-profit housing that the housing units have been 
excluded from market and are owned collectively. He argues that the housing units can 
be protected from disinvestment or depreciation because they are no longer market 
goods, thus it is possible to reduce displacement and loss of affordable housing caused 
from gentrification. Furthermore, in particular, CLTs can assist build community assets 
by its own character that facilitates residents’ participation in decision making process 
and increases home ownership. In sum, researchers suggested production and 
preservation of affordable housing, community asset building, and government 
intervention as main tools to reduce drawbacks of gentrification, and CLTs were 
recommended as one of the main strategies.  
 
2.2 Community Land Trusts 
2.2.1 Background of CLTs 
Affordable housing is a conventional and multifaceted issue. Housing policy in 
the U.S. has been mainly focused on the issue, and federal, state, and local governments 
have eagerly tried to address the problem over times. Since low-income housing is an 
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undeniably high level of necessity, enormous funds have been spent in the form of 
subsidies to provide and maintain affordable housing units so far. However, most cases 
have shown that those subsidies were not retained in neighborhoods for a long time.  
CLTs can provide a solution for a dearth of sustainable subsidy retention. The 
most common legal mechanism used by CLTs is the ground lease model with deed 
restriction approach. CLT homes that are either acquired with the land or built by the 
CLT organization require that the homeowner live in the home as their primary 
residence. In this mechanism, the land is owned by the community and leased for private 
use, and a leaseholder –a private user and owner occupied resident- owns the buildings 
on the land with resale restriction. Thus, a leaseholder takes the appreciation of building 
price albeit it is restricted, and this is a form of sharing their appreciation via resale price 
limits, while the appreciation of land price reverts to the community.  
This process enables subsidy retention or subsidy recapture in neighborhoods, 
and thus initial subsidy becomes permanently locked in neighborhoods. Furthermore, 
more CLTs have focused on the role as stewards rather than developers. Therefore, 
CLTs can provide houses that are affordable for generations to come with subsidy 
retention.  
Since the first CLT, New Communities, Inc. was established in 1969, the number 
of CLTs across the country grew modestly for two decades. During that period, a 
number of CLTs were established by private activists or organizations (Curtin & 
Bocarsly, 2008). From the 1980s, even though CLTs are dependent on the cycle of the 
real estate market, an increasing number of CLTs was initiated or supported by local and 
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state governments. First and foremost, numerous city and county governments become 
more interested in CLTs because municipalities are granting great subsidies to low-
income households in order to maintain housing affordability in their jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, more municipal officials want to make sure that affordable homes will not 
be lost as a result of inclusionary zoning, incentive zoning, and other similar programs.
3
  
CLTs had initially been successfully started only in rural settings. The first inner-
city CLT was the Community Land Cooperative of Cincinnati (CLCC), which was 
founded in 1980. This inner-city CLT was started to combat gentrification by removing 
land from a speculative market in a low-income, African-American neighborhood in 
Cincinnati (Curtin & Bocarsly, 2008; Davis, 2010). In addition, while 30 years ago, even 
20 years ago, almost all CLTs worked in a single neighborhood or in a single small 
town, today we have CLTs that span multiple neighborhoods, an entire city, or an entire 
county or metropolitan region.  
 
2.2.2 Definition of the CLT model 
A variety of sources including academic literature and internet documents 
provide the information about CLTs in the United States. Several academic documents 
give a general overview of a CLT model, but lots of those documents include the 
authors’ own definition of CLT model and insufficient discussion. In other words, there 
                                                 
3 National Study of Community Land Trusts (2007), which has analyzed the results of a survey carried out 
in 2006 of 186 CLTs known to exist at that time, shows that the support of local governments and 
municipalities plays a growing role in the formation of CLTs recently. 
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is an analysis of CLTs’ concepts in some of the academic literature about housing, but 
nowhere in peer-reviewed articles is there synthesis of the CLT literature (Gray, 2008).  
Defining the CLT model is important because its impact can change depending 
on the definitions or the purposes of CLT model. Despite the various definitions of CLT 
model across the U.S., they can’t compare to the amount of discussion about 
gentrification among scholars. Thus, it is difficult to define CLTs across the U.S. in a 
few words. 
However, in 1992 Congress developed a definition that has five provisions 
including regulation of the organization’s membership and board of directors.4 This 
definition describes CLT as a non-profit organization established to acquire land, to 
transfer ownership of homes to the lessees, and to retain the price of affordable homes. 
Thus, typically a CLT is a non-profit, tax-exempt 501(c)(3) corporation that is created to 
preserve land for the benefit of the community and low-income households (Curtin & 
Bocarsly, 2008). However, some CLTs are programs of local governments or other 
nonprofit organizations, and recently, more CLTs have been established in relation to 
municipal support (Curtin & Bocarsly, 2008; Davis & Jacobus, 2008).  
The basic approach of every CLT model is as follows: leasing the land, selling 
the structural improvements, regulating their occupancy and use, and capping the price 
for which this owner-occupied housing may be resold. In other words, the CLT owns the 
land, while individuals or families usually own the buildings, which are usually homes. 
                                                 
4 U.S. Congress created an official definition of a CLT on October 5, 1992. See Appendix 1. 
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The CLT leases the land to the homeowner, usually renewable for 99 years, allowing 
members and their descendants to live there as long as they wish (Davis, 2010). 
The main purpose of CLTs is to provide long-term affordability to people. In 
addition, CLTs have many common aspects with other strategies for providing 
affordable housing. A major role of the CLT model is related to the housing function, 
and CLTs are mainly serving moderate and low-income families. These two features 
make the CLT model attractive to many local governments as a good strategy for 
providing affordable housing in their neighborhoods. In addition, the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis in the U.S. that surfaced as a much bigger global financial and economic 
crisis in 2008 also highlights the importance of having measures of long-term housing 
affordability (Abeysinghe & Gu, 2011). Therefore, many researchers think at least that 
the most critical function of CLT is to preserve housing affordability (Curtin, 2008; 
Angotti, 2007; Gray, 2008; Towey, 2009; Paterson & Dunn, 2009; Hubbard, 2009). 
However, there are a number of diverse CLTs across the country. This diversity 
of CLTs’ structure and operating system makes it difficult to describe each CLT under a 
specific set of criteria. It was reported at the 2006 National CLT Network meeting that 
only 70% of CLTs met the federal definition
5
 of a CLT. For instance, while some CLTs 
are programs within other nonprofit organizations, others are supported by local 
governments. In this situation, Davis (2007) suggests ten key features of the classic CLT 
model as follows: 
                                                 
5 See Appendix 1. Federal Definition of a Community Land Trusts (1992) 
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Considering the above discussion and the common features in the basic CLT 
model, the operational definition of the CLT model for this study is as follows: They are 
not sponsored by a for-profit organization and are dual owned. The CLT owns the land, 
while individuals or families usually own the buildings or rarely pay rents for the 
buildings, which are usually homes. The CLT leases the land to the homeowner, usually 
renewable for 99 years, allowing members and their descendants to live there as long as 
they wish. The CLT land lease contains a resale restriction by a specific formula for 
perpetual affordability. They have open and place-based membership, and their board of 
directors includes residents of CLT units, other community residents, and public 
representatives for community control by governance. 
1. Nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation. 
2. Dual ownership. 
3. Leased land. 
4. Perpetual affordability. 
5. Perpetual responsibility. 
- CLT has responsibility for managing and repairing their structures. 
6. Open, place-based membership. 
7. Community control. 
8. Tripartite governance. 
- The board of directors of CLT has three parts, each with an equal number of 
seats. One-third represents CLT residents,; one-third represents the residents 
of the surrounding community who do not lease CLT land; and one-third is 
made up of public officials, local funders, nonprofit providers of housing or 
social services, and other individuals presumed to speak for the public 
interest. 
9. Expansionist program. 
10.  Flexible development. 
- Many CLTs do development with their own staff, while others delegate this 
responsibility to partners. Some focus on a single type and tenure of housing, 
while others develop housing of many types and tenures. Other CLTs focus 
more broadly on comprehensive community development. 
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2.2.3 Main benefits of CLTs 
The primary purpose of CLT model is to provide affordable housing to middle- 
and low-income households for a long time. However, CLTs also have some additional 
advantages for their own neighborhoods and surrounding areas. There are several 
general benefits of CLTs are as follows: First, CLTs can preserve affordability in their 
neighborhoods. What distinguishes the CLT model from other housing models is that it 
preserves affordability over the long term (99 years) (Curtin, 2008). Second, CLTs help 
retain community wealth and increase public subsidies value in them. Third, CLTs can 
enhance residential or neighborhood stability. Fourth, CLTs can expand homeownership, 
especially low-income accessibility to homeownership. Fifth, CLTs facilitate creation of 
individual wealth of their residents. Finally, CLTs can enable residential mobility of 
lower income households.  
In addition, the CLT model is one of the shared equity homeownership models, 
which refer to any program that requires home buyers who get assistance in purchasing 
their homes to share housing price appreciation for the next home buyers (Rohe & 
Watson, 2007). Examining different types of shared equity homeownership such as 
condominiums, limited equity cooperatives, CLTs and price restricted houses holistically 
may provide additional insights on CLTs’ benefits (Rohe et al., 2001). Shared equity 
homeownership models assist wealth building of their residents and provide stability in 
their neighborhoods, while preserving affordable housing units on behalf of community 
(Koschinsky, 1998). Like the basic concept of the CLT model, shared equity 
homeownership divides the traditional rights for property ownership into two different 
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rights; the right to own and to use. Two principles such as permanent affordability and 
long-term stewardship distinguish shared equity properties from other forms of 
ownership (Temkin et al., 2010; Ehlenz, 2014). Thus, we need to see the performance of 
the shared equity homeownership models as follows; Affordability, Stability, Wealth, 
Involvement, Improvement.  
Based on the previous discussion, three main benefits of CLTs are suggested as 
follows: to preserve housing affordability, to stabilize neighborhoods, and to build 
community assets. The basic concept of CLTs is that land should not be a private 
possession but a common thing primarily owned by community. The separation in 
ownership of land and house, allows future buyers to purchase the house only. The trust 
continues to own the land and lease the land to the next homeowner. In this way, the 
community is continually able to maintain a stock of affordable housing. This 
preservation of affordable housing units is the first main benefit of CLTs and also a 
primary purpose of CLTs at the same time. In addition, when we consider that general 
market land prices are skyrocketing, several strategies are needed to address the 
problem. Because land speculation tends to raise property values, removing real estate 
such as houses, buildings, and lands from the market stabilizes property values. That 
removal could prevent the economic eviction of the community's poorer residents from 
displacement.  
The second main benefit of CLTs is to stabilize neighborhoods. CLTs can 
enhance neighborhood stability in terms of both individual and community dimension. 
Individually, CLTs can increase the length of residency, keep up the condition of units, 
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and ensure the security of tenure. On the other hand, CLTs can moderate too much 
speculative investment in gentrifying areas by preserving the affordability of low-cost 
housing and preventing the displacement of low-income people. In other words, CLTs 
can serve as a stabilizing factor in gentrifying neighborhoods (Saegert & Benitez, 2005; 
Davis, 1991; Coalition for Nonprofit Housing & Economic Development, 2004).  
The third main benefit of CLTs is to build community assets. If CLTs perform as 
promised, there should be an active civic engagement with a sense of belonging to their 
community. In other words, the owner-occupants of CLTs will regularly interact on the 
basis of residential interests they hold in common. Conditions in the surrounding 
neighborhood will also improve. Also, CLTs can make a significant contribution toward 
increasing economic and racial diversity. To promote community diversity, CLTs have 
been widely used to create and preserve affordable housing units in neighborhoods 
where people with lower incomes would not otherwise be able to live (Davis, 2006). The 
CLT model, therefore, is believed to be a good strategy to build community assets. 
In addition to the above three benefits, CLT home buyers can get better mortgage 
loans from banks than their low-income counterparts because CLTs’ stewardship lower 
the risk of foreclosure (Ehlenz, 2014). Even though many benefits of CLTs are 
suggested, there are few studies with empirical data that support the generally known 
benefits of the CLT model.  
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2.2.4 Disadvantages of CLTs 
CLTs are not well known and are not extensively used yet, probably because 
their concept of community land ownership is so unusual in the U.S. (Greenstein & 
Sungu-Eryilmaz, 2005). To know the reason of CLTs’ unpopularity, general 
disadvantages of CLTs should be discussed. 
First, the reasons why people own home are diverse. There are not only financial 
reasons for owning a home, but also non-financial reasons, and CLTs do not fulfill some 
of these desires. For instance, many Americans use homeownership as a wealth 
generation vehicle and CLTs limit this for their homeowners (Hartman, 2002). 
Second, there is a dearth of empirical evidence on CLTs. There are few empirical 
studies to support the claims of the benefits of CLTs, in spite of the abundant anecdotal 
literature available on the Internet and the thirty-plus years that the CLT model has been 
in existence. 
Third, sustainable resources are needed to maintain CLTs for a long time. 
Finding resources to support the management and development of CLTs plus organizing 
the residents and community around affordable housing and other issues is a difficult, 
constant, and time-consuming necessity. The resources are not limited to monetary 
resources, but include people like community leaders and organizers.  
Fourth, the CLT model is just small solution to affordable housing, thus 
communities don’t need to focus on CLTs. Whenever a non-profit meets a community 
needs, the risk of allowing federal officials to ignore their responsibilities follows (Bratt, 
1989). Private-sector models cannot become the only providers of affordable housing. 
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After considering the above disadvantages, the first one could not mainly apply 
to low-income households not having ability to own houses. To ease the second one is 
the purpose of this research. About the third one, CLTs can provide affordability for a 
long time, so the cost-benefit analysis of providing affordable housing continuously 
might be better than other subsidies that could not ensure the affordability after some 
time passed. About the fourth one, CLT model is not just for providing affordable 
houses, but for many other functions such as community asset building, well housing 
maintenance for a long time, and enhancing neighborhood stability and so forth. One 
more challenge of CLTs is finding lenders or banks that are willing to work with the 
partners because usually they don’t understand the CLT model. Thus, it is needed to 
educate financial staffs or institutions about the model and to advertise more. However, 
despite all these disadvantages, the recent huge increase of CLTs, for instance, more 
municipalities or local governments introduce and support CLTs in their jurisdictions, 
prominently lends support to the availability of the model. 
 
2.2.5 Overview of CLTs in the U.S. 
There is no exact comprehensive listing of CLTs in the U.S. However, the 
number and location of CLT organizations can be roughly speculated by the list of the 
National Community Land Trust Network, which is a non-profit organization established 
to support CLT organizations in the U.S. The network is consistently updating the 
directory of CLTs, albeit not all organization in the directory is CLT organization. 
According to the directory, as of February 2015, there are 249 CLTs in 46 states, 
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including corporations and programs, in the U.S. Table 2-2 shows the current 
distribution of CLTs in the U.S. by state and region.  
 
 
 
Table 2-2. The number of CLTs by state and U.S. region 
U.S. 
Region 
State CLTs 
Midwest 
IA 3 
IL 4 
IN 0 
KS 2 
MI 8 
MN 9 
MO 3 
ND 3 
NE 0 
OH 5 
SD 1 
WI 2 
Subtotal 40 
Northeast 
CT 4 
DC 2 
DE 1 
MA 17 
MD 6 
ME 7 
 
U.S. 
Region 
State CLTs 
Northeast 
NH 4 
NJ 3 
NY 17 
PA 5 
RI 3 
VT 10 
Subtotal 79 
Southeast 
AL 1 
AR 0 
FL 14 
GA 8 
KY 1 
LA 6 
MS 3 
NC 7 
SC 1 
TN 2 
VA 3 
WV 0 
 
U.S. 
Region 
State CLTs 
Subtotal 46 
Southwest 
AZ 5 
NM 5 
OK 0 
TX 9 
Subtotal 19 
West 
AK 3 
CA 21 
CO 6 
HI 1 
ID 1 
MT 5 
NV 1 
OR 6 
UT 2 
WA 18 
WY 1 
Subtotal 65 
Total 249 
 
Source: The national community land trust network website (cltnetwork.org) 
 
 
 
Northeast and West regions have a large number of CLTs compared to other 
regions. Five states like Massachusetts, New York, Florida, California, and Washington 
have more than 10 CLTs, and five states have no CLTs. Figure 2-1 geographically 
illustrates the distribution of CLTs in the U.S. as follows: 
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Source: The 2011 Comprehensive CLT Survey  
Figure 2-1. The location of CLTs in the U.S. 
 
 
 
There are two national-level CLT surveys conducted by the National Community 
Land Trust Network so far. The first CLT survey conducted in 2006 and reported in 
2007 was a census survey, and the overall response rate was 65%. In other words, 106 
CLTs responded to the survey by July 28, 2006. The second survey was conducted in 
2011, and 96 CLTs responded by the start of 2011, approximately 40% of the total 
CLTs. The surveys were sent to all CLTs having available mailing addresses at that 
time; that is, no sampling was done. According the 2011 Comprehensive CLT Survey, 
the total number of housing units in CLTs in the U.S. is unknown. Therefore, those two 
national surveys are important sources to get more information about CLTs in the U.S., 
and the 2011 survey provides details on CLTs as follows: 
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The average number of resale-restricted units is 54.2, and the median number of 
units is 29.5. 25% have less than 11 units, and 75% have less than 57 units. Only 25% 
have more than 57 units. The number of national resale-restricted units can be roughly 
estimated at 7,139. The majority (76%) of CLTs has been established since 1990s, and 
around 45% were established since 2000s. The service area for CLTs is various: Only 
14% serve just their neighborhoods, 16% serve the city, 31% serve the county, 17% 
serve more than one county, and others serve the MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) or 
states. In other words, the majority of CLTs serve multiple neighborhoods, the city as a 
whole, the county, or even multiple counties. Average income of households who 
purchased a CLT home in 2010 was 65% of AMI (Area Median Income), ranging from 
22% to 100%. Among those who purchased a CLT unit, first time home buyers are 79%. 
The operating budget ranges from $0 to $3,000,000. The number of parcels ranges from 
one to 600, and the mean number of parcels held in trust is 38, and median number is 12. 
The mean size of land is 48 acres, and median size is 4.5 acres. The majority (77%) of 
CLTs have a ground lease document in place. The duration of CLT’s ground lease range 
from 20 to 99 years, with 99 years being the most frequently used (95%) term. Ground 
leases are renewable. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Research Gaps 
Gentrification is one of the most widely known processes, and currently a lot of 
gentrifying or gentrified communities have existed throughout the nation. However, 
empirical research about the relationship between gentrification and housing models has 
been scarce or, if anything, has focused on minor details of gentrification. Many scholars 
focus on whether gentrification and displacement exist, or spend too much time and 
space discussing theoretical issues. On the other side, many studies are limited to a few 
practical examples of gentrification in typical American metropolitan cities such as New 
York and Boston. However, there is currently no academic study focused on the 
relationship between CLTs and gentrification. 
According to the literature review, the CLT model is regarded as an effective tool 
for providing affordable housing, stabilizing neighborhoods, and building community 
assets. In particular, CLTs are employed mainly to provide long-term owner-occupied or 
rental housing for the moderate- and low-income households in the U.S. However, as 
described above, while a few case studies on CLTs exist, very few quantitative studies 
on CLTs can be found. Therefore, this research seeks to address this lack of evaluation 
of CLTs’ effects on neighborhoods. Researchers and practitioners certainly have 
working hypotheses based on studies and experience, but those hypotheses are 
insufficient for explaining the impact of CLTs. 
Although several scholars try to define the CLT model neatly using some 
features, the diversity of CLTs’ structure and operating system makes it difficult to 
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evaluate each CLT under a specific set of criteria. In addition, since the histories of 
CLTs are relatively short, it is premature to make a judgment about their effectiveness. 
In other words, the results from the major role of CLTs—to provide long-term 
affordable housing to residents—cannot be assessed within such a short period. 
Therefore, the problem of CLTs’ short history establishes the need to consider different 
approaches in order to examine the actual impacts of CLTs on neighborhoods.  
Few studies examine the practical impacts of CLTs on their communities, 
although there are a variety of documents that show their benefits. In addition, even 
fewer studies focus on the relationship between a certain situation and CLTs. However, 
in a contemporary post-industrial society, both CLTs and gentrification co-exist, and 
those two overlap in the same place in many cases. The housing units provided by CLTs 
in gentrified neighborhoods might affect their neighborhoods in some way or other. 
Thus, the investigation of the relationship between a recently rising system (CLTs) and 
an extensively existing phenomenon in the U.S. (gentrification) is also beneficial to 
speculate about the effectiveness of CLTs. 
 
3.2 Research Objective and Hypotheses 
Gentrification has been a widespread phenomenon in many cities around the 
world for several decades and also has many negative effects on neighborhood with a 
few benefits. On the other hand, the CLT model is a growing initiative of community 
development and is expected to moderate major negative impacts of gentrification on 
neighborhood. This study starts from the concern about the impact of CLTs on 
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gentrification. This study is interested in the impacts of a growing community 
development model on existing gentrified neighborhoods. In addition, with the rapid 
expansion of CLTs in the U.S. over the last several decades, we now have the chance to 
systematically address evaluative questions about the impacts of CLTs.  
One of the extensively recognized merits of CLTs is their ability to keep housing 
price affordable over the long time even in high price and rapidly appreciating markets. 
CLT homes stabilize surrounding neighborhoods and counteract the displacement and 
the loss of affordable units that generally occurs in gentrifying neighborhoods. These 
attributes raise a question about the relationship between CLTs and gentrification as 
follows: Do CLTs counteract the negative neighborhood effects caused by 
gentrification? 
To answer this research question, the effects of CLTs on gentrification need to be 
investigated thoroughly. The fundamental objective of this research is to find out the 
impacts of CLTs on gentrification in practice. In other words, the relationship between 
CLTs and gentrification is a specific concern of this research. Thus, the objective of this 
study is as follows: To assess the impacts of CLTs on gentrification. 
To discern the impact of CLTs on gentrification, three assumptions that must be 
met are suggested based on literature and the conceptual basis. The main research 
hypothesis to be tested is as follows: CLTs will moderate the negative effects of 
gentrification.  
The following sub-research hypotheses are as follows: 1) CLTs will counteract 
the displacement in gentrified neighborhoods, 2) CLTs will facilitate the increase of 
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affordability in gentrified neighborhoods, and 3) CLTs will stabilize the speculative 
increase of property values in gentrified neighborhoods. 
 
3.3 Basic Research Framework 
The central question posed here is how CLTs counteract gentrification. This of 
course implies a counterfactual question, that is, how would CLTs affect neighborhoods 
did not undergo gentrification? Thus, control groups are needed for better comparison. 
Four categories are established as follows: non-gentrifying neighborhoods and 
gentrifying neighborhoods, and neighborhoods having CLT units and neighborhoods not 
having CLT units. The comparison using those four categories can tell us the impacts of 
CLTs on gentrification more clearly.  
Therefore, although this research employs a mixed research method, quantitative 
and qualitative, basically this research was conducted as a comparative cross-sectional 
study that compares the relationship between gentrified neighborhood and non-gentrified 
neighborhood depending on the existence of CLT units. Figure 3-1 shows the conceptual 
framework of the study as follows: 
 
 
 
 NHs With CLT NHs Without CLT 
Gentrified NHs A B 
Non-gentrified NHs C D 
*NHs: Neighborhoods 
Figure 3-1. Conceptual framework 
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This cross-sectional comparison can show the effects of CLTs on gentrification 
more clearly. Using aggregated data, this research compares those four kinds of 
neighborhoods by the mean comparison test (t-test) using several independent variables. 
The comparison between A and B, and C and D show the difference of CLTs’ impact on 
gentrification. On the other hand, the comparison between A and C, and B and D show 
the impact of gentrification in neighborhoods.  
Additionally, this research employs a binomial logistic regression model, which 
is to predict a binary dependent variable and to measure the relationship between 
gentrification and CLTs. This additional estimation can bolster the results of the 
quantitative approach.  
In the qualitative approach, based on the results of the quantitative approach, the 
actual aspects of CLTs in gentrified neighborhoods were investigated by interviewing 
CLT practitioners. Hence, this study employs a mixed method as a primary method, 
which is used when both quantitative and qualitative data provide a better understanding 
of research problem than either type by itself. Thus, the evidence from this research can 
disclose the actual impacts of CLTs on gentrification from the holistic viewpoint. Figure 
3-2 describes the research framework as follows: 
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Figure 3-2. Research framework 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Quantitative Approach 
3.4.1 Identifying gentrified neighborhood 
Identifying gentrified neighborhoods compared to non-gentrified neighborhoods 
is one of the most important parts in this analysis. The purpose of this literature review is 
to establish a working definition of gentrification and research indicators, measurements 
and how they apply to measuring and monitoring gentrification.  
Although there are many definitions of gentrification, some common 
characteristics appear consistently among the different definitions. Several studies have 
used the characteristics of neighborhoods to explain whether they were gentrified. Table 
3-1 shows the criteria of gentrification in previous studies. 
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Table 3-1. Criteria of gentrification on previous studies 
Author (Year) Criteria of Gentrification Data Source 
Kennedy & 
Leonard (2001) 
Displacement 
Increased Tax Revenues 
Increased Property Values 
Deconcentration of Poverty 
Income mix 
No data used (Just 
guideline) 
Freeman & 
Braconi (2004) 
Income  
Rent 
Education (College graduate %) 
Race (White %) 
New York City 
Housing and 
Vacancy Survey 
(NYCHVS) 
Sullivan (2007) 
Owner-occupied units (%) 
Vacant housing units (%) 
Median house value ($) 
Median rent ($) 
Median household income ($) 
Poverty (%) 
College degree (%) 
White, non-Hispanic(%), Black(%), Hispanic(%), 
Others(%) 
-Face-to-face 
Survey 
-U.S. Census data 
Levyet al,  
(2006) 
Number of home sales (represent accelerated housing 
markets) 
Loan amounts (represent accelerated housing markets) 
Demographic changes 
-Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) data 
-U.S. Census data 
-telephone 
interviews 
Galster & 
Peacock (1986) 
Decadal changes in: 
Proportion black 
Proportion college-educated 
Real incomes 
Real property values 
U.S. Census data 
Freeman (2005) 
1. Be located in the central city. 
2. Have a median income less than the median (40th 
percentile) for that metropolitan area. 
3. Have a proportion of housing built lower than the 
proportion found at the median (40th percentile) for 
the respective metropolitan area. 
4. Have a percentage increase in educational attainment 
greater than the median increase in educational 
attainment for that metropolitan area. 
5. Have an increase in real housing prices during the 
intercensal period. 
 
Meet 1, 2, 3:  
potentially 
gentrifying 
 
 
Meet 1,2,3,4,5: 
gentrifying 
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The selection of variables for identifying gentrification is largely based on the 
preceding literature review. Using the information obtained from the review of 
gentrification literature, I can better understand what factors potentially lead to 
gentrification. The following characteristics about demographic attributes and property 
values can be used to identify gentrified neighborhoods: Ethnic composition, education 
level, neighborhood average income, property values, and homeownership types. In 
addition, the changes over time should be considered as primary criteria to identify 
neighborhoods whether gentrified or not. Thus, the rate of change was investigated using 
the U.S. Census data to determine whether gentrification occurs or not in neighborhoods. 
Therefore, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 U.S. Census data and the American Community 
Survey data were selectively used to discern gentrified neighborhoods. Thus, a gentrified 
neighborhood should meet the following quantitative conditions: 
(1) The rate of change in median value of single family homes is more than 
corresponding city-wide median 
(2) The rate of change in median income is more than 120% of 
corresponding city-wide median 
(3) The rate of change in percentage college-educated is more than the 
corresponding city-wide median 
(4) The rate of change in percentage white is more than the corresponding 
city-wide median 
(5) The rate of change in percentage owner-occupied units is more than the 
corresponding city-wide median 
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While many studies of gentrification take the central city as their subject, as 
mentioned in literature review section, some others document the gentrification of rural 
areas (Bridge, 2003; Phillips, 2004). In addition, several scholars identified rural 
gentrification in the 1970s associated with the back-to-the-land movement. Many people 
agree that baby boomers’ retirement, increasing rates of second-home ownership, and 
technologies that make telecommuting possible encouraged the escalation of the 
gentrification of some small towns (Brown-Saracino 2009, 5). Therefore, the data used 
in this study included not only urban neighborhoods, but also rural neighborhoods. 
 
3.4.2 Conceptual basis for quantitative comparison 
According to the literature review, gentrification has negative effects on 
neighborhoods. The major negative effects are displacement of incumbent residents, 
lower neighborhood affordability, and skyrocketing property values in neighborhoods. 
Several indices need to be selected for measuring neighborhood impacts of gentrification 
with respect to major benefits of CLTs, which are providing affordable housing, 
stabilizing neighborhoods, and building community assets. Figure 3-3 illustrates the 
correlations between the negative effects of gentrification and the benefits of CLTs as 
follows: 
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Figure 3-3. Correlation between benefits of CLTs and negative effects of 
gentrification 
 
 
 
The negative neighborhood effects of gentrification are elaborated as follows: 
First, the displacement caused by gentrification induces demographic composition 
change (Hamnett, 2003b; Atkinson, 2004) and class confliction in the existing 
neighborhoods (McDougall, 1981; Brown-Saracino, 2004). Second, lower affordability 
means the increase of housing prices compared to residents’ income. Third, skyrocket of 
property values includes both the speculative increase of land and improvement 
(building) price.  
Moreover, such effects of gentrification can be connected with the benefits of 
CLTs as follows: First, gentrification causes displacement of incumbent residents from 
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their neighborhoods. However, CLTs’ benefit of building community assets moderates 
class conflicts; thus, the length of residence is extended. Moreover, the increased 
affordable housing counteracts the displacement of low-income people. Second, 
gentrification decreases the number of affordable housing units in neighborhoods, but 
CLTs’ primary objective is to maintain and increase such housing units. Third, 
gentrification causes speculative increase in property values in neighborhoods, but CLTs 
stabilize the skyrocketing prices by preventing speculative investment into their 
neighborhoods.  
The correlations between the negative effects of gentrification and the benefits of 
CLTs support the main research hypothesis that CLTs will moderate the negative effects 
of gentrification. The above correlation can be estimated by the comparison between 
neighborhoods with CLT units and those without CLT units. For more exquisite 
examination of the relationship, some specific indicators are needed.  
 
3.4.3 Unit of analysis 
How to define the neighborhood is an absolutely critical issue in the study of 
neighborhoods. It is more difficult to understand neighborhoods than cities, states, or 
firms because mainly neighborhood behavior is neither formal nor just a sum of 
individual actions. However, it is obvious that neighborhoods are fundamentally social 
units (Clay, 1979: 5).  
Many previous studies on neighborhood impacts have used census tracts or 
census block groups as the unit of analysis for their research. This shows that there is no 
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consensus about the exact definition of neighborhood, and furthermore, no general 
geographical boundary of neighborhood commonly accepted in this field at present. It is 
an ongoing issue; thus, many quantitative studies alternatively use the geographical unit 
from the U.S. Census data like census tracts or census block groups. 
Based on the previous literature review, the delineation of neighborhood 
boundary is often a highly political and negotiated process (Chaskin, 1999). However, 
many researchers (Kasarda, 1993; Hughes, 1990; Gramlich et al., 1992; Galster & 
Mincy, 1993) are doing analyses of neighborhoods using census tracts in practice 
(Sawicki & Flynn, 1996). When narrowing down studies on gentrifying neighborhoods, 
the following table shows the unit of analysis that each study used to define the 
neighborhood.  
 
Table 3-2. Definition of neighborhood in previous literature 
Research Unit of Analysis 
Bostic & Martin (2003) gentrifying census tracts 
Atkinson (2000) 
The study of gentrification, often described at a neighborhood level, 
uses the smallest level of census data, the enumeration district (ED). 
 Britain Case 
Freeman (2005) census tracts identified as central city neighborhoods 
Sullivan (2007) 
designated neighborhood partly by the city’s Office of 
Neighborhood Involvement (Portland, Oregon) and additionally used 
his own criteria 
Galster & Booza (2007) census tracts for neighborhood income diversity 
 
 
Based on table 3-2, the census tract has been mainly used as a proxy of a 
neighborhood in academic field, while some researchers argued that the smallest level of 
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available census data should be used for analyzing neighborhood impacts. The boundary 
of neighborhoods is a highly debatable issue and arbitrarily used in some literature. 
Moreover, gentrification takes place at a variety of spatial scales: gentrification is 
occurring at the sub city level in numerous census tracts, and not solely in entire cities 
(Henig, 1980). Therefore, complying with the trend of previous literature, this study 
employs a census tract as a unit of analysis.  
The unit of analysis of this study is determined as a census tract, which is 
roughly close to approximating what is typically thought of as a neighborhood.  Census 
tracts are generally defined to contain 4,000 people and never cross state or county 
boundaries. They are relatively homogeneous units with respect to population 
characteristics, economic status, and living conditions.
1
  
The use of numerous census tracts in a quantitative approach can extend the 
external validity of the findings. Census tracts are the geographic entities, and the 
variables are compared by the neighborhood type.  
 
3.4.4 Statistical methods 
The cross-sectional comparison between each type of neighborhood to know how 
CLTs counteract gentrification is the main method of this research. A binomial logistic 
regression is additionally employed to complement the findings from the cross-sectional 
comparison.  
                                                 
1 Defined by the United States Census Bureau 
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The comparative cross-sectional study is based on the comparison of two groups; 
thus, the outputs are rendered by group mean comparison, which is generally called the 
t-test. The t-test is commonly used for hypothesis testing, and the null hypothesis is that 
the means of two populations are equal. The alternative hypothesis is that the means of 
two populations are unequal or one of which mean is larger. When the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted, the null hypothesis is rejected. The null hypothesis, 0H , and the 
alternative hypothesis, aH , are described as the following equations: 
210 :  H  
21:  aH ,     21:   orHa  
When there is no difference between two group means, the decision is that we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis. The t-statistic is produced by the comparison, and the 
value is used for determining the significance of the comparison.  
Each type of neighborhood is used to reflect theoretically or experimentally 
important independent or explanatory variables. The comparison between neighborhood 
types predicts a difference between the two means of neighborhoods, and the statistical 
inferences are made possible by the results of the comparison. Only independent 
variables that are statistically significantly at p < 0.05 are considered to be significant. 
In addition, the logistic regression analyses are employed to determine what 
factor best explains gentrification. When a dependent variable is dichotomous or binary, 
the logistic regression is used rather than ordinary least squares (OLS). The OLS 
regressions can easily handle categorical independent variables, but they are not 
appropriate for categorical dependent variables (Treiman, 2009). Since the dependent 
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variable of this study is gentrification, which is a binary variable composed of a 
gentrified neighborhood or a non-gentrified neighborhood, the binomial logistic 
regression is used. 
The logistic regression uses odds, which are the likelihood of a given event 
occurring, compared to the likelihood of the same event not occurring. The equation in 
terms of odds is as follows: 
kk xx
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Where iP  is the probability that y = 1, and iP1   indicates the probability that y ≠ 1 
or in this case 0. βk represents the impact that kx  has on the odds of P = 1. So, an odds 
value of 1 generally means no impact, less than 1 means it reduces the odds, and larger 
than 1 means it increases the odds. A logit is the natural logarithm of the odds and is 
used to get a linear model for the logistic regression. The equation using a logit is as 
follows:  
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For this study, a dummy or indicator variable for gentrification (1= gentrified 
neighborhood, 0 = otherwise) will be added for a dependent variable. Where iP   
indicates the probability of gentrification, kX  means the possible factors that can affect 
gentrification, and the independent variables include the existence of CLT units. 
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Therefore, a logistic regression using the above equation and variables will be estimated 
for this study. 
 
3.5 Qualitative Approach 
A different CLT, using its own resale formula and operating under various 
market conditions, might be expected to produce somewhat diverse results. This large 
variation of CLTs suggests the need to reassess the findings of the quantitative approach, 
which is conducted by numerical sources. In addition, the samples of the quantitative 
analysis could be biased and/or could have insufficient information. Therefore, the 
introduction of the qualitative approach is needed in order to complement and bolster the 
results of the quantitative analysis.  
In addition to the criteria for the quantitative approach, qualitative criteria are 
also needed. Based on the research hypotheses, the qualitative study focuses on testing 
the following assumptions of CLTs in gentrified neighborhoods. First, CLTs can 
counteract the displacement of existing residents in practice. Second, CLTs can facilitate 
the provision of affordable housing to their neighborhood. Whereas providing affordable 
housing is one of the fundamental purposes and roles of CLTs, it is important to see 
whether actually CLTs affect their neighborhoods. Third, CLTs can control the increase 
in property value of their neighborhoods. While the property values of CLT units cannot 
be significantly increased like market rate units due to the resale formula of CLT, it is 
critical to determine how CLTs affect their neighborhoods in terms of lowering property 
prices.  
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In this sense, the interviews, for which informed consent was obtained, with CLT 
practitioners are employed to complement the quantitative approach. It is expected that 
the interview can investigate substantial condition that could be outside the scope of a 
quantitative analysis, and more information about the causes of CLTs’ impacts on 
gentrification could be gained.  
To examine the aspects that cannot be expressed and analyzed in the form of 
number, the semi-structured interview is employed for the qualitative approach in this 
research. The semi-structured interview is used when an interviewer only has one chance 
to interview someone and when observations about the topic already exist. This 
interviewing format allows an interviewer to develop relevant and meaningful semi-
structured questions based on a keen understanding of the topic. The role of this 
interview is to make sure that relevant contexts are properly taken into account so that 
knowledge specific to a particular situation can be produced. In addition, the inclusion of 
open-ended question provides the opportunity for learning new perspective and 
understanding of the context (Mason, 2004). 
Therefore, in this research, several structured questions that provide the 
information of both actual condition and background will be developed based on the 
findings from the quantitative approach. The interviewees of this semi-structured 
interview will be current CLT practitioners who work in CLT organizations and with 
stakeholders in the field. Written or spoken communication, including telephone or 
email interviews with CLT practitioners, will be conducted. In sum, this research 
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complements the quantitative approach by measuring more precisely CLT practitioners’ 
opinion about the quantitative findings.  
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4. DATA COLLECTION AND SELECTION
4.1 Quantitative Approach 
4.1.1 Process of data collection 
To collect data needed for this research, I asked the executive director or staff of 
every CLT organization in the U.S. whose information was available in the CLT 
directory of the National CLT Network for locations of their CLT units and the first year 
that their CLT units were introduced. 
First, I gathered the contact information of every CLT organization that had their 
own webpages or email addresses. I sent emails to 131 CLTs that I had found the contact 
information for from April 15, 2014 to July 17, 2014 until I received the data. I waited 
for responses for two months when some didn’t respond, I emailed them again at least 
three times, and finally, 64 organizations responded to my email. Then, attempts were 
made to contact 27 CLTs that did not respond to my email by phone, and four CLTs 
responded additionally. 
Finally, while I asked 131 CLTs, I received the responses from 68 CLTs. 
Through this process, I learned that, in 2014, 22 CLTs among responding organizations 
have not introduced any units yet. In total, 68 of 131 CLTs responded; thus, the response 
rate to my request was 51.91%. Table 4-1 shows the descriptions of responses. 
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Table 4-1. Descriptions of responses 
Types of respondents Number of CLT organizations 
Responded CLT 
With data 46 CLTs 
68 CLTs 
Not yet started (No data) 22 CLTs 
Not responded CLT 
Declined 9 CLTs 
63 CLTs 
Lack of response 54 CLTs 
Total 131 
Response rate 51.91% (68/131) 
4.1.2 Overall data descriptions 
As a whole, the data of the location and the first year that CLT was introduced 
were received from 68 CLTs in 30 states, and the number of CLT units that those CLTs 
gave me was 3,709. Most portfolios of responded CLTs are predominantly comprised of 
owner-occupied and single-family houses, which are main characteristics of typical CLT 
unit, although not every CLTs informed the type of their units. Table 4-2 shows the 
distribution of collected data as follows: 
Table 4-2. Overall collected data distribution 
Region State 
CLT Organization Unit 
State Region State Region 
Midwest 
Iowa 1 
13 (19.1%) 
0 
880 (23.7%) 
Minnesota 6 762 
Missouri 2 26 
North Dakota 1 2 
Ohio 1 7 
Wisconsin 2 83 
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Table 4-2. Continued 
Region State 
CLT Organization Unit 
State Region State Region 
Northeast 
Connecticut 1 
13 (19.1%) 
102 
614 (16.6%) 
DC 1 0 
Massachusetts 5 189 
Maine 2 18 
New Jersey 1 0 
New York 1 0 
Vermont 
2 
251 
New Hampshire 54 
Southeast 
Florida 5 
11 (16.2%) 
90 
317 (8.5%) 
Georgia 1 0 
Louisiana 3 0 
North Carolina 1 223 
Virginia 1 4 
Southwest 
New Mexico 1 
2 (2.9%) 
90 
90 (2.4%) 
Texas 1 0 
West 
Alaska 1 
29 (42.6%) 
0 
1,808 (48.7%) 
Arizona 1 78 
California 8 390 
Colorado 3 401 
Montana 1 47 
Oregon 3 219 
Utah 1 4 
Washington 10 580 
Wyoming 1 89 
Total 30 68 3,709 
 
 
 
According to the CLT directory of the National CLT Network, currently there are 
249 CLTs in the U.S. including corporations and programs. However, not every CLT in 
the directory is a CLT organization. Some of them are CLT programs in housing projects, 
and others are affordable housing related programs or organizations and become just 
network members of the National CLT Network because they are interested in the CLT 
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model. In addition, during the data collection process, some responded to the recruiting 
email that they were not CLT organizations or had not built any CLT units yet. Others 
said that they were just giving mortgage lending support for a few CLT projects or only 
had resident-owned coops or commercial properties. It was revealed that 13 
organizations were not actual CLT among 144 of total contacted organizations. It is 
reasonable to assume that many organizations that haven’t respond or have no contact 
information in the CLT directory of the National CLT Network might be inactive or 
inexistent organizations or programs. Therefore, to my knowledge, there are currently 
less than 238 CLTs in the U.S.  
The proportion of sampling can be estimated by the results of recruiting. The 
number of responded CLT organizations is 68 in 30 states out of the maximum total 
nationwide number of 238 CLTs in 46 states. Thus, the proportions are at least 28.6% of 
CLTs and 66.7% of states.  
Since there is no published information about the exact number of CLT 
organizations, the distribution according to the U.S. region is a good alternative in order 
to examine the quality of sampling. Table 4-3 shows the number of CLTs by state and 
region based on both the CLT directory of the National CLT Network and the results of 
recruitment in this research.  
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Table 4-3. The number of CLTs by state and U.S. region 
U.S. 
Region 
State CLTs 
Midwest 
IA 2 
IL 4 
IN 0 
KS 1 
MI 8 
MN 9 
MO 3 
ND 3 
NE 0 
OH 5 
SD 1 
WI 2 
Subtotal 38 
Northeast 
CT 4 
DC 2 
DE 1 
MA 16 
MD 6 
ME 7 
 
U.S. 
Region 
State CLTs 
Northeast 
NH 4 
NJ 3 
NY 17 
PA 5 
RI 3 
VT 9 
Subtotal 77 
Southeast 
AL 1 
AR 0 
FL 14 
GA 8 
KY 1 
LA 6 
MS 2 
NC 6 
SC 1 
TN 2 
VA 3 
WV 0 
 
U.S. 
Region 
State CLTs 
Subtotal 44 
Southwest 
AZ 5 
NM 5 
OK 0 
TX 8 
Subtotal 18 
West 
AK 3 
CA 19 
CO 5 
HI 1 
ID 1 
MT 5 
NV 1 
OR 5 
UT 2 
WA 18 
WY 1 
Subtotal 61 
Total 238 
 
 Source: Revised from the CLT directory of the National CLT Network according to collected 
data in this research 
 
 
 
According to the above national CLT distribution, the proportion of each region 
is as follows: Midwest 16.0% (38 CLTs), Northeast 32.4% (77 CLTs), Southeast 18.5% 
(44 CLTs), Southwest 7.6% (18 CLTs), and West 25.6% (61 CLTs). Based on this 
national distribution by U.S. region, the sampling distribution of this research shown in 
table 4-2 can be assessed by comparison. Table 4-4 explains the comparison of the 
distribution between the national CLT distribution and this research by its proportion to 
the total CLT number as follows: 
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Table 4-4. The proportion of CLT organizations by the U.S. region 
Region National This research Difference 
Midwest 16.0% 19.1% 3.1% 
Northeast 32.4% 19.1% -13.3% 
Southeast 18.5% 16.2% -2.3% 
Southwest 7.6% 2.9% -4.7% 
West 25.6% 42.6% 17.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 0 
 
 
 
This research shows 17% more in west region compared to the national 
distribution and shows 13.3% less in northeast region. However, the distribution of CLT 
organizations is not the exact distribution of CLT units in the nation and does not 
indicate CLTs that have housing units now. Moreover, the data of this research comes 
from the voluntary responses of CLTs, so this might reflect the actual distribution of 
current active CLT organizations. In addition, although there are some differences 
between the distributions, the data came from every region, thus the distribution is not 
much biased. Therefore, this research sample is a reasonable representation of the 
national CLT distribution.  
Although the total number of CLT units in the U.S. is unknown, my sample size 
is large enough to be analyzed. The 2011 Comprehensive CLT survey (Thaden, 2012), 
conducted in partnership with the National Community Land Trust Network and the 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, provides the most recent and comprehensive 
information on CLTs in the United States. According to this survey, excluding start-up 
CLTs, only 25% of CLTs have more than 57 units, and the median number of units per 
 71 
 
each CLT organization was 29.5. This 2011 survey collected the information from 96 
out of the 216 organizations as of the end of 2010. 
On the other hand, the data of my research shows higher response rate and has 
more number of units than the 2011 comprehensive CLT survey. The number of 
recruited CLT organizations is 131, and 68 organizations in 30 states responded.  Table 
4-5 compares the 2011 comprehensive CLT survey with this research: 
 
Table 4-5. Comparison between 2011 Comprehensive Survey and this research 
 2011 Comprehensive Survey This research (2014) 
Recruited Organizations 216 131 
Respondents (%) 96 (44%) 68 (52%) 
Number of units 3,669 3,709 
 
 
 
As shown above, in terms of the distribution of both organizations and units, it is 
possible to argue that this research provides representative data of CLTs in the U.S.  
 
4.1.3 Refining data for the analysis 
This research aims first to assess the impacts of CLTs on gentrification 
quantitatively; thus, the comparison between before and after CLT units were introduced 
is conducted in each neighborhood. To measure neighborhood changes with the times 
for comparison, it is important to generate measurable and testable data. Since the 
decennial data such as Census data are used to measure neighborhoods’ characteristics, 
the range of the CLT units using in this research is limited to the CLT units that first 
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introduced before 2009. Table 4-6 shows the distribution of census tracts that CLT units 
were introduced before 2009: 
 
 
 
Table 4-6. Distribution of census tracts with CLT units before 2009 
Region State 
CLT Organization Unit Census Tract 
State Region State Region State Region 
Midwest 
Minnesota 5 
8 (19.5%) 
539 
610 
(24.7%) 
122 
136 
(42.5%) 
Missouri 0 0 0 
North Dakota 0 0 0 
Ohio 1 7 5 
Wisconsin 2 64 9 
Northeast 
Connecticut 1 
9 
(22.0%) 
102 
486 
(19.7%) 
1 
30 
(9.4%) 
Maine 1 6 2 
Massachusetts 5 144 17 
Vermont 
2 234 10 
New Hampshire 
Southeast 
Florida 5 
6 
(14.6%) 
64 
225 
(9.1%) 
15 
24 
(7.5%) 
North Carolina 1 161 9 
Virginia 0 0 0 
Southwest New Mexico 1 
1 
(2.4%) 
70 
70 
(2.8%) 
1 
1 
(0.3%) 
West 
Arizona 0 
17 
(41.5%) 
0 
1,078 
(43.7%) 
0 
129 
(40.3%) 
California 3 163 13 
Colorado 3 4 1 
Montana 1 47 1 
Oregon 1 364 11 
Utah 1 131 36 
Washington 7 280 66 
Wyoming 1 89 1 
Total 18 41 2,469 320 
 
 
 
As mentioned before, although 131 CLTs were recruited and 68 CLTs in 30 
states responded, only 46 CLT organizations in 22 states responded with the information 
 73 
 
of 3,709 units. However, the received data included the information of CLT units 
introduced after 2010; thus, when the range of the CLT units is limited to before 2009, 
the number of units decreases from 3,709 to 2,469 in 41 CLT organizations. The reason 
that only 41 CLT organizations out of 46 responding CLT organizations have available 
census tracts is that this research uses the information of CLT units introduced before 
2009 because of the availability of U.S. Census data. Among 46 responded CLT 
organizations, five introduced the first CLT unit after 2010. The number of CLT units in 
one census tract ranged from 1 to 102, and the average number of CLT units per CLT 
organization was 60.22 (2,469 units / 41 organizations).  
After the analysis of the above data, a total of 321 census tracts were identified as 
having CLT units and contained 2,469 CLT units, and the average number of units per 
census tract was 7.72 (2,469 units/320 tracts). In addition, the average number of census 
tracts in one CLT organization is 7.80 (320 tracts /41 organizations).  
Table 4-6 shows that many CLT units are dispersed in different census tracts. 
The research design focused on comparing census tracts with CLT units and those 
without CLT units. In this context, the contrast between two groups is crucial, thus it is 
better to exclude census tracts that have too small number of CLT units for better 
research. Since we cannot assume the cluster effects of CLT in this distribution of CLT 
units, it is meaningless to count census tracts having less than three CLT units. Therefore, 
the census tracts that included three or more CLT units were regarded as census tracts 
with CLT in this research. Table 4-7 describes the distribution as follows: 
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Table 4-7. Distribution of census tracts with 3+ CLT units before 2009 
Region State 
CLT Organization Unit Census Tract 
State Region State Region State Region 
Midwest 
Minnesota 5 
6 
(16.7%) 
452 
509 
(22.6%) 
58 
61 
(39.1%) 
Missouri 0 0 0 
North Dakota 0 0 0 
Ohio 0 0 0 
Wisconsin 1 57 3 
Northeast 
Connecticut 1 
8 
(22.2%) 
102 
467 
(20.8%) 
1 
22 
(14.1%) 
Maine 1 5 1 
Massachusetts 4 126 10 
Vermont 
2 234 10 
New Hampshire 
Southeast 
Florida 4 
5 
(13.9%) 
53 
213 
(9.5%) 
7 
15 
(9.6%) 
North Carolina 1 161 8 
Virginia 0 0 0 
Southwest New Mexico 1 
1 
(2.8%) 
70 
70 
(3.1%) 
1 
1 
(0.6%) 
West 
Arizona 0 
16 
(44.4%) 
0 
989 
(44.0%) 
0 
57 
(36.5%) 
California 3 161 12 
Colorado 3 364 11 
Montana 1 47 1 
Oregon 1 103 13 
Utah 1 4 1 
Washington 6 221 18 
Wyoming 1 89 1 
Total 17 36 2,248 156 
 
 
 
The number of units decreases from 2,469 to 2,248, the number of census tracts 
decreases from 320 to 156, and the number of organizations decreases from 41 to 36 in 
17 states. In other words, 164 census tracts have only one or two CLT units, and five 
organizations do not have three or more units in one census tract. The number of CLT 
units in one census tract ranged from three to 102, and the average number of CLT units 
per CLT organization was 62.44 (2,248 units / 36 organizations).  
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After the analysis of the above data, a total of 156 census tracts were identified as 
having CLT units and included 2,248 CLT units, and the average number of units per 
census tract was 14.41 (2,248 units/156 tracts). In addition, the average number of 
census tracts in one CLT organization is 4.33 (156 tracts /36 organizations). The census 
tracts and units are more evenly distributed by region than the previous data including 
census tracts with one or two CLT units. Each census tracts were matched with 
decennial data from the U.S. Census and the American Community Survey. Table 4-8 
shows this distribution of census tracts by year. 
 
 
 
Table 4-8. Census tracts distribution by year 
First year of CLT unit introduction Number of census tract with 3+ CLT units 
1980-1989 3 (1.9%) 
1990-1999 29 (18.6%) 
2000-2009 124 (79.5%) 
Total 156 
 
 
 
Only the information about CLT units introduced between 2000 and 2009 was 
used to compare the condition before CLT with effects on neighborhoods after CLTs 
were introduced. This limited use of data can reduce any unexpected impacts when 
comparing the changes of different time spans. Moreover, it can ensure maximum 
homogenous characteristics of the environment such as the national economic and 
housing market conditions. Above all, the census tract including CLT units introduced 
between 2000 and 2009 account for the majority of total census tracts (about 80%). 
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Accordingly, the information of selected census tracts was matched to both 2000 
and 2010 U.S. Census and/or American Community Survey data, and this criterion 
might be able to increase the reliability of pre and post comparison. Table 4-9 shows the 
final dataset that used in this research.  
 
 
 
Table 4-9. Distribution of census tracts with 3+ CLT units (2000-2009) 
Region State 
CLT Organization Unit Census Tract 
State Region State Region State Region 
Midwest 
Minnesota 5 
6 
(20.7%) 
383 
426 
(28.1%) 
53 
55 
(44.4%) 
Missouri 0 0 0 
North Dakota 0 0 0 
Ohio 0 0 0 
Wisconsin 1 43 2 
Northeast 
Connecticut 0 
6 
(20.7%) 
0 
221 
(14.6%) 
0 
14 
(11.3%) 
Maine 1 5 1 
Massachusetts 3 63 7 
Vermont 
2 153 6 
New Hampshire 
Southeast 
Florida 4 
5 
(17.2%) 
53 
213 
(14.1%) 
7 
14 
(11.3%) 
North Carolina 1 160 7 
Virginia 0 0 0 
Southwest New Mexico 1 
1 
(3.4%) 
70 
70 
(4.6%) 
1 
1 
(0.8%) 
West 
Arizona 0 
11 
(37.9%) 
0 
585 
(38.6%) 
0 
40 
(32.3%) 
California 1 20 3 
Colorado 3 294 7 
Montana 1 47 1 
Oregon 1 103 13 
Utah 1 4 1 
Washington 4 117 15 
Wyoming 0 0 0 
Total 15 29 1,515 124 
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After data refining process, 124 census tracts with three or more CLT units 
comprised the final dataset. Also, the distribution of census tracts that have three or more 
CLT units introduced between 2000 and 2009 is illustrated in figure 4-1 by the number 
of CLT units that each census tract has: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Distribution of census tracts by the number of CLT units 
 
 
 
 
4.1.4 Selection of gentrified neighborhoods with CLT 
The appropriateness of selected cases is extremely critical to ensure the reliability 
of this research that employs the quasi-experimental research design. Because this 
research compares each type of neighborhood, adequate control groups, which are 
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comparable neighborhoods with similar characteristics, must be chosen to minimize the 
impacts of unexpected factors.  
To determine whether gentrification occurs or not in a neighborhood, the rate of 
change was investigated from the dataset established by the U.S. Census and/or the 
American Community Survey for the information of each census tracts in both 2000 and 
2010.  
A gentrified neighborhood should meet the following five quantitative conditions: 
(1) The rate of change in median value of single family homes is more than 
corresponding city-wide median 
(2) The rate of change in median income is more than 120% of corresponding 
city-wide median 
(3) The rate of change in percentage college-educated is more than the 
corresponding city-wide median 
(4) The rate of change in percentage white is more than the corresponding city-
wide median 
(5) The rate of change in percentage owner-occupied units is more than the 
corresponding city-wide median 
Using the above quantitative criteria, 14 census tracts in nine cities in five states 
were shown as gentrified neighborhoods between 2000 and 2010 out of 125 census tracts 
with three or more CLT units. Table 4-10 shows the cities where gentrified tracts with 
three or more CLT units are located. 
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Table 4-10. Gentrified census tracts with 3+ CLT units 
No. City State 
1 Denver Colorado 
2 Delray Beach Florida 
3 Delray Beach Florida 
4 Duluth Minnesota 
5 Duluth Minnesota 
6 Duluth Minnesota 
7 Duluth Minnesota 
8 Meadow Minnesota 
9 Minneapolis Minnesota 
10 Minnetonka Minnesota 
11 Proctor Minnesota 
12 Portland Oregon 
13 Portland Oregon 
14 Bellingham Washington 
 
 
 
The distribution of gentrified census tracts that have three or more CLT units 
introduced between 2000 and 2009 is shown at figure 4-2 according to the number of 
CLT units that each census tract has: 
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Figure 4-2. Distribution of gentrified census tracts with CLT by the number of 
CLT units 
 
 
 
Since 14 gentrified neighborhoods with CLT units out of 124 census tracts with 
CLT units are selected, automatically remaining 110 census tracts in 15 states are 
regarded as non-gentrified neighborhoods with CLT units. Table 4-11 shows the 
distribution of these neighborhoods by state. 
 
 
 
Table 4-11. Distribution of non-gentrified census tracts with 3+ CLT units 
No. State Census Tract 
1 Minnesota 45 
2 Wisconsin 2 
3 Maine 1 
4 Massachusetts 7 
5 Vermont 
6 
6 New Hampshire 
7 Florida 5 
8 North Carolina 7 
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Table 4-11. Continued 
No. State Census Tract 
9 New Mexico 1 
10 California 3 
11 Colorado 6 
12 Montana 1 
13 Oregon 11 
14 Utah 1 
15 Washington 14 
Total 110 
 
 
 
The distribution of non-gentrified census tracts that have three or more CLT units 
introduced between 2000 and 2009 is shown at figure 4-3 according to the number of 
CLT units that each census tract has: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3. Distribution of non-gentrified census tracts with CLT by the number of 
CLT units 
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4.1.5 Selection criteria for corresponding city-wide areas 
To ensure the reliability of this research, the concept of corresponding city-wide 
area should be defined appropriately. In general, the census tracts within the same city-
wide area indicate that they are in the same housing market, so the analysis involved 
comparing the gentrified census tracts with CLT and without CLT in the same housing 
market. Therefore, the corresponding city-wide area means the area that includes 
selected neighborhoods where CLT units are located. In the meantime, while the 
definition of city-wide area comes from the traditional definition of gentrification within 
metropolitan areas, rural gentrification can be considered as well. 
Based on the above discussion, three selection criteria were employed to identify 
corresponding city-wide area. First, the corresponding city-wide areas must encompass 
the gentrified census tract with CLT units. Second, when there is a specific area in the 
Census such as “census place”, it is used as a corresponding city-wide area. Even in this 
case, if the population of a corresponding city-wide area is 10 times or less than the 
census tract with CLT units, the county was regarded as city-wide areas alternatively. 
The reason is that a few cities encompass less than five census tracts in their jurisdictions. 
In this case, the census tract with CLT units takes up a major portion within the city; 
thus, the comparison of the census tracts with their city-wide area is meaningless. Third, 
when there is no specific area data in the Census, the county data was also used instead. 
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4.1.6 Selection of gentrified neighborhoods without CLT 
The basic concept of this neighborhood type is to correspond city-wide area with 
neighborhoods with CLT units. From this concept of city-wide areas, gentrified 
neighborhoods without CLT units were selected as follows. 
First, according to the above results of 14 gentrified neighborhoods with CLT 
units, nine cities in five states encompass gentrified census tracts with CLT. Every 
census tract within nine city-wide areas was selected, and those census tracts were 
examined to determine whether they were gentrified or not using the same criteria 
previously used. In this process, census tracts that had one or two CLT units in the 
dataset were excluded to highlight net impacts of CLTs on neighborhoods.  
This exclusion has minimum risks because multiple CLT organizations rarely 
existed in one city-wide area actually. I know which CLTs did not release their location 
information to me. There are just a few major CLT organizations which have many units 
– more than the national median number (29.5) - before 2010. It is possible to recognize 
their approximate locations through their web sites. Moreover, they are scattered 
throughout the U.S., so the possibility of overlap is very unlikely. 
Within those nine cities that include at least one census tract with three or more 
CLT units, 498 census tracts were comparable census tracts between 2000 and 2010. 
Among them, census tracts having at least one CLT unit were excluded from the dataset, 
and only 388 census tracts had no CLT units at all. Finally, 38 gentrified census tracts 
without CLT units were found. The selection process and results are shown at table 4-12. 
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Table 4-12. Number of gentrified census tracts without CLT 
No. City State 
Total Comparable 
Tracts 
Comparable Tracts 
without CLT 
Gentrified 
Tracts 
1 Denver (1) CO 121 116 19 
2 Delray Beach (2) FL 18 14 0 
3 Duluth (4) MN 31 11 2 
4 Meadow (1) MN 10 10 1 
5 Minneapolis (1) MN 113 76 2 
6 Minnetonka (1) MN 14 6 0 
7 Proctor (1) MN 30 30 1 
8 Portland (2) OR 149 123 13 
9 Bellingham (1) WA 12 2 0 
   
498 388 38 
Note : (  ) means the number of gentrified census tract with 3+ CLT units.  
 
 
 
For a more precise comparison, another approach is employed to select gentrified 
census tracts without CLT within the corresponding city-wide area. Since corresponding 
gentrified census tracts without CLT were selected from only within the city-wide areas 
that have gentrified census tracts with CLT, other city-wide areas that have CLT units 
were not considered at all. To reduce this selection bias, every census tract that has over 
30 CLT units was selected. According to the 2011 National CLT Survey, the average 
unit number per CLT organization was 29.5. Therefore, census tracts that include 30 or 
more CLT units were selected to find more gentrified census tracts without CLT because 
30 is a high enough number to be considered as typical neighborhood with CLT. Table 
4-13 shows the census tracts that have 30 or more CLT units: 
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Table 4-13. Locations of census tracts with 30 or more CLT units 
No. City State CLT unit number 
1 Denver Colorado 80 
2 Albuquerque New Mexico 70 
3 Chapel Hill North Carolina 62 
4 Denver Colorado 62 
5 Hanover New Hampshire 61 
6 Rochester Minnesota 59 
7 Los Angeles California 57 
8 Denver Colorado 54 
9 Missoula Montana 47 
10 Chapel Hill North Carolina 43 
11 Longmont Colorado 32 
12 Denver Colorado 31 
13 Lebanon New Hampshire 30 
14 Madison Wisconsin 30 
 
 
 
While 14 census tracts out of 124 census tracts including three or more CLT 
units have 30 or more CLT units, four census tracts are located at the pre-selected city-
wide area (Denver in Colorado). Therefore, 10 census tracts in 9 cities in 8 states were 
subjects for the second approach.  
For selecting gentrified census tracts without CLT, surrounding census tracts 
adjacent to those 10 census tracts with 30 or more CLT units were examined. This 
examination aimed to investigate additional city-wide areas in case that the adjacent 
census tract was gentrified. The subjects of investigation were restricted to only adjacent 
census tracts in order to get more appropriate cases for comparison.   
To avoid selection bias, a maximum of four census tracts were selected as 
subjects of investigation per each census tract with over 30 CLT units. The first four 
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census tracts which had similar populations with the census tract with over 30 CLT units 
during the starting year (e.g. 2000) were selected. Population density was not used 
because the census tracts could include large sized census tracts within an area, and 
fewer people, which could skew the results. Therefore, census tracts within the same 
county with the census tract with over 30 CLT units were chosen. In some cases, census 
tracts in different counties touch with the census tract with over 30 CLT units. Different 
counties could mean they have dissimilar socio-economic characteristics; therefore, 
those census tracts were excluded.  
There is another exclusion. If the subject census tract has an area of land ten 
times or larger than the census tract with over 30 CLT units, it was excluded. In many 
cases, those census tracts are at the border of the entire county or have low population 
density, which means many socio-economic characteristics could be largely different 
from the research area. 
As a result, only the city of Albuquerque has a gentrified census tract adjacent to 
the census tract that has 30 or more CLT units. Thus, only one city, Albuquerque in New 
Mexico, was selected for this research. Figure 4-4 describes the distribution of each type 
of census tracts in Albuquerque, New Mexico. 
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Figure 4-4. Distribution of each type of census tracts in Albuquerque, NM 
 
 
 
Within Albuquerque, 124 census tracts were known as comparable census tracts 
between 2000 and 2010. Among them, census tracts having at least one CLT unit were 
excluded based on the dataset, and still 124 census tracts had no CLT unit at all. 
According to this process, six gentrified census tracts without CLT units were found in 
Albuquerque. Table 4-14 shows the result of this selection. 
 
 
 
Table 4-14. Number of gentrified census tracts without CLT in Albuquerque 
City State 
Total Comparable 
Tracts 
Comparable Tracts 
without CLT 
Gentrified 
Tracts 
Albuquerque NM 124 124 6 
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Based on the above two stage process, the total number of census tracts selected 
as gentrified neighborhoods without a CLT unit is 44. The distribution of gentrified 
census tracts that do not have any CLT unit introduced between 2000 and 2009 is shown 
at figure 4-5: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-5. Distribution of gentrified census tracts without CLT 
 
 
 
 
4.1.7 Non-gentrified neighborhoods without CLT 
Selecting corresponding cases is a very important process in a quasi-
experimental research design. Non-gentrified neighborhoods without CLT units are 
corresponding cases to both gentrified neighborhoods and neighborhoods with CLT 
units in this research. Moreover, this neighborhood type is the most common in the U.S. 
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among the four types of neighborhoods. Therefore, an elaborate selection with 
reasonable criteria is critical to conduct this research appropriately. 
To reduce unexpected impacts, the corresponding census tracts should be close to 
the neighborhoods with CLT or, at least, in the same city-wide area.  This might ensure 
the corresponding census tracts are in the same environment with regard to housing 
market, demographic composition, and so on. Based on this principle, non-gentrified 
neighborhoods without CLT were selected through a two-step process.  
First, census tracts adjacent to those with CLT units were selected. In order to 
select adjacent census tracts, the previous criteria were used for selecting gentrified 
census tract without CLT. The adjacent census tracts of 14 gentrified census tracts with 
CLT were examined, and 17 non-gentrified census tracts without CLT unit were selected. 
In addition, the adjacent census tracts of 14 non-gentrified census tracts having 30 or 
more CLT units were investigated, and 35 non-gentrified census tracts without CLT unit 
were selected. Table 4-15 shows the distribution of selected census tracts as follows: 
 
 
 
Table 4-15. Non-gentrified census tracts without CLT from adjacent tracts 
Source City State Selected tracts Total 
Adjacent to 14 
gentrified census 
tracts with CLT 
Denver CO 3 
17 census tracts 
Delray Beach (2) FL 5 
Duluth (4) MN 3 
Meadow MN 1 
Proctor MN 0 
Minnetonka MN 1 
Minneapolis MN 2 
Portland (2) OR 2 
Bellingham WA 0 
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Table 4-15. Continued 
Source City State Selected tracts Total 
Adjacent to 14 non-
gentrified census 
tracts with 30+ CLT 
Albuquerque NM 3 
35 census tracts 
Denver (4) CO 10 
Chapel Hill (2) NC 4 
Hanover NH 1 
Rochester MN 2 
Los Angeles CA 2 
Missoula MT 4 
Longmont CO 4 
Lebanon NH 3 
Madison WI 2 
Total 52 census tracts 
Note: (  ) means the number of census tract 
 
 
 
Second, census tracts from the ten city-wide areas, which were used to select 
gentrified census tracts without CLT, were selected. Since too many non-gentrified 
census tracts with no CLT unit are in this pool, only 10% of every available census tracts 
were randomly selected. If the total number of available census tracts was less than 10, 
one census tract was randomly selected. Table 4-16 shows the distribution of total non-
gentrified census tracts without CLT from corresponding city-wide areas. 
 
 
 
Table 4-16. Non-gentrified census tracts without CLT from corresponding city-
wide areas 
No. City State Total comparable tracts Selected tracts 
1 Denver CO 97 12 
2 Delray Beach FL 14 2 
3 Duluth MN 8 1 
4 Meadow MN 9 1 
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Table 4-16. Continued 
No. City State Total comparable tracts Selected tracts 
5 Minneapolis MN 74 8 
6 Minnetonka MN 6 1 
7 Proctor MN 29 3 
8 Portland OR 110 11 
9 Bellingham WA 2 1 
10 Albuquerque NM 120 12 
Total 469 52 
 
 
 
Based on the previous process, first, 52 census tracts adjacent to those with CLT 
units were selected as shown in table 4-15. Second, 52 census tracts from city-wide areas 
that have gentrified census tracts with CLT units were selected as shown in table 4-16. 
Table 4-17 shows the total distribution of non-gentrified census tracts without CLT unit.  
 
 
 
Table 4-17. Distribution of non-gentrified census tracts without CLT 
No. City State Selected tracts 
1 Denver CO 25 
2 Los Angeles CA 2 
3 Longmont CO 4 
4 Delray Beach FL 7 
5 Duluth MN 4 
6 Meadow MN 2 
7 Proctor MN 3 
8 Minnetonka MN 2 
9 Minneapolis MN 10 
10 Rochester MN 2 
11 Missoula MT 4 
12 Chapel Hill NC 4 
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Table 4-17. Continued 
No. City State Selected tracts 
13 Hanover NH 1 
14 Lebanon NH 3 
15 Albuquerque NM 15 
16 Portland OR 13 
17 Bellingham WA 1 
18 Madison WI 2 
Total 104 
 
 
 
The distribution of non-gentrified census tracts that do not have any CLT unit 
introduced between 2000 and 2009 is described in figure 4-6 as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-6. Distribution of non-gentrified census tracts without CLT 
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For a better understanding, the distribution of non-gentrified census tracts 
without CLT and corresponing census tracts in the area of Chapel Hill, North Carilina 
are illustrated in figure 4-7: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-7. Distribution of each type of census tracts in Chapel Hill, NC 
 
 
 
 
4.1.8 Summary and limitation  
To examine CLTs’ impacts on gentrified neighborhoods, the data of the location 
of CLT units have been collected from 46 CLT organizations in 22 states, and the 
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neighborhoods from the data have been matched with similar neighborhoods that do not 
have CLT units within the same housing market. The total number of neighborhoods is 
272, and they are categorized into four types for this study as table 4-18 shows: 
 
 
 
Table 4-18. The number of each neighborhood type 
 Neighborhoods With CLT Neighborhoods Without CLT 
Gentrified Neighborhoods 14 Neighborhoods 44 Neighborhoods 
Non-gentrified Neighborhoods 110 Neighborhoods 104 Neighborhoods 
 
 
 
The distribution of these four types of neighborhoods is illustrated in figure 4-8 
as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-8. Distribution of census tracts for the analysis 
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To describe this distribution more clearly, the following maps show the actual 
distribution by census tracts. Two cities, Minneapolis in Minnesota and Denver in 
Colorado that have every type of census tract could show the distribution clearly. Figure 
4-9 and 4-10 show the distribution of each type of census tract as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-9. Distribution of each type of census tracts in Minneapolis, MN 
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Figure 4-10. Distribution of each type of census tracts in Denver, CO 
 
 
 
In the meantime, there are a few limitations on selecting data. First, I have 
selected 44 gentrified census tracts with no CLT units from 10 cities in 6 states in order 
to get cases corresponding to 14 gentrified census tracts with CLT units. The reason was 
that only 14 census tracts with CLT units were gentrified, so it was an inevitable process 
97 
to ensure the reliability of the comparison. Nonetheless, the limited number of cities in 
this process is obviously the limitation for generalization. Second, some major CLT 
organizations in mega city regions were excluded from the analysis because they were 
widely scattered over their regions or their CLT units were not in the gentrified census 
tract. This unintended exclusion could cause unexpected bias. 
4.2 Qualitative Approach 
To complement these limitations and to develop understanding of actual 
conditions, this study employs in-depth interviewing using semi-structured questions 
(Marshall & Rossman, 1999). 
The major strength of interviewing is the opportunity to learn about what we 
cannot see and to explore alternative explanations of what we have found in quantitative 
analysis. Furthermore, through a combination with the quantitative findings, 
interviewing allows us to understand common characteristics each neighborhood holds 
(Glesne, 1999). 
The selection of study participants is the first step to set the interviewing. 
Basically, the subjects of interviewing are field experts such as CLT directors. Their 
direct experiences in the field and practical insight are needed for this study. Therefore, I 
sent email to the persons whom I contacted to get the CLT information and received it, 
and most of them are CLT directors. I let participants know that participation is 
voluntary, of any aspects of the research that might affect their well-being, and that they 
may freely choose to stop participation at any point in the study by written informed 
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consent form. I communicated with them by phone and/or email from November 4, 2014 
to December 20, 2014, and 11 of them from 11 CLT organizations within 9 states 
responded. While I do not disclose which neighborhoods were gentrified to participants, 
4 CLT organizations have CLT units in gentrified neighborhoods. Table 4-19 shows the 
distribution of respondents for interviewing. 
 
 
 
Table 4-19. Distribution of respondents for interviewing 
No. State Responded CLT experts 
1 California 1 
2 Colorado 2 
3 Florida 2 
4 Minnesota 1 
5 New Mexico 1 
6 North Carolina 1 
7 Oregon 1 
8 Washington 1 
9 Wisconsin 1 
Total 11 
 
 
 
Next step is to design interview questions that fit the purpose. The questions are 
developed from the quantitative findings, and the pre-established questions remain 
unchanged through the interview.  
Both to get a holistic view and to generate facts, opinions, and insights, I used an 
open-ended structured interview that would enable the exploration of many themes but 
that still could focus on CLTs. In addition, one of the advantages of open-ended question 
is the potential to recall unexpected data from interviewees. 
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Three structured questions were used for complementing my quantitative 
findings. First question is about the findings that support my research hypotheses that are 
related to CLT’s positive effects to counteract gentrification. Second question is about 
the findings that are contrary to my research hypotheses. The last question is a general 
question that they can express any aspect of their thoughts related to CLT and 
gentrification.  
However, this method also has some concerns or limitations. First, participants 
can misunderstand the findings of quantitative approach. Second, there could be possible 
bias from the desire of participants. For example, every participant is CLT practitioner; 
thus, they are likely to have more positive perspectives to their model than negative ones. 
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5. FINDINGS
5.1 Quantitative Approach 
5.1.1 Framework for data analysis 
This study is based on ethnographic and socioeconomic research and conducted 
in a timeframe of a decade (2000-2010) in the U.S. To examine the impacts of CLTs on 
gentrification, measurable indices were selected based on the previous literature in 
Section 3. Table 5-1 shows again the relationship between negative effects of 
gentrification and benefits of CLTs and how each neighborhood index is related to the 
impacts of CLTs on gentrification: 
Table 5-1. Theoretical foundation of measurable neighborhood index 
Negative effect of 
gentrification 
Benefits of CLTs Neighborhood index 
Displacement 
Build Community Assets 
Ethnic composition 
Middle-class ratio 
Income level 
Education level 
Stabilize Neighborhood 
Length of residence 
Age fluctuation 
Lower Affordability Increase Affordability 
Affordability  
Owner-occupied housing rate 
Skyrocket of Property 
Price 
Stabilize Neighborhood Housing price 
The above neighborhood indices were analyzed by measurable data from the U.S. 
Census and the American Community Survey. To match the indices with available data, 
the measurement methods for each neighborhood index are summarized as follows: 
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Table 5-2. Measurement methods for each neighborhood index 
Neighborhood 
index 
Measurement method 
Ethnic composition Proportion of white population 
Middle-class ratio Proportion of households having 80-100% of Area Median Income 
Income level Proportion of median income compared to city-wide area 
Education level Proportion of residents who graduated high school or more 
Length of 
Residence 
Proportion of residents who live in the same house compared to city-
wide area 
Age fluctuation Amount of change in age distribution between 2000 and 2010 (Index) 
Affordability Proportion of median housing value compared to city-wide area 
Owner-occupied 
housing rate 
Proportion of owner-occupied housing units compared to all occupied 
housing units 
Housing Price 
Proportion of median housing value compared to national median 
housing value 
 
 
 
Table 5-2 illustrates how to measure each index. The details of each index will be 
described in the following corresponding subsections. Based on the above measurement 
methods, table 5-3 shows the statistics from two major public datasets used for decennial 
comparison. 
 
 
 
Table 5-3. Statistics and dataset for each neighborhood index  
Neighborhood 
index 
Statistics Dataset 
Ethnic 
composition 
Race: proportion of white alone Census 2000 & 2010 
Middle-class 
ratio 
Household Income: Proportion of 
households having 80-100% of each 
city-wide median income 
Census 2000 & American 
Community Survey 2006-2010 
Income level Median Household Income 
Census 2000 & American 
Community Survey 2006-2010 
Education level 
Cumulative Educational Attainment For 
Population 25 Years And Over: High 
School Graduate or more 
Census 2000 & American 
Community Survey 2006-2010 
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Table 5-3. Continued 
Neighborhood 
index 
Statistics Dataset 
Length of 
Residence 
Residence In 1995 For The Population 
5+ Years: Same house in 1995  
Census 2000 
Residence 1 Year Ago By Sex In The 
United States: Same house 1 year ago 
American Community Survey 
2006-2010 
Age fluctuation 
Age (Short Version): Total Population: 
Under 18 years / 18 to 34 years / 35 to 
64 years / 65 and over 
Census 2000 & 2010 
Affordability 
Median House Value For All Owner-
Occupied Housing Units: Median value 
Census 2000 & American 
Community Survey 2006-2010 
Owner-occupied 
housing rate 
Tenure: Occupied Housing Units: 
Owner Occupied  
Census 2000 & American 
Community Survey 2006-2010 
Housing Price 
Median House Value For All Owner-
Occupied Housing Units: Median value 
Census 2000 & American 
Community Survey 2006-2010 
 
 
 
While the length of residence has different statistics between 2000 and 2010 due 
to the reformation of the Census, this difference is not problematic because the rate of 
change from 2000 to 2010 was used and those two statistics were compared to city-wide 
areas. Accordingly, the absolute value of length of residence is not meaningful, but the 
calculated index is. Other indices used the same statistics between 2000 and 2010 for a 
correct comparison.  
The actual statistical values that were used in this research were investigated for 
each census tract for both 2000 and 2010. The averages of each type of neighborhood 
were essentially used to show the characteristics of the neighborhoods. Table 5-4 
indicates the averages of the neighborhood indices for building community assets by the 
type of neighborhood: 
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Table 5-4. Average of building community assets index 
Neighborhood 
White 
population 
ratio (%) 
Middle-class 
ratio (%) 
Median income 
($) 
Highschool+ 
ratio (%) 
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 
Gentrified & CLT 64.21 67.88 12.05 9.94 38,686 52,456 79.11 86.44 
CLT 78.03 60.95 13.03 10.43 44,831 54,928 84.62 86.94 
Gentrified 69.92 58.46 13.06 8.65 37,645 53,929 81.55 91.49 
Other 77.23 57.66 12.44 9.68 44,022 51,949 83.34 86.79 
 
 
 
Table 5-5 shows the average values of neighborhood indices related to the 
benefits of CLTs such as stabilizing neighborhoods and affordability by the type of 
neighborhood: 
 
 
 
Table 5-5. Average of stabilizing neighborhood and affordability index 
Neighborhood 
Long term resident 
ratio (%) 
Owner-occupied 
housing rate (%) 
Median housing 
value ($) 
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 
Gentrified & CLT 56.56 84.02 67.89 67.88 100,014 211,393 
CLT 47.74 82.67 63.03 60.95 149,105 271,119 
Gentrified 41.47 79.92 56.88 58.46 148,930 287,785 
Other 46.57 79.84 60.05 57.66 150,425 259,163 
 
 
 
The age distribution is a little bit more complicated. According to a short version 
of the Census dataset, age distribution was divided into four brackets. To analyze age 
distribution change, the information about every age bracket was collected. Table 5-6 
 104 
 
shows the average values of each age bracket by the type of neighborhood and by year 
of 2000 and 2010: 
 
 
 
Table 5-6. Averages of age distribution by neighborhood type 
Neighborhood 
Population ratio (%) 
2000 2010 
0-18 18-34 35-64 65+ 0-18 18-34 35-64 65+ 
Gentrified & 
CLT 
28.08 22.34 36.84 12.79 23.48 24.81 39.25 12.47 
CLT 25.15 24.85 37.74 12.32 22.46 25.64 39.25 12.66 
Gentrified 20.36 29.17 38.39 12.11 16.60 29.65 41.78 11.54 
Other 21.11 27.28 37.79 13.83 19.66 27.53 39.11 13.72 
 
 
 
Lastly, only the differences between two groups that are statistically significantly 
at p < 0.05 are considered to be significant in the following comparisons. 
 
5.1.2 Ethnic composition 
The research hypothesis is that CLTs might help increase racial diversity in 
gentrifying neighborhoods. The proportion of the white population in the total 
population was used to examine the diversity of race in neighborhoods. Therefore, the 
ethnic composition was measured by the proportion of the white population in a 
neighborhood. Table 5-7 shows the averages of white population ratio by neighborhood 
type and year: 
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Table 5-7. Average of white population ratio by neighborhood type 
Neighborhood 
White Population Ratio (%) 
2000 2010 ± t-value 
Gentrified & CLT 64.21 69.54 +5.33 -2.03** 
CLT 77.88 75.60 -2.28 4.37** 
Gentrified 69.92 77.48 +7.56 -7.03** 
Other 77.23 76.74 -0.49 0.70 
 
 
 
According to the above table 5-7, the white population ratio was not significantly 
changed in non-gentrified neighborhoods without CLT between 2000 and 2010. 
However, there is a significant increase in the white population ratio in both gentrified 
neighborhoods regardless of the presence of CLT units.  
Since the variable of the white population ratio had been used to choose 
gentrified neighborhoods, the significant change in gentrified neighborhoods shouldn’t 
be considered. The important issue is that the white population ratio significantly 
decreased in only non-gentrified neighborhoods with CLT.  
 
 
 
Table 5-8. Average of white population ratio by CLT 
Neighborhood 
White Population Ratio (%) 
2000 2010 ±  t-value 
Neighborhoods with CLT 76.30 74.90 -1.40 2.38** 
Neighborhoods without CLT 75.10 76.96 +1.86 -2.84** 
t-value -0.44 0.88   
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Table 5-8 shows that there is a significant difference in the white population ratio 
between neighborhoods with CLT and without CLT. While the white population ratio 
significantly decreased in neighborhoods with CLT, it significantly increased in 
neighborhoods without CLT. This means that generally CLT has positive effects on the 
diversity of ethnicity in their neighborhoods. Table 5-9 shows the cross comparison for 
average of white population ratio. 
 
 
 
Table 5-9. Cross comparison for average of white population ratio 
2000 2010 
 CLT No CLT t-value  CLT No CLT t-value 
Gentrified 64.21 69.92 -0.73 Gentrified 69.54 77.48 -1.29 
No Gentrified 77.88 77.23 0.22 No Gentrified 75.60 76.74 -0.44 
t-value -1.91 -2.09**  t-value -0.94 0.26  
 
 
 
As mentioned above, t-value calculated between gentrified and non-gentrified 
neighborhoods has no meaning because the variable of the white population ratio has 
already been used to select gentrified neighborhoods. Thus, there is no result that is 
statistically significant. 
In summary, CLT has positive effects on diverse ethnic composition generally. 
However, CLT doesn’t have any significant effect on diverse ethnic composition in 
gentrified neighborhoods. CLTs have positive effects on diverse ethnic composition in 
neighborhoods where they are located. 
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5.1.3 Middle-class ratio 
The research hypothesis related to the middle-class ratio is that CLTs might help 
increase middle-class ratio in gentrifying neighborhoods. The definition of middle class 
is varied; however, this study focuses on the lower middle-class because it is a target 
class of CLTs. Generally, the lower middle-class has 80 to 100% of the area median 
income (AMI). Therefore, the lower middle-class ratio means the proportion of 
households with incomes 80 to 100% of the AMI. Table 5-10 shows the average of 
lower middle-class ratio by neighborhood type and year: 
 
 
 
Table 5-10. Average of lower middle-class ratio by neighborhood type 
Neighborhood 
Lower middle-class ratio (%) 
2000 2010 ± t-value 
Gentrified & CLT 12.05 9.94 -2.11 1.56 
CLT 13.14 10.58 -2.56 4.81** 
Gentrified 13.06 8.65 -4.41 6.40** 
Other 12.44 9.68 -2.76 6.83** 
 
 
 
The lower middle-class ratio was not significantly changed in gentrified 
neighborhoods with CLT between 2000 and 2010. However, there were significant 
decreases in gentrified neighborhoods without CLT and both non-gentrified 
neighborhoods. This result can be interpreted that CLTs have significant effects on the 
lower middle-class ratio only in gentrified neighborhoods.  
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Table 5-11. Average of lower middle-class ratio by gentrification and CLT 
Neighborhood 
Lower middle-class Ratio (%) 
2000 2010 ±  t-value 
Gentrified neighborhoods 12.82 8.96 -3.86 6.18** 
Non-gentrified neighborhoods 12.79 10.13 -2.66 7.98** 
t-value -0.14 1.95   
Neighborhoods with CLT 13.01 10.51 -2.50 5.07** 
Neighborhoods without CLT 12.62 9.38 -3.24 9.16** 
t-value -0.44 0.88   
 
 
 
According to table 5-11, the lower middle class ratio in neighborhoods decreased 
less in neighborhoods with CLT than without CLT. However, the t-test does not show 
the size of difference between two group means; thus, there is no evidence that CLTs 
have positive effects on maintaining lower middle-class residents in their neighborhoods. 
Table 5-12 shows the cross comparison for average of lower middle-class ratio. 
 
 
 
Table 5-12. Cross comparison for average of lower middle-class ratio 
2000 2010 
 CLT No CLT t-value  CLT No CLT t-value 
Gentrified 12.05 13.06 -0.90 Gentrified 9.94 8.65 1.37 
No Gentrified 13.14 12.44 1.31 No Gentrified 10.58 9.68 1.67 
t-value -0.93 0.96  t-value -0.57 -1.57  
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According to the above comparison, nothing is statistically significant. This 
means that statistically there is no difference in averages between any two types of 
neighborhoods in either year period. 
From the results of the analysis, we can learn that the lower middle-class ratio 
decreased in every type of neighborhoods except gentrified neighborhoods with CLT. 
CLTs have positive effects on preventing the decrease of the lower middle-class ratio in 
gentrifying neighborhoods. In addition, generally CLTs have negative effects on 
decreasing lower middle-class ratio in their neighborhoods. In summary, CLTs prevent 
decrease of the proportions of lower middle-class residents in gentrified neighborhoods. 
In other words, CLT can help lower middle-class residents from being displaced from 
gentrified neighborhoods. 
 
5.1.4 Income level 
The research hypothesis related to the income level is that CLTs might help 
maintain the income level in gentrifying neighborhoods. Maintaining the income level in 
gentrifying neighborhoods means that not many low income residents were pushed out 
from their living spaces. The median income index is the proportion of median income 
compared to each city-wide area. Even though this is not an actual income but an index 
compared to the surrounding areas, the variable of median income had been used to 
select gentrified neighborhoods. Therefore, the results by gentrification shouldn’t be 
compared in the same way it was in the ethnic composition. Table 5-13 shows the 
averages of median income index by neighborhood type and year: 
 110 
 
Table 5-13. Average of median income index by neighborhood type 
Neighborhood 
Median income index 
2000 2010 ± t-value 
Gentrified & CLT 0.98 1.10 +0.12 -8.36** 
CLT 0.99 1.00 +0.01 -0.17 
Gentrified 0.96 1.16 +0.20 -9.02** 
Other 1.09 1.08 -0.01 0.72 
 
 
 
There is no meaningful information from the table 5-13. As we can guess, 
gentrification increases the median income of neighborhoods compared to the citywide 
areas. The following table compares neighborhoods with CLT and without CLT, but 
doesn’t compare by gentrification due to the above reason. 
 
 
 
Table 5-14. Average of median income index by CLT 
Neighborhood 
Median income index 
2000 2010 ±  t-value 
Neighborhoods with CLT 0.99 1.01 +0.02 -1.37 
Neighborhoods without CLT 1.05 1.10 +0.05 -3.19** 
t-value 1.39 1.99**   
 
 
 
According to table 5-14, while the median income index significantly increased 
in general neighborhoods, there is no significant change in neighborhoods with CLT. 
This means that CLTs stabilize the income of their neighborhoods compared to 
surrounding areas despite there are more low-income households in neighborhoods with 
CLT units. Table 5-15 shows no significant difference by neighborhood type and year: 
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Table 5-15. Cross comparison for median income index 
2000 2010 
 CLT No CLT t-value  CLT No CLT t-value 
Gentrified 0.98 0.96 0.18 Gentrified 1.10 1.16 -0.59 
No Gentrified 0.99 1.09 -1.90 No Gentrified 1.00 1.08 -1.48 
t-value -0.21 -1.86  t-value 1.19 1.14  
 
 
 
In summary, while gentrification increases income in neighborhoods compared 
to surrounding areas, CLTs stabilize income level in their neighborhoods. CLTs help 
maintain income levels in their neighborhoods. 
 
5.1.5 Education level 
The research hypothesis related to the education level is that CLTs help increase 
the education level of residents in gentrifying neighborhoods. As shown in the previous 
two neighborhood indices such as the ethnic composition and the income level, the ratio 
of people who graduated college with bachelor’s degree or more has already been used 
to identify gentrified neighborhoods. However, to measure the education level of 
residents, the proportion of population who graduated high school or more in each 
neighborhood was used because CLTs focus on low income residents who are more 
likely to be less educated. Even though those two are different variables, the proportion 
of population who graduated high school or more wasn’t used for comparing by 
gentrification. This is because the possible correlation between the high school graduate 
ratio and the college graduate ratio could exist. Thus, the education level means the 
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proportion of residents who graduated high school or more. Table 5-16 shows the 
average of the high school or more graduates ratio by neighborhood type and year: 
 
 
 
Table 5-16. Average of education level by neighborhood type 
Neighborhood 
Education (Highschool+) (%) 
2000 2010 ± t-value 
Gentrified & CLT 79.11 86.44 +7.33 -5.44** 
CLT 84.30 86.67 +2.37 -2.11** 
Gentrified 81.55 91.49 +9.95 -9.54** 
Other 83.34 86.79 +3.45 -6.13** 
 
 
 
Table 5-16 indicates that the high school graduates ratio is significantly increased 
in all kind of neighborhoods. Table 5-17 compares neighborhoods with CLT and without 
CLT and doesn’t compare by gentrification due to the above reason. 
 
 
 
Table 5-17. Average of education level by CLT 
Neighborhood 
Education (High School Educated +) 
2000 2010 ±  t-value 
Neighborhoods with CLT 83.70 86.64 +2.94 -2.90** 
Neighborhoods without CLT 82.82 88.16 +5.36 -9.63** 
t-value -0.56 0.96   
 
 
 
Table 5-17 shows that there is no difference between neighborhoods with CLT 
and without CLT. The education level increased regardless of the presence of CLT units.  
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Table 5-18. Cross comparison for education level 
2000 2010 
 CLT No CLT t-value  CLT No CLT t-value 
Gentrified 79.11 81.55 -0.69 Gentrified 86.44 91.49 -2.03** 
No Gentrified 84.30 83.34 0.53 No Gentrified 86.67 86.79 -0.06 
t-value -1.54 -0.73  t-value -0.05 2.48**  
 
 
 
According to table 5-18, the gentrified neighborhoods without CLT shows more 
increase in high school educated residents than the gentrified neighborhoods with CLT 
between 2000 and 2010. This result can be interpreted that CLTs have negative effects 
on high school education rate in gentrified neighborhoods.  
In summary, CLTs have negative effects on education level in gentrified 
neighborhoods. While CLTs have no impact on education level in non-gentrified 
neighborhoods, CLTs do not help increase the education level of residents in gentrified 
neighborhoods. 
 
 
5.1.6 Length of residence 
The length of residence is related to one of the benefits of CLTs: stabilizing 
neighborhoods. The research hypothesis related to the length of residence is that CLTs 
help increase the length of residence in gentrifying neighborhoods. The length of 
residence index means the proportion of people who live in the same house compared to 
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city-wide areas. Table 5-19 shows the length of residence index by neighborhood type 
and year: 
 
 
 
Table 5-19. Average of length of residence index by neighborhood type 
Neighborhood 
Length of Residence Index 
2000 2010 ± t-value 
Gentrified & CLT 1.10 1.06 -0.04 1.43 
CLT 0.96 1.00 +0.04 -2.32** 
Gentrified 0.90 1.01 +0.11 -2.49** 
Other 1.02 1.01 -0.01 0.29 
 
 
 
The length of residence index is significantly increased in non-gentrified 
neighborhoods with CLTs and gentrified neighborhoods without CLTs. Table 5-20 
shows the length of residence index by gentrification and CLT: 
 
 
 
Table 5-20. Average of length of residence by gentrification and CLT 
Neighborhood 
Length of Residence Index 
2000 2010 ±  t-value 
Gentrified neighborhoods 0.95 1.02 +0.07 -2.04** 
Non-gentrified neighborhoods 0.99 1.01 +0.02 -1.11 
t-value 0.93 -0.74   
Neighborhoods with CLT 0.98 1.01 +0.03 -1.90 
Neighborhoods without CLT 0.99 1.01 +0.02 -1.21 
t-value 0.20 0.19   
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The length of residence is significantly increased in gentrified neighborhoods, 
while there is no significant difference between 2000 and 2010 in other types of 
neighborhoods. Table 5-21 shows the cross comparison for length of residence. 
 
 
 
Table 5-21. Cross comparison for length of residence 
2000 2010 
 CLT No CLT t-value  CLT No CLT t-value 
Gentrified 1.10 0.90 2.07** Gentrified 1.06 1.01 1.38 
No Gentrified 0.96 1.02 -1.50 No Gentrified 1.00 1.01 -0.58 
t-value 2.24** -1.98**  t-value 1.75 -0.13  
 
 
 
The results from the cross comparison indicate first that the length of residence 
index decreased in gentrified neighborhoods with CLT while increasing in gentrified 
neighborhoods without CLT. Second, the length of residence index decreased in 
gentrified neighborhoods with CLT while increasing in non-gentrified neighborhoods 
with CLT. Third, the length of residence index decreased in non-gentrified 
neighborhoods without CLT while increasing in gentrified without CLT. In sum, the 
length of residence index increased in both gentrified neighborhoods without CLT and 
non-gentrified neighborhoods with CLT while decreased in both gentrified 
neighborhoods with CLT and non-gentrified neighborhoods without CLT. Therefore, we 
can say that CLTs have negative effects on the length of residence in gentrified 
neighborhoods, while having positive effects in non-gentrified neighborhoods. 
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5.1.7 Age fluctuation 
The age fluctuation is related to one of the benefits of CLTs, stabilizing 
neighborhoods. The research hypothesis related to the age fluctuation is that CLTs help 
stabilize the age fluctuation in gentrifying neighborhoods. Thus, the age index was 
composed, which means the amount of change in age distribution between 2000 and 
2010.  
There are four age brackets in the Census dataset. Each bracket has its own 
percentage in a neighborhood, so the age index is calculated by the sum of the percent 
change in each bracket between 2000 and 2010 data. This index can be shown in table 5-
22: 
 
 
 
Table 5-22. Description of the age index formula 
Age Bracket 2000 2010 change 
Under 18 years A0 A1 (A1-A0)
2
 
18 to 34 years B0 B1 (B1-B0)
2
 
35 to 64 years C0 C1 (C1-C0)
2
 
65 and over D0 D1 (D1-D0)
2
 
 
Age Index = √(A1 − A0)^2 +  (B1 − B0)^2 + (C1 − C0)^2 +  (D1 − D0)^2 
 
 
 
According to the function of the age index, the age index has only one value 
because it considers both the year of 2000 and 2010. Moreover, the absolute value of the 
 117 
 
age index has no meaning. The value of the age index can only be used for comparison. 
Table 5-23 shows the age index by gentrification and CLT: 
 
 
 
 Table 5-23. Average of age index by gentrification and CLT 
Neighborhood 
Age Index 
±  
Gentrified neighborhoods 7.45 
Non-gentrified neighborhoods 5.85 
t-value -3.48** 
Neighborhoods with CLT 5.89 
Neighborhoods without CLT 6.44 
t-value 1.44 
 
 
 
This result shows that age distribution was changed more in gentrified 
neighborhoods than non-gentrified neighborhoods. More age fluctuation is generally 
expected in gentrified neighborhoods because more people move and/or are displaced in 
those neighborhoods. 
 
 
 
Table 5-24. Cross comparison between each neighborhood 
 
 
 
 
 
 CLT No CLT t-value 
Gentrified 6.59 7.73 -0.98 
No Gentrified 5.79 5.91 -0.30 
t-value 0.83 3.52**  
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Table 5-24 shows that the only statistically significant difference of change of 
age distribution between gentrified and non-gentrified neighborhoods is within 
neighborhoods without CLT. That is, more age distribution change occurred in gentrified 
neighborhoods without CLT than non-gentrified neighborhoods without CLT. However, 
there is no difference between gentrified neighborhoods with CLT and non-gentrified 
neighborhoods with CLT in the age distribution change. In summary, CLTs stabilize 
abrupt age distribution fluctuation in gentrified neighborhoods. 
 
5.1.8 Affordability 
One of the benefits of CLTs is to increase affordability. The research hypothesis 
related to affordability is that CLTs help counteract decreased affordability in 
gentrifying neighborhoods. Affordability is frequently defined in the city under a variety 
of criteria. The housing value compared to the surrounding area is considered as 
affordability. Thus, the affordability index is the proportion of median housing value 
compared to city-wide areas. The following table shows the affordability index by 
neighborhood type and year. The sign of the actual affordability index was converted to 
help better understand neighborhood affordability. Therefore, the affordability index 
values closer to zero indicate more affordable neighborhoods, while more negative 
affordability index values mean less affordable neighborhoods. Table 5-25 shows the 
average of affordability index by neighborhood type and year: 
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Table 5-25. Average of affordability index by neighborhood type 
Neighborhood 
Affordability Index 
2000 2010 ± t-value 
Gentrified & CLT -0.91 -1.00 -0.09 -4.28** 
CLT -1.00 -1.00 0 -0.11 
Gentrified -1.03 -1.20 -0.17 -7.89** 
Other -1.10 -1.10 0 -0.13 
 
 
 
Affordability index is significantly decreased in both gentrified neighborhood 
with CLT and without CLT. On the other hand, there is no change in non-gentrified 
neighborhoods. Table 5-26 shows the average of affordability by gentrification and CLT. 
 
 
 
Table 5-26. Average of affordability by gentrification and CLT 
Neighborhood 
Affordability Index 
2000 2010 ±  t-value 
Gentrified neighborhoods -1.00 -1.16 -0.16 -8.58** 
Non-gentrified neighborhoods -1.05 -1.05 0 -0.17 
t-value 0.95 -1.83   
Neighborhoods with CLT -1.00 -1.00 0 -0.92 
Neighborhoods without CLT -1.08 -1.13 -0.05 -3.15** 
t-value 2.05** 2.73**   
 
 
 
Gentrification has negative effects on the affordability in neighborhoods, and 
CLTs stabilize the decrease of the affordability in their neighborhoods. Moreover, 
affordability was significantly decreased in neighborhoods without CLT. 
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Table 5-27. Cross comparison for average of affordability 
2000 2010 
 CLT No CLT t-value  CLT No CLT t-value 
Gentrified -0.91 -1.03 -1.88 Gentrified -1.00 -1.20 -3.00** 
No Gentrified -1.00 -1.10 -1.88 No Gentrified -1.00 -1.10 -1.72 
t-value -0.90 -1.13  t-value 0.02 1.43  
 
 
 
According to table 5-27, only statistically significant finding is that affordability 
was less decreased in gentrified neighborhoods with CLT than without CLT between 
2000 and 2010. This finding shows that CLTs stabilize the decrease of affordability in 
gentrified neighborhoods.  
In summary, while gentrification decreases affordability in their neighborhoods, 
CLTs stabilize affordability in their neighborhoods. CLTs alleviate the decrease of 
affordability in gentrified neighborhoods. 
 
5.1.9 Owner-occupied housing rate 
The owner-occupied housing rate is related to one of the benefits of CLTs: 
increasing affordability. The research hypothesis related to the owner-occupied housing 
rate is that CLTs help stabilize increasing owner-occupied housing rates in gentrifying 
neighborhoods. The owner-occupied housing rate is the percentage of the owner-
occupied housing units in the total occupied housing units. Table 5-28 shows the owner-
occupied housing rates by neighborhood type and year: 
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Table 5-28. Average of owner-occupied housing rate by neighborhood type 
Neighborhood 
Owner-occupied housing rate 
2000 2010 ± t-value 
Gentrified & CLT 67.89 67.88 -0.01 0.01 
CLT 62.92 60.70 -2.22 4.03** 
Gentrified 56.88 58.46 +1.58 -2.32** 
Other 60.05 57.66 -2.39 5.37** 
 
 
 
According to the table, CLTs lessened the owner-occupied housing rate in 
gentrified neighborhoods, which means that rental housing units are more affordable, 
and increased in proportion or at least didn’t reduce their proportions. Table 5-29 
compares neighborhoods with CLT and without CLT: 
 
 
 
Table 5-29. Average of owner-occupied housing rate by CLT 
Neighborhood 
Owner-occupied housing rate 
2000 2010 ±  t-value 
Neighborhoods with CLT 63.49 61.53 -1.97 3.90** 
Neighborhoods without CLT 59.13 57.89 -1.24 3.09** 
t-value -1.52 -1.34   
 
 
 
According to the table, CLTs have no effects on the owner-occupied housing rate 
in their neighborhoods. The neighborhoods shouldn’t be compared by gentrification 
because it has already been used to select gentrified neighborhoods. 
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Table 5-30. Cross comparison for average of owner-occupied housing rate 
2000 2010 
 CLT No CLT t-value  CLT No CLT t-value 
Gentrified 67.89 56.88 1.46 Gentrified 67.88 58.46 1.43 
No Gentrified 62.92 60.05 0.90 No Gentrified 60.70 57.66 0.99 
t-value 0.82 -0.70  t-value 1.22 0.19  
 
 
 
Table 5-30 shows the cross comparison for average of owner-occupied housing 
rate. This table shows that there is no significant difference between proportions of 
rental units by neighborhood type. In summary, CLTs retain the proportion of rental 
units in gentrified neighborhoods. Thus, CLTs lessen the loss of rental units in gentrified 
neighborhoods. 
 
5.1.10 Housing price 
The housing price is related to another benefit of CLTs: stabilizing 
neighborhoods. The research hypothesis related to the housing price is that CLTs help 
stabilize increasing housing prices in gentrifying neighborhoods. To measure housing 
price change correctly, I compare the actual median housing price of each neighborhood 
to the national median housing price in the same year. The national median price is 
$111,800 in the year 2000 and $188,400 in the year 2010. Thus the housing price index 
indicates the proportion of the median housing price to the national median housing 
price. Table 5-31 shows the housing price index by neighborhood type and year: 
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Table 5-31. Average of housing price index by neighborhood type 
Neighborhood 
Housing price index 
2000 2010 ± t-value 
Gentrified & CLT 0.90 1.12 +0.22 -3.92** 
CLT 1.31 1.43 +0.12 -3.78** 
Gentrified 1.33 1.53 +0.20 -5.36** 
Other 1.35 1.38 +0.03 -0.96 
 
 
 
Only non-gentrified neighborhoods without CLT show no difference in the 
housing price index between 2000 and 2010, which means that the sampling of this 
research was not biased in terms of housing prices. In addition, in case of non-gentrified 
neighborhoods, more median housing value increase in neighborhoods with CLTs than 
neighborhoods without CLTs was shown between 2000 and 2010. This means that CLTs 
help increase their neighborhoods’ housing prices in non-gentrified neighborhoods. 
 
 
 
Table 5-32. Average of housing price index by gentrification and CLT 
Neighborhood 
Housing price index 
2000 2010 ±  t-value 
Gentrified neighborhoods 1.23 1.43 +0.20 -6.60** 
Non-gentrified neighborhoods 1.33 1.40 +0.07 -3.29** 
t-value 1.20 -0.29   
Neighborhoods with CLT 1.27 1.39 +0.12 -4.60** 
Neighborhoods without CLT 1.34 1.42 +0.08 -3.11** 
t-value 1.06 0.35   
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Table 5-32 shows no difference between the changes of housing price index by 
neighborhood types. In every neighborhood, there were significant increases in the 
housing price index with no difference between neighborhoods. 
 
 
 
Table 5-33. Cross comparison for average of housing price index 
2000 2010 
 CLT No CLT t-value  CLT No CLT t-value 
Gentrified 0.90 1.33 -3.93** Gentrified 1.12 1.53 -3.39** 
No Gentrified 1.31 1.35 -0.36 No Gentrified 1.43 1.38 0.55 
t-value -2.29** -0.14  t-value -1.52 1.46  
 
 
 
Table 5-33 shows that the housing price increased more in gentrified 
neighborhoods than non-gentrified neighborhoods in the neighborhoods with CLT. This 
is reasonable because of the fundamental characteristic of gentrification. In the 
neighborhoods without CLT, there are no differences between gentrified and non-
gentrified neighborhoods. In gentrified neighborhoods, the housing price is higher in the 
neighborhoods without CLT than with CLT. However, CLTs didn’t have significant 
effects on the increase of housing price index. In this sense, it can be presumed that 
CLTs were introduced in distressed areas from the first time, thus CLTs played a role in 
alleviating housing prices in gentrified neighborhoods consequently.  
In summary, while gentrification facilitates an increase of housing prices, CLTs 
stabilize the excessive increase of housing prices in gentrified neighborhoods by initially 
entering into lower housing price neighborhoods. 
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5.1.11 Logistic regression 
The collected data also can be analyzed by the binomial logistic regression 
model, which is a conventional logistic model. The purpose of this analysis is to 
determine the relationship between gentrification and other possible factors, including 
CLTs, that can affect gentrification. Thus, the dependent variable is whether 
gentrification occurs or not between 2000 and 2010, and independent variables are nine 
factors from the cross-sectional comparison. Only the housing price index was omitted 
from the independent variables because of collinearity. Table 5-34 shows the results of 
the logistic regression.  
 
 
 
Table 5-34. Logistic regression analysis predicting the likelihood of gentrification 
 Odds Ratio Coefficient z-statistics 
White population (%) 0.974** -0.027** -2.08 
Middle-class household (%) 0.953 -0.048 -1.04 
Graduate high school or more (%) 1.051*  0.049*  1.95 
Length of residence compared to city-
wide area 
1.170  0.157  0.09 
Affordability index 0.950 -0.052 -0.08 
Owner-occupied unit (%) 1.003  0.003  0.27 
Income level compared to city-wide area 1.663  0.509  0.66 
Age fluctuation between 2000 and 2010 1.147***  0.137***  2.84 
CLT = 1 0.301*** -1.202*** -3.28 
Constant 0.011* -4.548* -1.81 
N 272 
LR chi2 (9) 35.36 
Prob > chi2 0.0001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.125 
Log likelihood -123.27371 
Note: ∗ p < 0.10  ∗∗ p < 0.05  ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
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The total number of neighborhoods used in this analysis is 272, which includes 
every type of neighborhoods in this study. The LR chi2 tests the null hypothesis that all 
the independent variables’ coefficients are zero, and the statistic is 35.36 with 9 degree 
of freedom, which is statistically significant as shown in p-value (0.0001). The pseudo 
R
2 
statistic, which means the overall fit of the model, is 0.125. 
The odds ratio are interpreted as follows: If a dependent variable and an 
independent variable are unrelated, the logit coefficient of an independent variable will 
equal 0, and the odds ratio will therefore equal e
0
 = 1. Hence, the stronger the 
relationship, the farther the odds ratio will be from 1. The farther the odds ratio is above 
1, the more a positive association exists; the farther the odds ratio is below 1, the more a 
negative association exists.  
There are several independent variables that are statistically significant in the 
analysis. First and foremost, the existence of CLT units is significantly related to 
gentrification. The odds ratio can be interpreted that, other things are equal, the odds of 
gentrification are 0.30 times as likely for neighborhoods with CLT units than for 
neighborhoods without CLT units. In other words, having CLT units, compared to not 
having CLT units, decreases the odds of gentrification by 69.9%. Second, the white 
population rate is significantly related to gentrification. That is, when other things are 
equal, for every percent increase in the white population rate, the odds of gentrification 
decrease by 2.6%. Third, the degree of age fluctuation is significantly related to 
gentrification. That is, when other things are equal, for every increase in the age change 
index, the odds of gentrification increase by 14.7%. 
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The results from the logistic regression analysis reveal that CLTs have a 
statistically significant relationship with gentrification in a way that counteracts 
gentrification. The age fluctuation between 2000 and 2010 also has a statistically 
significant relationship with gentrification. As generally expected, more age fluctuation 
was happening in gentrified neighborhoods. The white population rate has a statistically 
significant relationship with gentrification, but different from the general expectation, a 
lower rate of white people is shown in gentrified neighborhoods. This could be because 
the neighborhoods gentrified between 2000 and 2010 had a much lower white 
population rate in 2000; thus, the white population rate of gentrified neighborhoods in 
2010 could be a little bit lower than non-gentrified neighborhoods. 
5.2 Qualitative Approach 
5.2.1 Developing questions 
Based on the previous quantitative findings, structured interviewing was 
employed as a qualitative support. To do structured interviews, several questions that fit 
the purpose of this research need to be developed, and the results from the quantitative 
approach become foundations to construct questions. The quantitative findings were 
summarized in very brief sentences and divided into two categories such as supportive 
and controversial in relation to the research hypotheses. The supportive quantitative 
results are as follows: 
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1. CLTs have positive effects on diverse ethnic composition in neighborhoods 
where they are located. 
2. CLTs stabilize abrupt age distribution fluctuation in gentrified neighborhoods. 
3. CLTs alleviate the decrease of affordability in gentrified neighborhoods. 
4. CLTs increase the proportions of low-income residents found in gentrified 
neighborhoods. In other words, CLT can help low-income residents from being 
displaced from gentrified neighborhoods. 
5. CLTs help maintain income levels in their neighborhoods.  
6. CLTs lessen the loss of rental units in gentrified neighborhoods. 
7. CLTs stabilize the excessive increase of housing prices. 
 
As described above, the supportive results can be interpreted as CLTs countering 
the negative effects of gentrification. On the other hand, the controversial quantitative 
results are as follows: 
1. CLTs have negative effects on the length of residence in gentrified 
neighborhoods, while having positive effects in non-gentrified neighborhoods. 
2. CLTs do not help increase the education level of residents in gentrified 
neighborhoods. 
 
The controversial results indicate that CLTs have complex impacts on 
gentrification in a few aspects, even though not totally opposite to but different from the 
research hypotheses.  
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To interpret these findings adequately, a few simple interview questions, which 
are easily understandable for general CLT directors were developed. The number of 
questions is minimized for a higher response rate. The questions begin with the 
informational and introductory description first, and then the main questions follow.  
The first question is about supportive findings as follows: 
According to my analysis, CLTs can help counteract the negative impacts of 
gentrification (supportive results #1~7). Do you think this is true in your CLT? Are there 
any results that are inconsistent with your experience? 
The second question is about controversial findings as follows: 
My findings suggest that CLTs may result in greater neighborhood stability (as 
indicated by length of residence) in non-gentrified neighborhoods, but less stability in 
gentrifying neighborhoods. Do you think this is true in your CLT? Whether it is true or 
not, in your perspective, what do you think the reason for that might be? 
The last question has broad range to elicit more comprehensive responses from 
interviewees. It is expected to get critical insights from CLT directors through this 
general open-ended question. The question is as follows: 
Do you have any other thoughts about the overall results of my analysis or about 
your CLT? 
Using these three structured questions, 11 out of 46 CLT directors who were 
contacted responded through email and/or phone. 
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5.2.2 Data analysis 
To relate practice to theory, descriptive data should be summarized and then 
linked to more general theoretical constructs. In this sense, the summary of responses by 
table is needed to arrange structured interviews and to analyze qualitative research data. 
First, responses to supportive findings are summarized in table 5-35 as follows: 
 
 
 
Table 5-35. Summary of responses for supportive findings 
CLT’s effect Responses 
General findings 
Nine respondents agreed that CLT’s generally counteract the 
negative impacts of gentrification on neighborhoods. One 
respondent said he didn’t know about it, and one respondent did 
not agree with my general findings.  
Diverse ethnic 
composition 
One respondent said that high quality schools were in wealthier 
neighborhoods (gentrified neighborhoods), and this could be one 
of the most important reasons in demographic change. 
Stabilize age distribution 
One respondent gave both supportive and negative answers. He 
could see the ability of CLTs to stabilize abrupt age distribution 
fluctuation was true, but the opposite was possible where the 
predominantly elderly neighborhood in a well-established family 
neighborhood. 
Increase affordability  
Four respondents referred to maintain or increase affordability in 
the neighborhoods with CLT units, as well as CLT unit itself did. 
Increase middle-class 
Two respondents referred to low and moderate income families 
and another two said low income people were main targets of 
CLTs. CLTs prevent displacement of low/moderate income 
families from gentrifying neighborhoods. 
On the other hand, one respondent said that lower income 
families were displaced from a high income community. 
Stabilize income level 
No respondent specifically referred to income level of 
neighborhood 
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Table 5-35. Continued 
CLT’s effect Responses 
Increase middle-class 
Two respondents referred to low and moderate income families 
and another two said low income people were main targets of 
CLTs. CLTs prevent displacement of low/moderate income 
families from gentrifying neighborhoods. 
On the other hand, one respondent said that lower income 
families were displaced from a high income community. 
Stabilize income level 
No respondent specifically referred to income level of 
neighborhood 
Increase rental housing 
rate 
Two respondents disagreed with this. 
One said that he couldn’t see how CLTs lessen the loss of rental 
units within gentrified neighborhoods, and CLTs did not 
considered rental units. 
The other said his CLT program in fact increased the loss of 
rental units, so he said that there were times when CLTs may not 
lessen the loss of rental units.   
Stabilize housing price 
Two respondents agreed with this due to the ability of CLTs to 
restrict the resale price of houses. 
 
 
 
As a whole, many respondents agreed with most findings except the rental 
housing rate, but nobody referred to the neighborhood income level. In addition, some of 
them confused the effects of CLTs on neighborhood with those of CLT itself. However, 
many of them suggested reasonable comments to address some complicated and 
complex findings. On the other hand, some responded to several controversial findings 
by giving useful suggestions and sensible alternatives. Table 5-36 shows the summary of 
them. 
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Table 5-36. Summary of responses for controversial findings 
CLT’s effect Responses 
Reduce length of 
residence in 
gentrified 
neighborhoods 
Many respondents suggested alternative explanations about this finding. 
○ Residents who live in gentrified neighborhoods do not have a lot of 
options in residence, but those who live in non-gentrified 
neighborhoods have more options. 
○ Gentrification displaces whole communities - not just homeowners. 
Churches/businesses/jobs, etc. are all displaced. 
○ Households move for all sorts of reasons that may be unrelated to a 
neighborhood. 
○ A gentrifying neighborhood’s cost of buying/renting is increasing at 
a rate faster than a stabilized neighborhood. 
○ Two respondents said that the younger household viewed the CLT 
model as a stepping stone to more conventional homeownership. 
○ High living cost in gentrified area for CLT residents displaces them. 
Two respondents said that this was not true in their case, and one said that 
he couldn’t understand this. 
Do not increase 
education level 
Two respondents disagreed with this finding. They said that 10 years is a 
long time, but perhaps not long enough to track resident’s educational 
attainment. 
 
 
 
While some of them disagreed with the controversial findings, many respondents 
gave me a variety of alternative explanations for better interpretation of the findings.  
These comments from the CLT field enrich my arguments in the next section. Finally, 
responses to the last general question are summarized in table 5-37 as follows:  
 
 
 
Table 5-37. Summary of responses for general question 
Topic Responses 
General research 
Five respondents showed their support for my findings in general 
question. They thought my results pointed out what most of them in the 
CLT organizations knew about CLTs. 
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Table 5-37. Continued 
Topic Responses 
Role of CLT 
CLTs generally support community efforts to create stability and to 
provide for diversification both economically and culturally.  It is the role 
of community land trusts to enhance the community, hence the reason 
why land trusts have the word “community” in their name. 
Ethnic diversity 
CLTs make housing more stable in high cost markets and allow for more 
diversity. CLT people are finding that ethnic diversity is very hard to 
obtain and they are working on more methods to do this. 
Housing price 
With constantly fluctuating housing prices, CLTs can provide some 
stability for the potential homebuyers. 
 
 
 
General responses were provided with respect to several specific topics. In short, 
CLTs’ functions in stabilizing and diversifying neighborhoods were primarily discussed 
in the feedback from over 10 experienced CLT practitioners. 
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6. INTERPRETATION 
The findings from both quantitative and qualitative approaches are synthesized in 
this section, and then interpreted thoroughly. The interpretation progresses according to 
the research framework that illustrates how CLTs have effects on the negative effects of 
gentrification. As shown in Section 3, three main negative effects of gentrification and 
the benefits of CLTs that can counteract to those effects are shown in table 6-1: 
 
 
 
Table 6-1. Indices with respect to impacts of CLTs on gentrification 
Negative effect of 
gentrification 
Benefits of CLTs Neighborhood index 
Displacement 
Build Community Assets 
Ethnic composition 
Middle-class ratio 
Income level 
Education level 
Stabilize Neighborhood 
Length of residence 
Age fluctuation 
Lower Affordability Increase Affordability 
Affordability  
Owner-occupied housing rate 
Skyrocket of Property Price Stabilize Neighborhood Housing price 
 
 
 
The above table also shows the measurable indices corresponding to both the 
negative effects of gentrification and the benefits of CLTs. Those indices were analyzed 
quantitatively first, and complemented by qualitative research. In this section, 
interpretation will be conducted by this logical sequence. 
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6.1 Displacement 
Displacement is pointed out as a main negative effect of gentrification by many 
researchers. The effects of displacement are the destruction of the community, the loss of 
place, dislocations, and conflicts within communities (Betancur, 2002; Abu-Lughod, 
1994; Smith, 1996; Rose, 1996; Betancur, 2011). The research hypothesis is that these 
drawbacks of displacement caused by gentrification can be balanced out by the benefits 
of CLTs.  
 
6.1.1 Build community assets 
As a counter strategy to displacement caused by gentrification, community assets, 
which play a key role in decreasing it, can be considered. Building community assets 
includes not only physical assets but also invisible values such as a sense of belonging to 
community. Also, it relates to diverse ethnic composition, enough middle-class 
households, stable income level, and higher education level. According to the 
hypotheses of this research, CLTs can help build community assets, and both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches were used to show it.  
 
Ethnic composition 
The research hypothesis assumes that CLTs can counteract the trend of 
displacement by ethnic diversification. As mentioned earlier, displacement causes 
transformation of demographic composition in neighborhoods. The quantitative findings 
suggest that CLTs have positive effects on ethnic diversity regardless of whether 
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neighborhoods are gentrified or not. More specifically, in gentrified neighborhoods, 
CLTs don’t have any significant effect on ethnic diversity. 
This result shows only that ethnic diversity is a general benefit of CLTs in 
practice. However, from this evidence, it can be noted that this general benefit of CLTs 
definitely can help increase ethnic diversity in gentrified neighborhoods as well. If 
neighborhoods were gentrified, CLTs would not have a strong enough effect on ethnic 
diversity to reverse the trend of gentrification, which in this case is considered an 
increase in white population ratio. However, it is possible to say that CLTs have 
significant effects on increasing ethnic diversity even in gentrified neighborhoods.  
 
Middle-class ratio 
Building community assets supports the concept that mixed-income residents can 
live together in a community; it is especially important that the middle- and low-income 
household ratio is secured in reality. Since CLTs themselves encourage lower middle-
class households to live in their own dwelling units, this research assumes that CLTs can 
reduce the displacement of lower middle-class residents from gentrified areas.  
The quantitative analysis indicates that CLTs prevent the decrease of lower 
middle-class residents’ ratio in gentrified neighborhoods. This finding is supported by 
responses from the experiences of CLT practitioners as follows: 
"Low and moderate income people are the main target of CLT, and CLTs prevent 
displacement of low/moderate income families from gentrifying neighborhoods.” 
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From the findings and support, we can suggest with more confidence that CLTs 
can help lower middle-class residents from being displaced from gentrified 
neighborhoods. 
Moreover, the existence of displacement in practice is supported from a CLT 
practitioner’s response: 
“Our CLT works within a high income community that is also a master planned 
community ... The high incomes and high costs of housing have ‘priced out’ lower 
income families and/or families that are first time home buyers.” 
From this statement we can learn that a lot of middle and low income residents 
were displaced from their community when the gentrifying process proceeded rapidly. 
 
Income level 
Generally speaking, higher residents’ income means more assets in a community. 
Thus, it is more likely that the increase in income level is needed to build more 
community assets. However, when displacement happens due to the influx of wealthier 
people into gentrifying areas, a stabilization of income level is better to maintain existing 
community assets by preventing displacement of low income residents in those areas.  
In this sense, this research assumes that CLTs can stabilize neighborhood income 
levels in gentrifying neighborhoods. The income level used here is a relative income 
compared to surrounding city-wide areas.  
Although gentrification necessarily raises income levels of neighborhoods, the 
quantitative finding suggests that CLTs stabilize them regardless of whether the 
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neighborhood is gentrified or not. However, there is no difference in income level 
according to the existence of CLT units in gentrified neighborhoods, while there is 
significant increase in income level in gentrified neighborhoods.  
Therefore, while CLTs do not seriously damage the income level of gentrified 
neighborhoods, they can have at least a small effect on the income level of 
neighborhoods, even in gentrified neighborhoods. 
 
Education level 
It is generally accepted that higher education levels are good for building 
community assets. According to the quantitative analysis, the average education level 
has been increased in all types of neighborhoods during the last decade. Only gentrified 
neighborhoods with CLT units show less increase significantly in education level than 
gentrified neighborhoods without CLT units. This result means that CLTs have negative 
effects on increasing education levels in gentrified neighborhoods.  
However, less increase in the education level can be interpreted as less 
transformation of the population in gentrified neighborhoods during the last decade. This 
supports the research hypothesis that CLTs can maintain education levels in gentrified 
neighborhoods. Thus, we can say that CLTs help prevent displacement of less educated 
people who might be generally lower income. In this sense, while CLTs have negative 
effects on building new community assets in terms of higher education level, it has 
positive effects on maintaining community assets such as a sense of belonging by 
preventing displacement of residents who had lived there before gentrification.  
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Nevertheless, since this result seems to be controversial to the research 
hypothesis, several interviewees disagree with the result that, while CLTs have no 
impact on education level in non-gentrified neighborhoods, CLTs do not help increase 
the education level of residents in gentrified neighborhoods. One interviewee supported 
this perspective as follows: 
 “10 years is a long time, but perhaps not long enough to track residents’ 
educational attainment. Or maybe there are other economic factors at play (people 
whose ambition to attend college were [sic] disrupted by the recession for example)”  
The above comment might come from the fact that higher education is not a 
target or a major concern of CLTs. Therefore, CLT practitioners may confuse the 
quantitative findings as negative ones for CLTs or misunderstand the applicability of the 
findings to non-gentrified neighborhoods in general. However, the findings are not 
contrary to the research hypothesis and can only be applied to a limited number of 
gentrified neighborhoods. Given this mixed finding, the hypothesis that CLTs can 
increase education level in their neighborhoods cannot be supported as much as other 
indices. 
 
6.1.2 Stabilize neighborhood 
Length of residence (Controversial) 
Generally, longer length of residence can help stabilize neighborhoods. Therefore, 
the research hypothesis was that CLTs can help extend length of residence especially in 
gentrified neighborhoods. However, the quantitative finding was a little bit complicated. 
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CLTs decrease the length of residence in gentrified neighborhoods, while increasing it in 
non-gentrified neighborhoods. Another interesting finding is that when we consider 
neighborhoods regardless of the existence of CLT units, the length of residence is longer 
in gentrified neighborhoods than non-gentrified neighborhoods. 
While several CLT practitioners said that that was not their case or disagreed 
with the finding, many others put forth alternative ideas to address this controversial 
result.  
First, there may be few or no other options for residence in gentrified 
neighborhoods. While the length of residence becomes longer when there are fewer 
options to move, CLTs provide more residence options to the neighborhoods.  
“Residents who live in gentrified neighborhoods do not have a lot of options in 
residence so they cannot move easily. However, those who live in non-gentrified 
neighborhoods have more options in residence, so they can move more than those [who] 
live in gentrified neighborhoods.” 
“If the housing stock in a neighborhood cannot offer affordable options that can 
accommodate a wide variety of household sizes, increased turnover will result.” 
Second, there are numerous reasons that people move. That is, high rents or 
property values are not the sole factor for moving, thus other reasons such as high living 
costs, change of job place, and family issues can be more influential to people’s decision 
to move.  
“Gentrification displaces whole communities - not just homeowners. 
Churches/businesses/jobs, etc. are all displaced. If a family is able to buy their home in 
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a gentrifying neighborhood, but over the course of the next 10 years their 
friends/family/church/job, etc. are displaced, then they may want to follow their support 
system, rather than stay in the community… CLTs can assist communities in locking in 
affordable commercial space as well.” 
“Households move for all sorts of reasons that may be unrelated to a 
neighborhood. Life realities as job changes, family composition changes (birth of 
children which create [sic] a need for a larger unit, divorce, empty nest) , financial 
hardship all cause a change in residence regardless of the occurrence of gentrification 
or not.” 
Third, increased rents in gentrified neighborhoods could cause high rates of 
moving. Therefore, the decrease of length of residence in gentrified neighborhoods with 
CLT units could be affected mainly by gentrification rather than by CLT units.  
 “A gentrifying neighborhood’s cost of buying/renting is increasing at a rate 
faster than a stabilized neighborhood. It seems to make sense to expect higher turnover 
of homes as investors and owners sell at substantially higher prices than they paid 
before the neighborhood turned around.” 
“Living in a gentrified neighborhood is typically more expensive overall with 
more expensive grocery stores, restaurants etc. and maybe this isn’t sustainable or 
desirable for CLT owners.  These neighborhoods may become more crowded too, and 
the general lifestyle changes, and folks may not like this either.” 
“High living cost in gentrified area for CLT residents displaces them” 
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Fourth, in some areas, age could be a factor in moving. In other words, younger 
people are more likely to move than older people in general. Thus, high mobility in 
gentrified neighborhoods might be related to the demographic characteristics of new 
comers. Another assumption is that younger people came to gentrified neighborhoods 
with CLT units more than gentrified neighborhoods without CLT units, so the mobility 
could depend on the influx of younger people rather than the existence of CLT units.  
“I have observed here that younger buyers (with or without children) tend to 
have lower tenures than older buyers … The younger household views the CLT model as 
a stepping stone to more conventional homeownership whereas the older residents have 
perhaps never been able to own a home and are very committed to achieving that goal 
and remaining there until the end. Another note about younger households is that they 
are more mobile by nature – jobs transfer them, they work for the military, etc. They are 
in a less physically stable position because of larger economic forces that may require 
them to move in pursuit of employment, may be transferred, reassigned or deployed. 
This is less of an issue for older households.” 
Fifth, CLTs can cause more mobility between classes when CLT owners use it as 
a stepping stone for better housing opportunity. 
 “Maybe the home was sold to someone at the upper end of the allowable income 
limit who was just using the CLT as a quality starter home before they moved along to a 
bigger and better home.  Maybe their original intentions were to not keep the home 
longer than a few years.  I think that lower income CLT homeowners (those at 60% CMI 
and below) seem committed to staying for long periods of time since they know that they 
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will not get a quality affordable home that they can afford elsewhere since many of our 
homes are brand new and even with their equity share they will not find another brand 
new home for the price of their CLT home for many, many years.” 
Through these abundant qualitative supports, the research hypothesis that CLTs 
can extend the length of residence in gentrified neighborhoods proved to be false, and 
the reasons for rejecting the research hypothesis were reasonably explained. All in all, 
the length of residence cannot be an indicator of the effects that CLTs have on 
gentrification.  
 
Age fluctuation 
In order to stabilize neighborhoods, the age composition of the population of a 
neighborhood should not change rapidly. Moreover, less change in age composition of 
population can indicate less displacement has occurred in a neighborhood. The change of 
age composition during the last decade was calculated through an index that is 
established in this research.  
The result shows that the fluctuation of age composition is higher in gentrified 
neighborhoods with or without CLT units as the research hypothesis expected. When 
CLT units are located in a neighborhood, there is no difference in the fluctuation of age 
composition between gentrified and non-gentrified neighborhoods. Further, when there 
are no CLT units in a neighborhood, age fluctuation is higher in gentrified 
neighborhoods than non-gentrified neighborhoods. This finding definitely shows that 
CLTs have a significant effect on the age fluctuation only when neighborhoods are 
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gentrifying. Thus, it is possible to say that CLTs help prevent residents from being 
displaced in their neighborhoods. 
CLT practitioners were in agreement with the finding on the whole as follows: 
“The greater stability is easily understood since CLT’s by definition remain 
engaged with their homeowners. We support our homeowners and this should help 
stabilize non-gentrified neighborhoods.” 
From the above statement, it can be suggested that CLTs can help stabilize 
neighborhoods even in non-gentrified neighborhoods. 
On the other hand, some respondents raised another possibility as follows: 
 “The ability of CLTs to stabilize abrupt age distribution fluctuation is true, but 
the opposite can be true in the predominantly elderly neighborhood, which is a well-
established family neighborhood …. A majority of our CLT owners tend to be starter 
families in a well-established family neighborhood.” 
After considering all findings from quantitative and qualitative approaches, it can 
be concluded with more confidence that CLTs can help stabilize their neighborhoods 
especially with regard to the age composition of the population. 
6.2 Lower Affordability 
Affordability is a primary issue for CLT advocates, and less affordability is one 
of the main negative effects of gentrification. Typically, gentrification promotes the loss 
of affordable units in neighborhoods. Therefore, some researchers pointed out that the 
decrease of affordable units in neighborhoods is a more serious problem than generally 
145 
believed (Zukin, 1987; Betancur, 2002). The research hypotheses expect that the benefits 
of CLTs can resolve this serious problem in gentrified neighborhoods. 
6.2.1 Affordability 
As mentioned earlier, the major purpose of CLTs is providing affordable housing 
units to middle- and low-income households, and also the CLT model by itself expands 
the number of permanently affordable dwelling units within neighborhoods. Therefore, 
how CLTs affect their neighborhoods in terms of affordability is a critical issue to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the CLT model, even though that effectiveness has been 
somewhat proved by the recent rapid increase of CLTs. 
The quantitative finding using an affordability index suggests definitely what 
was expected. Affordability decreases in gentrified neighborhoods and increases in 
neighborhoods with CLT units. In addition, while gentrified neighborhoods with CLTs 
show some decrease in affordability, those without CLT units show a greater decrease 
than those with CLTs. Thus, it is clear that CLTs mediate the decrease of affordability in 
gentrified neighborhoods. 
Many CLT practitioners supported CLTs’ impact on increasing affordability in 
their neighborhoods, but their comments were mainly about the purposes or roles of 
CLTs. Perhaps this is because increasing affordability is a main function of the CLT 
model. Thus, most respondents naturally could agree with the findings from quantitative 
analysis, even though many responses confused CLTs’ neighborhood effects with CLTs’ 
own effects. The important point is that CLTs cause affordability to decrease less 
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regardless of whether it is CLTs’ own purpose or CLTs’ impact on neighborhoods. 
Therefore, it can be suggested with more confidence that CLTs can counteract the trend 
of lower affordability in gentrified neighborhoods. 
6.2.2 Owner-occupied housing rate 
Fundamentally, the CLT model intends to increase homeownership to build 
community assets by leasing land and selling houses to residents. However, this is only 
applied specifically to the CLT units themselves, and how CLTs affect their 
neighborhoods is a different issue. CLTs can provide more options in residence to their 
neighborhoods, and an increased option provided by CLTs could result in an increase in 
rental units, which is generally considered as more affordable housing option. Generally, 
rental units are crucial for low and very low income residents, and it is important to 
ensure affordable rental units as land prices go up (Levy et al., 2007). 
The findings from quantitative analysis suggest that CLTs help retain rental units 
in gentrified neighborhoods, even though the existence of CLTs does not have a direct 
impact on the proportion of rental units in neighborhoods. However, from the results, the 
impacts of CLTs on owner-occupied housing rates would be smaller than expected. In 
addition, a few CLT practitioners disagreed with the findings as follows: 
“I cannot see how CLTs lessen the loss of rental units within gentrified 
neighborhoods, and CLTs are not considered rental units.” 
“My CLT program in fact increases the loss of rental units, so he says that there 
are times when CLTs may not lessen the loss of rental units.” 
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 “In our perspective, CLTs create stability as home owners of CLT properties 
tend to stay in their homes longer than many non-CLT properties.  This occurs in all 
areas of a community regardless of gentrification.  In areas that are undergoing 
gentrification, CLT home owners provide continuity and can be helpful in maintaining 
the community with historical information and context. Additionally, because of CLT 
requirements, home owners tend to occupy their homes rather than lease them.” 
However, as described in the above statements, every respondent confused CLTs’ 
own characteristics with their neighborhood impacts. In addition, there was no other 
reference about CLTs’ impact on rental housing units because such units located in the 
neighborhoods with CLT units were not the focus of the CLT model. Therefore, 
considering the results of both approaches, it is still possible to say that CLTs can 
prevent the loss of rental housing units in gentrified neighborhoods. 
6.3 Skyrocketing Property Prices 
The skyrocketing property prices in gentrified neighborhoods is one of the major 
negative effects of gentrification and is supported by numerous researchers who focused 
on the rent gap theory (Smith, 1996; Lees et al., 2008). To put it briefly, where 
gentrification occurs, wealthier people come in and raise rents for both residential and 
commercial uses, and the displacement of low income people accompanies this rent 
increase. Therefore, this research hypothesizes that CLTs can help alleviate an abrupt 
increase of property value in gentrified neighborhoods by providing affordable options 
for low income people. 
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The housing price is one of the most common indicators to show overall property 
value in neighborhoods. I analyzed it by each type of neighborhood using the housing 
price index, which is the relative housing price compared to the national average housing 
price in the same year. 
The findings from quantitative analysis indicate that there is no difference in the 
housing price index depending on both whether the neighborhoods are gentrified and 
whether the neighborhoods include CLTs. Rather, while gentrification definitely 
increases housing prices, CLTs can stabilize the excessive increase of housing prices in 
gentrified neighborhoods. Based on the quantitative analysis, it could be speculated that 
CLTs were introduced into neighborhoods that already had low housing prices, and 
those distressed neighborhoods have been gentrified during the last decade.  
Many CLT practitioners agreed with the role of CLTs in alleviating the excessive 
increase in housing prices.  
“I agree with this due to the ability of CLTs to restrict the resale price of homes” 
“With housing prices constantly fluctuating, CLT provides some stability for the 
potential homebuyers.” 
“The ability to restrict the resale price of homes and our mandate to sell to 
buyers earning 80% or less of Area Median Income means there will always be 
affordable housing even as the rest of the neighborhood becomes pricier.” 
Although there is still confusion between CLTs’ own impacts and their impacts 
on neighborhoods, all respondents expressed positive perspectives to the effects of CLTs 
to mediate excessive increase of housing prices. However, one respondent was 
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concerned about the significance of CLTs’ impacts on neighborhoods in spite of 
consenting with the quantitative result as follows: 
“CLT can counteract gentrification by stabilizing housing prices and maintain 
affordability. However, I am concerning that the neighborhood impacts could be small 
because of few number of CLT units.” 
However, this concern about the small number of CLT units in neighborhoods 
can be resolved by numerous neighborhood cases that were used in the quantitative 
analysis. A total of 272 neighborhoods were employed for the analysis in order to 
guarantee the statistical significance of the results. 
Even though CLTs have limited and indirect effects on housing prices in their 
neighborhoods, there was no counter evidence to its stabilizing effects on neighborhoods. 
Therefore, we can say that CLTs can help stabilize skyrocketing housing prices in 
gentrified neighborhoods.  
 
6.4 Summary 
The research findings from both quantitative and qualitative approaches were 
synthetically interpreted by each index with respect to mitigating negative effects of 
gentrification. However, each interpretation was compiled into the following table to 
provide a more comprehensive explanation for CLTs’ effects on every index in 
gentrified neighborhoods and neighborhoods with CLT units. Additionally, Table 6-2 
illustrates qualitative supports as well: 
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Table 6-2. CLTs’ effects on neighborhoods by index 
CLTs’ effects on… 
Gentrified 
Neighborhood 
Qualitative 
Support 
Neighborhood 
with CLT 
Link with 
CLTs’ benefits 
Ethnic diversity Medium High Extra High 
Build  
Community 
Assets 
Maintain middle-class 
ratio 
High High Medium 
Stabilize income level Medium Medium High 
Maintain education 
level 
High None None 
Increase length of 
residence 
Negative Agree  High 
Stabilize 
Neighborhood 
Decrease age 
fluctuation 
High High None 
Stabilize housing price Medium High None 
Increase affordability  High Extra High High 
Increase 
Affordability Decrease owner-
occupied housing rate 
Medium None None 
 
 
 
Table 6-2 first describes the effect of CLTs on gentrification and their 
neighborhoods by each index, and then shows whether the indicators were qualitatively 
supported. 
 Quantitative analysis indicates that CLTs have effects on slowing gentrification 
except for one indicator: increased length of residence. However, CLTs’ general effects 
on their neighborhoods are significant in five indicators and insignificant in four indices. 
This result shows that CLTs’ merits appeared more prominently in gentrifying 
neighborhoods than in general.  
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Qualitative analysis indicates that CLT practitioners support seven indices and 
have no opinion on two indices: maintaining education level and decreasing owner-
occupied housing rate. In particular, they agreed with the research hypothesis that CLTs 
can increase length of residence in their neighborhoods. As a result, they disagreed with 
the quantitative finding, which indicated a negative effect of CLTs on increasing length 
of residence in gentrified neighborhoods. However, CLT practitioners offered a variety 
of alternatives to figure out the reason for the quantitative finding.  
The overall interpretation comes from combining the above two approaches. The 
impacts of CLTs on gentrification are significant on the whole. In particular, it is highly 
supported that CLTs maintain middle class ratios and increase affordability in 
gentrifying neighborhoods. CLTs have significant effects on maintaining education level 
and decreasing age fluctuation in gentrifying neighborhoods. CLTs have less significant 
impacts on increasing ethnic diversity, stabilizing income level, decreasing owner-
occupied housing rates, and stabilizing housing prices in gentrifying neighborhoods. 
Finally, less length of residence in gentrifying neighborhoods was shown in 
neighborhoods with CLT units, and this result was interpreted differently based on a 
variety of alternatives that many CLT practitioners provided.  
All in all, only increased length of residence was proved not to support the main 
research hypothesis, but the rest of them supported it. Moreover, qualitative analysis 
supports numerous alternative explanations about why housing turnover happens more 
frequently in gentrified neighborhoods with CLT. Among the benefits of CLTs, both the 
qualitative analysis and the quantitative analysis support building community assets 
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more than other two benefits of CLTs: stabilizing neighborhoods and increasing 
affordability.  
The results from the logistic regression analysis provide an interesting insight 
into the impact of CLTs on gentrification. These results support the quantitative and the 
qualitative findings of this study. Quantitatively, the logistic regression analysis shows a 
clear link between CLT and gentrification into a negative direction statistically. This is 
in fact a robust finding that statistically supports the main research hypothesis: CLTs 
will moderate the negative effects of gentrification.  
In conclusion, CLTs have effects on slowing down gentrification, and most 
negative effects of gentrification are more or less affected by CLTs’ benefits. This 
conclusion is supported by the following CLT practitioner’s comment from the 
qualitative approach: 
“I believe that any housing program which provides below market pricing 
targeted to below median incomes will partially counteract impacts of gentrification.  I 
also believe that CLT’s do a better job than other methods such as deed restrictions or 
covenants because CLT’s strive to assist home owners before and after they buy the 
home.  The stewardship practices inherent in the CLT model provide stability that comes 
with pre- and post-purchase counseling and support.” 
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7. CONCLUSION
The mixed method of quantitative and qualitative analyses explored by this 
research highlights the impact of CLTs on their neighborhoods in terms of the 
gentrifying process. I collected the location information of each CLT unit and 
information about the first year they were introduced. To get high quality information 
from simple and clear comparisons, the neighborhoods were categorized into four types 
and carefully compared using nine indices by the U.S. Census data and telephone or 
email interviews with CLT practitioners. The nine indices represent the spectrum of 
CLTs’ effects on gentrification and most of them agreed that CLTs can slow down the 
gentrifying process. 
7.1 Policy Implication 
The scope of this research is not limited to a handful of CLTs scattered across the 
country, but comprehensive information was used. Moreover, since CLTs are not yet 
widely spread out across the country, the corresponding cases that do not have any CLT 
units at all were selected for more accurate comparison. The comparison was almost not 
affected by the original condition of neighborhoods and possible problems caused when 
using a different time frame because this research examined the rate of change between 
2000 and 2010. The change between 2000 and 2010 is the most recent information that 
we can obtain from the U.S. Census data; thus, the findings are timely to use. These are 
good backgrounds to compare neighborhoods with CLT units to those without them. 
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Previous research has demonstrated a range of disadvantages of gentrification but 
just assumed and suggested CLTs’ role in mitigating them. In addition, previous 
research has not evaluated the actual effects of CLTs on gentrifying process. Therefore, 
this research contributes to planning theory by providing practical evidences for the 
assumptions of previous research.  
The findings also highlight the importance of utilizing the CLT model as the way 
for alleviating disadvantages of gentrification in neighborhoods. As mentioned in 
Section 2, previous literature suggested production and preservation of affordable 
housing, community asset building (Levy et. al, 2012; Kennedy & Leonard, 2001), and 
government intervention (Levy et. al, 2012; Kennedy & Leonard, 2001; Henig, 1980) as 
main tools to address gentrified areas. The CLT model itself is one of the best ways to 
produce affordable housing, to preserve affordability, and to build community asset in 
neighborhoods. As recently shown in many cases, local or municipal governments can 
make use of the CLT model. City governments can consider using CLTs as a way of 
slowing down gentrification, so they can reduce negative effects and pursue a better 
change with keeping incumbent residents in their dwellings. Furthermore, a community 
that intends to keep their neighborhood affordable and stable in the midst of the 
gentrifying process can utilize it as well.  
One more lesson to draw from this research relates to subcategories of the 
benefits of CLTs. That is, CLTs also can be regarded as a way of building community 
assets in neighborhoods, which relates to strengthening the solidarity of neighborhoods. 
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Therefore, gentrification can be slowed down in the neighborhoods that have more 
solidarity.  
On a larger scale, the findings of this research suggest CLT’s practical effects on 
neighborhoods in terms of each indicator. Since CLTs have its own function and purpose, 
the neighborhood effects of CLTs are more likely to be considered as the same with 
CLT’s general objectives for their residents. This confusion conceals the real 
neighborhood effects of CLTs. However, the neighborhood effects of CLTs were 
described clearly in my quantitative analysis. CLTs have an extremely high effect on 
ethnic diversity of neighborhoods, and additionally, have a high effect on affordability 
increase, neighborhood income level stabilization, and length of residence increase in 
their neighborhoods. Also, CLTs have a certain level of effects on maintaining middle-
class ratio. Thus, any local government that intends to make a better community with 
more neighborhood stability can consider using the CLT model as a good option. On the 
other hand, CLTs have no effect on education level, age, owner-occupied housing rate, 
and housing price in their neighborhoods. Thus, policy makers or community 
representatives can use the CLT model more efficiently and become more confident in 
engaging the CLT model in their neighborhoods by becoming aware of the result of this 
research.  
 
7.2 Limitations 
The findings and policy implications of this research are more suggestive than 
definitive because of the following limitations. Although this research derives many 
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meaningful findings from the mixed method, and has a robust research design in 
comparison, still not every CLT was recruited as a sample. The first limitation is 
sampling bias. I tried to address this through evenly distributing samples by U.S. region, 
but the possibility of sampling bias still exists. Also, the number of gentrified 
neighborhoods with CLT units is relatively small, though this cannot reduce statistical 
significance in my research. Another possible limitation was identifying gentrified 
neighborhoods; I used a definition of gentrification through quantitative standards from 
the previous studies. However, to impose an objective definition of gentrification may 
have some issues itself.  
Next, the total numbers of CLT units are low, so drawing a sample of a sufficient 
size was challenging.  So I worked with secondary data sources primarily, and used the 
sample selection to control for some of the differences. Using census tracts as a unit of 
analysis, I set up treatment and control groups of census tracts with two treatments—
having a CLT, and being gentrified. Nevertheless, the numbers of census tracts in each 
of the four types were relatively small, but conducting t-tests between and among them 
allowed us establish statistical significance of the group mean differences. Even though 
the small number of CLT units in each neighborhood seems to be problematic, it doesn’t 
damage statistical significance of the findings.  
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APPENDIX 1 
FEDERAL DEFINITION OF A COMMUNITY LAND TRUST 
 
Source: United States Federal Register (1992) 
 
Introduced by U.S. Representative Bernie Sanders and signed into law in 1992. 
 
SECTION 212, HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1992 
 
H1 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD – HOUSE    October 5, 1992 
 
DEINITION OF COMMUNITY LAND TRUST - For purposes of this section, the term 
“community land trust” means a community housing development organization (except that 
the requirements under subparagraphs (C) and (D) of section 104(6) shall not apply for 
purposes of this subsection)- 
(1) that is not sponsored by a for-profit organization; 
(2) that is established to carry out the following activities; 
(3) that- 
(A) acquires parcels of land, held in perpetuity, primarily for conveyance under 
longterm ground leases; 
(B) transfers ownership of any structural improvements located on such leased parcels 
to the lessees; and 
(C) retains a preemptive option to purchase any such structural improvement as a price 
determined by a formula that is designed to ensure that the improvement remains affordable 
to low- and moderate- income families in perpetuity; 
(4) whose corporate membership is open to any adult resident of a particular geographic 
area specified in the bylaws of the organization; and 
(5) whose board of directors- 
(A) includes a majority of members who are elected by the corporate membership; and 
(B) is composed of equal numbers of  
(ⅰ) lessees pursuant to paragraph (3)(B), 
(ⅱ) corporate members who are not lessees, and  
(ⅲ) any other category of persons described in the bylaws of the organization. 
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APPENDIX 2 
CONTACT LIST FOR QUANTITATIVE APPROACH 
No CLT Organization Location 
1 Anchorage CLT  Anchorage, AK 
2 Sitka Community Development Corporation Sitka, AK 
3 Newtown Community Development Corporation Tempe, AZ 
4 Community Homes of Patagonia, Inc. Patagonia, AZ 
5 Pima County Community Land Trust  Tucson, AZ 
6 City of Flagstaff CLT Program Flagstaff, AZ 
7 
Community Land Trust Association of West Marin 
(CLAM) 
Point Reyes Station, 
CA 
8 Housing Land Trust of Sonoma County Petaluma, CA 
9 Bolinas Community Land Trust (BCLT) Bolinas, CA 
10 Bay Area Community Land Trust (BACLT) Berkeley, CA 
11 Beverly Vermont Community Land Trust (BVCLT)  Los Angeles, CA 
12 Humboldt Community Development Land Trust Arcata, CA 
13 Saint Joseph Community Land Trust 
South Lake Tahoe, 
CA 
14 Northern California Land Trust (NCLT) Berkeley, CA 
15 Irvine Community Land Trust Irvine, CA 
16 California Community Foundation Los Angeles, CA 
17 San Francisco Community Land Trust (SFCLT) San Francisco, CA 
18 Habitat for Humanity of Southern Santa Barbara County Goleta, CA 
19 T.R.U.S.T. South LA Los Angeles, CA 
20 San Diego Community Land Trust San Diego, CA 
21 Hemet Community Land Trust Hemet, CA 
22 Rocky Mountain Community Land Trust 
Colorado Springs, 
CO 
23 Thistle Community Housing Boulder County, CO 
24 Colorado Community Land Trust (CCLT) Denver, CO 
25 Urban Land Conservancy Denver, CO 
26 Litchfield Housing Trust, Inc. Litchfield, CT 
27 Naugatuck Valley Housing Development Corporation Waterbury, CT 
28 City First Homes Washington, DC 
29 South Florida Community Land Trust Fort Lauderdale, FL 
30 Habitat for Humanity of South Palm Beach County Delray Beach, FL 
31 Lee County Housing Development Corp. Fort Myers, FL 
32 BHP CLT Ft. Lauderdale, FL 
 172 
 
33 Florida Low Income Housing Associates Inverness, FL 
34 Coast and Islands CLT Sanibel Island, FL 
35 Hannibal Square CLT Winter Park, FL 
36 Delray Beach Community Land Trust, Inc. Delray Beach, FL 
37 Neighborhood Renaissance 
West Palm Beach, 
FL 
38 The Community Land Trust of Palm Beach County, Inc. 
West Palm Beach, 
FL 
39 Adopt-a-Family of the Palm Beaches Lake Worth, FL 
40 Housing Partnership, Inc. Riviera Beach , FL 
41 Bright Community Trust Clearwater, FL 
42 Athens Land Trust Athens, GA 
43 Atlanta Land Trust Collaborative (ALTC) Atlanta, GA 
44 Pittsburgh Community Improvement Association Atlanta, GA  
45 Nā Hale O Maui Wailuku, HI 
46 Story County Community Housing Corporation Ames, IA 
47 Community Partners for Affordable Housing Highland Park, IL 
48 Lexington Community Land Trust Lexington, KC 
49 Lawrence Community Housing Trust Lawrence, KS 
50 Lower 9th Ward NENA New Orleans, LA 
51 Crescent City Community Land Trust New Orleans, LA 
52 Northshore Housing Initiative Covington, LA 
53 Jane Place Neighborhood Sustainability Initiative New Orleans, LA 
54 Holyoke Community Land Trust                                      Holyoke, MA 
55 Valley Community Land Trust Greenfield, MA 
56 Andover Community Trust (ACT) Andover, MA 
57 Bread and Roses Housing Lawrence, MA 
58 Island Housing Trust West Tisbury, MA 
59 CLT in the Southern Berkshires Great Barrington, MA 
60 Worcester Common Ground, Inc.  Worcester, MA 
61 Dudley Neighbors, Incorporated (DNI) Roxbury, MA  
62 Frederick County Affordable Housing Land Trust 
Frederick County, 
MD 
63 Island Housing Trust Mount Desert, ME 
64 Waterville Community Land Trust Waterville, ME 
65 Rondo CLT St. Paul, MN 
66 Two Rivers CLT Woodbury, MN 
67 West Hennepin Affordable Housing Land Trust Minnetonka, MN 
68 The City of Lakes Community Land Trust (CLCLT) Minneapolis, MN 
69 Northern Communities Land Trust (NCLT) Duluth, MN 
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70 First Homes Community Land Trust Rochester, MN 
71 Central MN Housing Partnership, Inc. St. Cloud, MN 
72 Homes Within Reach Minnetonka, MN 
73 24:1 COMMUNITY LAND TRUST St. Louis, MO 
74 Springfield Community Land Trust Springfield, MO 
75 North Gulfport CLT Gulfport, MS 
76 North Missoula CDC Missoula, MT 
77 Durham Community Land Trustees, Inc. (DCLT) Durham, NC 
78 Outer Banks CDC Kill Devil Hills, NC 
79 Davidson Housing Coalition Davidson, NC 
80 Community Home Trust Orange County, NC 
81 Grand Forks CLT Grand Forks, ND 
82 Laconia Area CLT Laconia, NH 
83 Contoocook Housing Trust New Ipswich, NH 
84 Essex CLT Montclair, NJ 
85 The Housing Trust Santa Fe, NM 
86 Sawmill Community Land Trust (SCLT) Albuquerque, NM 
87 Albany Community Land Trust Albany, NY 
88 CLT of Schenectady Schenectady, NY 
89 Jubilee Homes of Syracuse, Inc. SYRACUSE, NY 
90 Adirondack Community Housing Trust Elizabethtown, NY 
91 South Country CLT Brookhaven, NY 
92 Cooper Square CLT New York, NY  
93 Yellow Springs Home, Inc Yellow Springs, OH 
94 Community Land Trust of Greater Cleveland Cleveland, OH 
95 Proud Ground Portland, OR 
96 Lincoln Community Land Trust Corvallis, OR 
97 Kôr Community Land Trust Bend, OR 
98 State College CLT State College, PA 
99 Lehigh Valley Community Land Trust (LVCLT) Bethlehem, PA 
100 Dakota Land Trust Deadwood, SD 
101 HomeBase Austin, TX 
102 Guadalupe Neighborhood Development Corporation Austin, TX 
103 Mountainlands Community Housing Trust Park City, UT 
104 Thomas Jefferson CLT Charlottesville, VA 
105 Central Vermont Community Land Trust (CVCLT) Barre, VT 
106 Twin Pines Housing Trust 
White River Junction, 
VT 
107 Champlain Housing Trust (CHT) Burlington, VT 
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108 Addison County Community Trust Vergennes, VT  
109 Vashon HouseHold Vashon, WA 
110 S.H.A.R.E. Community Land Trust Leavenworth, WA 
111 Homestead CLT  Seattle, WA 
112 Housing Resources Board 
Bainbridge Island, 
WA 
113 Kulshan CLT Bellingham, WA 
114 Lopez Community Land Trust Lopez Island, WA 
115 Home Trust of Skagit Burlington, WA 
116 Kittitas Yakima Valley CLT Ellensburg, WA 
117 Spokane Community Land Trust Spokane, WA 
118 Kittitas Yakima Valley CLT Ellensburg, WA 
119 OPAL Community Land Trust  Eastsound, WA  
120 Saratoga Community Housing Freeland, WA  
121 Coulee Community Land Trust Westby, WI 
122 Madison Area CLT Madison, WI  
123 San Juan Community Home Trust Friday Harbor, WA 
124 Diamond State CLT (State-wide), DE  
125 
Franklin County Community Development & Land Trust 
Corporation 
Apalachicola, FL 
126 ARCH Community Housing Trust  Ketchum, ID 
127 Chicago CLT (CCLT) Chicago, IL 
128 Northwest Montana CLT Kalispell, MT 
129 Community housing land trusts State-wide, RI 
130 Windham & Windsor Housing Trust  Brattleboro, VT 
131 Jackson Hole Community Housing Trust Jackson, WY 
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APPENDIX 3 
CONTACT EMAIL FOR QUANTITATIVE APPROACH 
Title: Request for CLT information 
 
Dear (Name of CLT practitioner), 
 
Hello! I am Myungshik, a Ph.D. candidate in the Urban and Regional Science program at Texas 
A&M University, a research fellow in the Center for Housing & Urban Development, and a 
research collaborative member of the National Community Land Trust Network. 
 
I am conducting a research study on Community Land Trusts (CLTs) for my dissertation. The 
purpose of this study is to show how the CLTs affect neighborhood change in the neighborhoods 
around the CLT units. I will gather data on as many CLTs as possible for my analysis. The 
findings from this study will help policy makers, land trust boards, and others interested in 
locating CLTs in their jurisdictions. It can help community leaders and residents know how to 
maximize the benefits of CLTs.  
 
This study has been approved by my graduate committee, supervised by Dr. Shannon Van Zandt, 
Director of the Center for Housing & Urban Development. It has also been approved by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Texas A&M University to protect privacy of those 
responding to this request. The information I am requesting will be held in confidence and not 
disclosed to anyone. The data I collect will be reported in the aggregate, so individual units will 
not be identifiable. By responding to this email, you are giving consent to participate in this 
research. 
 
To conduct my research, I need to know both the location of CLT units and when the first 
resident moved in (or the first year a unit was sold). 
 
Please reply to this email with the following information: 
 
1. Geographic location of units.  This will allow me to map the units and determine the census 
tract location.  You can provide me with one or more street addresses that will help me locate the 
units, or you can give me the tract number if you know it. Addresses will NOT be used to contact 
residents. [Addresses of CLT units] 
2. The year the first resident moved in (or the first built or purchased year as a CLT unit) 
 
 For example, 
 
Address Year 
1001 Harvey Rd. College Station, Texas 77840 2001 
(Street #, Street name, City, State) (year) 
 
 
If there are multiple units at the same address, please let me know the number of units at that 
address. 
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Or 
 
Census Tract Numbers Year 
4032 2001 
(Census Tract Number) (year) 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this research, please call me at (000) 000-0000 or e-
mail me at ooo0000@tamu.edu.  
In addition, I would be happy to provide the proposal of my research if needed. I will do my best 
to give an answer to your question. 
Your response is greatly appreciated! 
 
Thank you very much in advance for your time and assistance. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
Myungshik Choi 
 
Ph.D. Candidate, Urban and Regional Science Program, 
Department of Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning 
Research Fellow, Center for Housing & Urban Development 
Texas A&M University 
3137 TAMU 
College Station, TX 77843-3137 
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APPENDIX 4 
CONTACT EMAIL FOR QUALITATIVE APPROACH 
Title: The result of CLT research and a few questions 
 
Dear (Name of CLT practitioner), 
 
Hello! I am Myungshik, a Ph.D. candidate at Texas A&M University, who contacted 
you a few months ago. Again, I really appreciate your response. 
Thanks to your sincere assistance, I have completed the analysis of my quantitative data. 
I have attached a brief report on my findings. According to my analysis, your 
organization has CLT units in neighborhoods that have undergone some gentrification 
(i.e., an increase in housing costs, ownership rates, etc., according to census or American 
Community Survey data) between 2000 and 2010. Thus, I would like to ask you a few 
questions about actual conditions in these neighborhoods. 
As I told you at that time, I am conducting a research study to know how the CLTs affect 
gentrification. This study has been approved by my graduate committee, supervised by 
Dr. Shannon Van Zandt, Director of the Center for Housing & Urban Development. It 
has also been approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Texas A&M 
University to protect privacy of those responding to this request. Your identity will be 
held in confidence and not disclosed to anyone. By responding to this email, you are 
giving consent to participate in this research. 
Please respond to the questions either by email (ooo0000@tamu.edu) or phone (000-
000-0000) at your convenience. Your identity will not be disclosed by using a 
pseudonym when I would refer to your answer.  
 
Questions: 
1. According to my analysis, CLTs can help counteract the negative impacts of 
gentrification (supportive results #1~7). Do you think this is true in your CLT? Are there 
any results that are inconsistent with your experience? 
2. According to my analysis, CLTs help reduce the length of residence in gentrified 
neighborhoods while increasing it in non-gentrified neighborhoods. Do you think this is 
true in your CLT? Whether it is true or not, in your perspective, what do you think the 
reason for that might be? 
3. Do you have any other thoughts about the overall results of my analysis or about 
your CLT? 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this research, please call me at (000) 000-
0000 or e-mail me at ooo0000@tamu.edu. You can also reach my adviser, Shannon Van 
Zandt, at 000-000-0000 or ooooooooo@arch.tamu.edu.  Your response is greatly 
appreciated again! 
 
My next step is to analyze your answer compared to the result from the quantitative data. 
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I will be happy to provide the preliminary research result upon request.  
 
Thank you very much in advance for your time and assistance. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
Myungshik Choi 
 
Ph.D. Candidate, Urban and Regional Science Program, 
Department of Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning 
Research Fellow, Center for Housing & Urban Development 
Texas A&M University 
3137 TAMU 
College Station, TX 77843-3137 
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APPENDIX 5 
IRB CONSENT FORM 
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APPENDIX 6 
RESPONSES TO SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
< Questions > 
 
1. According to my analysis, CLTs can help counteract the negative impacts of 
gentrification (supportive results #1~7). Do you think this is true in your CLT? Are there 
any results that are inconsistent with your experience? 
2. According to my analysis, CLTs help reduce the length of residence in gentrified 
neighborhoods while increasing it in non-gentrified neighborhoods. Do you think this is 
true in your CLT? Whether it is true or not, in your perspective, what do you think the 
reason for that might be? 
3. Do you have any other thoughts about the overall results of my analysis or about your 
CLT? 
 
 
Respondent’s pseudonym: AM (Denver, CO) 
 
1. Absolutely I agree with that. CLT can counteract gentrification by stabilizing 
housing prices and maintain affordability. However, I am concerning that the 
neighborhood impacts could be small because of few number of CLT units. In 
many cases, because of not enough number of CLT units, CLT cannot truly have 
impact on their neighborhoods. So I think CLTs could have limited effects in this 
sense. I think the Dudley Neighborhood of Boston, the Champlain Housing Trust 
of Vermont, and the Sawmill CLT in Albuquerque are the most successful CLT 
with lots of units in their stocks, and they are all in the city areas. They have 
experienced gentrification or gentrification is obvious in those CLTs. 
2. I think residents who live in gentrified neighborhoods do not have a lot of 
options in residence, so they cannot move easily. However, those who live in 
non-gentrified neighborhoods have more options in residence, so they can move 
more than those live in gentrified neighborhoods. 
3. The Northeast Park Hill neighborhood where Dahlia Apartment located is not gentrified, 
while the North Park Hill neighborhood are gentrifying. Rather, I think, in the 
surrounding area of the Holly shopping center in the Northeast Park Hill, gentrification 
is happening economically but not yet completed. The Holly shopping center is the first 
commercial property and located 5 miles away from the rail system, business 
improvement district, and old airport area.  First time we purchased the Dahlia 
Apartment in 1990s, the apartment was half full. We renovated it, and now operate it, 
 182 
 
but the apartment is suffering from the negative reputation from the past. This is current 
challenge for the apartment. Both Jody and Dahlia apartments are land leased units.  
We do not only focus on housing field, but on commercial and transit-oriented 
development (TOD). We were established in 10 years ago, and now invest 24 projects 
most of them are near corridors between train and bus routes. 
I think every CLT has their own circumstances in various history, so differences among 
regions or areas should be considered.  
In fact, high quality schools are in wealthier neighborhoods (gentrified neighborhoods), 
and this can be one of the most important reasons in demographic change.  
Suggestion:  
The research focus on non-residential use of CLT is needed. 
CLT was originated from rural area (farmland). 4,000 acres of farmland, largest 
farmland owned by African-American is important case in the first CLT history. Thus, 
the research on demographic change in rural area through CLT would be interesting 
topic. 
 
 
Respondent’s pseudonym: KU (Portland, OR) 
 
1. Yes, I fully support this analysis. CLT's create permanently affordable 
homeownership opportunities in gentrifying neighborhoods. The CLT essentially 
locks in properties in appreciating areas and removes them from the speculative 
market, reserving them for low/moderate income families forever. Gentrification 
typically causes increases in housing prices and displacement of low/moderate 
income families. Often affecting families that have deep roots in the 
neighborhood being gentrified - CLTs are a true way to protect homes to provide 
homeownership opportunities in perpetuity. And homeownership is the one true 
way to allow a family to establish stable roots in a community. It also provides 
low/moderate income renters in gentrifying neighborhoods the opportunity to 
move into the stability of homeownership without having to leave their 
neighborhoods. Too often subsidized rentals in gentrifying neighborhoods are 
unable to transition families that want to become homeowners into affordable 
homeownership opportunities without displacement. This can result in families 
having to choose between staying in their neighborhoods as renters (close to 
jobs/schools/family/churches) OR buying a home of their own (often times far 
away from where they are living).  CLT's offer choice for families in this 
situation. CLT homeownership is an essential tool to prevent displacement of 
low/moderate income families from gentrifying neighborhoods.  
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2. This is an interesting finding and I would honestly have to evaluate this more 
closely to figure out the reasons behind this. My initial thoughts on this though 
are that the CLT homeownership opportunity is not enough to keep gentrifying 
neighborhoods appealing to these homeowners. Gentrification displaces whole 
communities - not just homeowners. Churches/businesses/jobs, etc. are all 
displaced. If a family is able to buy their home in a gentrifying neighborhood, but 
over the course of the next 10 years their friends/family/church/job, etc. are 
displaced, then they may want to follow their support system, rather than stay in 
the community.  This is just a guess and speaks to the need for communities to 
take a holistic approach to combat displacement caused by gentrification. CLTs 
can assist communities in locking in affordable commercial space as well. 
3. I think I shared most of them above. I'm very glad you are doing this research. 
We are working closely with our City on a plan to deal with displacement in 
some inner City neighborhoods. We are very vocal about the CLT being a highly 
effective model to do this, but we aren't getting the support we need locally. A 
well done research study could help our conversation move forward. 
 
Respondent’s pseudonym: ED (Delray Beach, FL) 
 
1. We are advocates for gentrification.  We do not live in a world of separatism nor 
want to tolerate NIMBYism.  The city of Delray Beach is very diverse and 
neighborhoods are not limited to one specific culture or race of people. 
2. This is not true of the neighborhoods we serve. 
3. I would like to know how you were able to measure the education levels of 
gentrified neighborhoods.  Gentrification from my perspective should not have a 
negative impact on housing in general.  It should not matter the ethnicity of my 
neighbor, what should be at the forefront is that we can all live in this world 
together regardless of race, color creed and financial status. 
 
Respondent’s pseudonym: JW (Minneapolis, MN) 
 
1. Absolutely.  We see numerous examples of households staying in communities 
through homeownership at a more affordable cost then the rent they were 
previously paying in the same neighborhood.  Rents that have been on the rise in 
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those neighborhoods were some of the drivers for the households to find a way 
(via homeownership) to stay. 
2. Interesting.  I don't know in our case.  As I think about the households assisted 
through the CLT in our community, I can think about just as many 
instances/examples that would run contrary to the above comments.  If the 
numbers suggest it, however, I'll probably be more inclined to agree with it. 
3. Not at this time. 
 
Respondent’s pseudonym: JH (Denver, CO) 
 
1. I believe that any housing program which provides below market pricing targeted 
to below median incomes will partially counteract impacts of gentrification.  I 
also believe that CLTs do a better job than other methods such as deed 
restrictions or covenants because CLT’s strive to assist home owners before and 
after they buy the home.  The stewardship practices inherent in the CLT model 
provide stability that comes with pre- and post-purchase counseling and support. 
2. I have no idea!  I am not sure length of residence is a meaningful measure for this 
topic.  Households move for all sorts of reasons that may be unrelated to a 
neighborhood.  Life realities as job changes, family composition changes (birth 
of children which create a need for a larger unit, divorce, empty nest) , financial 
hardship all cause a change in residence regardless of the occurrence of 
gentrification or not.  IF the housing stock in a neighborhood cannot offer 
affordable options that can accommodate a wide variety of household sizes, 
increased turnover will result. 
By definition, a gentrifying neighborhood’s cost of buying/renting is increasing 
at a rate faster than a stabilized neighborhood.  It seems to make sense to expect 
higher turnover of homes as investors and owners sell at substantially higher 
prices than they paid before the neighborhood turned around, 
3. I cannot give an opinion give to what you wrote without knowing what 
information you gathered and analyzed to achieve these results. What did you 
learn from the questions you asked that lead you to these results? I would need to 
see more background and quantitative analysis of the results of your research to 
accept these results. 
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Respondent’s pseudonym: RD (Carrboro, NC) 
 
1. If a negative impact is that low income people are forced out of a neighborhood 
when it gentrifies, then yes, CLT’s can counteract that trend.  Since we sell the 
home using a 99-year ground lease, and since we strive for permanent 
affordability, our homeowners are not typically priced out of neighborhoods. 
2. The greater stability is easily understood since CLT’s by definition remain 
engaged with their homeowners. We support our homeowners and this should 
help stabilize non-gentrified neighborhoods. I don’t understand why there would 
be less stability in gentrifying neighborhoods. That doesn’t make sense. 
3. Most of your conclusions make sense to me, but I don’t know what this means: 
CLTs stabilize abrupt age distribution fluctuation in gentrified neighborhoods. 
 
Respondent’s pseudonym: MA (Irvine, CA) 
 
1. Our CLT works within a high income community that is also a master planned 
community. Due to its master planning the issue of gentrification has not 
occurred. Rather the high incomes and high costs of housing have “priced out” 
lower income families and/or families that are first time home buyers.  The CLT 
has through its efforts created opportunities for first time home buyers. 
2. In our perspective, CLTs create stability as home owners of CLT properties tend 
to stay in their homes longer than many non-CLT properties.  This occurs in all 
areas of a community regardless of gentrification.  In areas that are undergoing 
gentrification, CLT home owners provide continuity and can be helpful in 
maintaining the community with historical information and context. Additionally, 
because of CLT requirements home owners tend to occupy their homes rather 
than lease them. Note that leasing is not prohibited but leases may not exceed the 
affordable cost per our agreements. This deters people from considering a CLT 
home has an investment opportunity. 
3. I believe CLTs generally support community efforts to create stability and to 
provide for diversification both economically and culturally.  It is the role of 
community land trusts to enhance the community, hence the reason why land 
trusts have the word “community” in their name. 
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Respondent’s pseudonym: WP (Albuquerque, NM) 
 
1. Yes, I agree that the CLT model does generally counteract the negative impacts 
of gentrification. The ability to restrict the resale price of homes and our mandate 
to sell to buyers earning 80% or less of Area Median Income means there will 
always be affordable housing even as the rest of the neighborhood becomes 
pricier. 
There are two additional elements worth considering, however. One is the issue 
of property taxes. This is a topic that is handled differently within every county 
(as they are the taxing body). We have an arrangement that helps control the cost 
of high property taxes which I can share if you wish, but I do not know that every 
CLT enjoys this relationship with their County Assessor. Furthermore, some 
states (particularly east coast states) have very high property taxes. For us here, 
older neighborhoods struggling with displacement due to gentrification are really 
struggling with increasing property tax burdens. 
Secondly, there is also the possibility of complications arising because of lenders. 
Finding lenders who will originate mortgages for leasehold ownership is already 
a bit challenging. On top of that, affordable housing in a gentrifying area could 
create problems with lenders pulling back because census tracts may no longer 
show up as low or moderate income. These products typically target the 80% or 
less of AMI demographic but if the lender is using this data (census-identified 
low to moderate income neighborhoods) to identify geographic areas where their 
lending is most needed, they may deem a gentrifying area as no longer in need. 
The same goes for lenders who give in low to moderate income areas to get CRA 
credits. 
2. I am not sure why this would be true. I have observed here, for example, that 
younger buyers (with or without children) tend to have lower tenures than older 
buyers. I suspect this is because the younger household views the CLT model as 
a stepping stone to more conventional homeownership whereas the older 
residents have perhaps never been able to own a home and are very committed to 
achieving that goal and remaining there until the end. Another note about 
younger households is that they are more mobile by nature – jobs transfer them, 
they work for the military, etc. They are in a less physically stable position 
because of larger economic forces that may require them to move in pursuit of 
employment, may be transferred, reassigned or deployed. This is less of an issue 
for older households. 
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3. I was not sure why the issue of education would not be more impacted by the 
CLT model as other stats show that stable households, and especially those that 
own, tend to achieve higher levels of educational attainment. 10 years is a long 
time, but perhaps not long enough to track this impact. Or maybe there are other 
economic factors at play (people whose ambition to attend college were disrupted 
by the recession for example) 
 
Respondent’s pseudonym: JP (Riviera Beach, FL) 
 
1. CLTs do work to provide a more affordable housing choice in market rate 
neighborhoods for low income families. The placement of CLT homes can help 
offset the negative effects of gentrification. I can see how your statement 
regarding the ability of CLTs to stabilize abrupt age distribution fluctuation is 
true, but I can see where the opposite can be true. If we have an elderly client 
interested in buying one of our CLT homes in a predominantly elderly 
neighborhood we will not prohibit it. Then again, I can only speak for our CLT 
homes. A majority of our owners tend to be starter families in a well-established 
family neighborhood. We have not witnessed what you claim to be true. I also 
cannot see how CLTs lessen the loss of rental units within gentrified 
neighborhoods. CLTs would not affect the rental units within the neighborhood 
and are not considered rental units. They are owner occupied units. 
2. In my perspective I can see how your findings can be correct. If a neighborhood 
is well-established with less “turnover” the residents will be more apt to maintain 
their residence there. Our CLT homes have minimal turnover. The initial 
residences, with the exception of one unit, are still the current owners. 
3. I think for the most part your analysis may be correct. CLTs prove to be a very 
good means of providing affordable housing, especially for Palm Beach County, 
Florida. With housing prices constantly fluctuating it provides some stability for 
the potential homebuyers. 
 
Respondent’s pseudonym: AL (Westby, WI) 
 
1. I would say that CLT’s generally counteract the negative impacts of 
gentrification on neighborhoods.  CLT’s have the ability to impact all of those 
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areas in a positive way.  However, I would say that there are times when they 
may not lessen the loss of rental units.  In our program we purchase foreclosed, 
blighted, vacant, abandoned, and condemned properties and rehabilitate them or 
demolish them and build new single family owner occupied homes.  Some of 
these properties we are purchasing may have been rental properties at one point 
in time.  Maybe the landlord lost their tenants and decided they no longer wanted 
to be a landlord and sold the property.  Maybe the landlord went into foreclosure 
and the tenants had to relocate due to the foreclosure.  Those are just  few 
examples but they are instances where I can see how our CLT program would in 
fact increase the loss of rental units.  These rental units were not quality units and 
probably barely habitable.  We also have a very small program so the effect on 
rental units would be minimal.    I do not definitively know that this has 
happened with any of the properties we have redeveloped but it is a possibility 
because our area has a lot of single family homes, duplexes, etc. used as rentals. 
2. I don’t really know if that statement is true or not.  I can see many of our CLT 
homeowners as being long term committed homeowners.  We are only 5 years 
old but we have not yet had a resale.  Maybe the home was sold to someone at 
the upper end of the allowable income limit who was just using the CLT as a 
quality starter home before they moved along to a bigger and better home.  
Maybe their original intentions were to not keep the home longer than a few 
years.  I think that lower income CLT homeowners (those at 60% CMI and 
below) seem committed to staying for long periods of time since they know that 
they will not get a quality affordable home that they can afford elsewhere since 
many of our homes are brand new and even with their equity share they will not 
find another brand new home for the price of their CLT home for many, many 
years. 
3. None. 
 
Respondent’s pseudonym: PE (Bainbridge Island, WA) 
 
1. Yes, I think this is generally true according to my experience. 
2. I am not sure whether or not it is true (my experience isn’t that broad yet) but I 
think that if it is true it could be because living in a gentrified neighborhood is 
typically more expensive overall with more expensive grocery stores, restaurants 
etc.. and maybe this isn’t sustainable or desirable for CLT owners.  These 
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neighborhoods may become more crowded too and the general lifestyle changes 
and folks may not like this either. 
3. I think your results point out what most of us in this work know about CLTs.  
They make housing more stable in high cost markets and allow for more 
diversity.  In my area of the country, we are finding that ethnic diversity is very 
hard to obtain and we are working on more methods to do this. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
